Examining the systemic accident analysis research-practice gap by Peter Underwood (7152638)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough University as a PhD thesis by the 
author and is made available in the Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
  
 
 
 
Examining the Systemic Accident Analysis 
Research-Practice Gap 
 
by 
Peter J. Underwood 
 
 
 
Doctoral Thesis 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of 
Philosophy of Loughborough University 
October 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
© by Peter J. Underwood, 2013 
i 
 
Abstract 
In order to enhance safety and prevent the recurrence of major accidents it is 
necessary to understand why they occur. This understanding is gained by 
utilising accident causation theory to explain why a certain combination of 
events, conditions and actions led to a given outcome: the process of 
accident analysis. 
At present, the systems approach to accident analysis is arguably the 
dominant research paradigm. Based on the concepts of systems theory, it 
views accidents as the result of unexpected and uncontrolled relationships 
between a system’s components. Various researchers claim that use of the 
systems approach, via systemic accident analysis, provides a deeper 
understanding of accidents when compared with traditional theories. 
However, the systems approach and its analysis techniques are yet to be 
widely adopted by the practitioner community and, therefore, a research-
practice gap exists. The implication of such a gap is that practitioners may be 
applying outdated accident causation theory and, consequently, producing 
ineffective safety recommendations. 
The aim of this thesis was to develop the current understanding of the 
systemic accident analysis research-practice gap by providing a description 
of the gap, considering its extent and examining issues associated with 
bridging it. Four studies were conducted to achieve this aim. The first study 
involved an evaluation of the systemic accident analysis literature and 
techniques, in order to understand how their characteristics could influence 
the research-practice gap. The findings of the study revealed that the 
systems approach is not presented in a consistent or clear manner within the 
research literature and that this may hinder its acceptance by practitioners. In 
addition, a number of issues were identified (e.g. model validation, analyst 
bias and limited usage guidance) which may influence the use of systemic 
analysis methods within industry. The examination of how the analysis 
activities of practitioners may contribute to the gap motivated Study 2. This 
study involved conducting semi-structured interviews with 42 safety 
professionals and various factors, which affect the awareness, adoption and 
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usage of the systems approach and its analysis methods, were highlighted. 
The combined findings of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that the systemic 
accident analysis research-practice gap is multifaceted in nature. Study 3 
investigated the extent of the gap by considering whether the most widely 
used analysis technique (the Swiss Cheese Model) can provide a systems 
approach to accident analysis. The analysis of a major rail accident was 
performed with a model based on the Swiss Cheese Model and two systemic 
analysis methods. The outputs and usage of the three analysis tools were 
compared and indicate that the Swiss Cheese Model does provide a means 
of conducting systemic accident analysis. Therefore, the extent of the 
research-practice gap may not be as considerable as some proponents of 
the systems approach suggest. The final study aimed to gain an insight into 
the application of a systemic accident analysis method by practitioners, in 
order to understand whether it meets their needs. Six trainee accident 
investigators took part in an accident investigation simulation and 
subsequently analysed the data collected during the exercise with the 
Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes model. The outputs of 
the participants’ analyses were studied along with the evaluation feedback 
they provided via a questionnaire and focus group. The main findings of the 
study indicate that the analysis technique does not currently meet the 
usability or graphical output requirements of practitioners and, unless these 
issues are addressed, will struggle to gain acceptance within industry. 
When considering the research findings as a whole a number of issues are 
highlighted. Firstly, given the benefits of adopting the systems approach, 
efforts to bridge the systemic accident analysis research-practice gap should 
be made. However, the systemic analysis methods may not be best suited to 
analyse every type of accident and, therefore, should be considered as one 
part of an investigator’s ‘analysis toolkit’. Adapting the systemic analysis 
methods to meet the needs of practitioners and communicating the systems 
approach more effectively represent two options for bridging the gap. 
However, due to the multidimensional nature of the gap and the wide variety 
of individuals, organisations and industries that perform accident analysis, it 
seems likely that tailored solutions will be required. Furthermore, due to the 
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differing needs of the research and practice communities, efforts to bridge 
the gap should focus on collaboration between the two communities rather 
than attempting to close the gap entirely. 
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 Chapter 1 1 
Chapter 1 – Thesis overview 
1.1   Problem statement 
The need to understand why accidents occur has existed in various forms for 
centuries, with major accidents often motivating interest in system safety and 
highlighting the dangers associated with safety-critical industries (Cooter and 
Luckin, 1997; Saleh et al., 2010). Indeed, demands to improve safety are 
usually made following accidents which involve a high number of casualties 
(e.g. Chernobyl and Bhopal), significant environmental damage (e.g. the 
Exxon Valdez and Deep Water Horizon oil spills) and/or destruction of 
symbolic technological assets (e.g. Concorde and space shuttle Columbia). 
Stakeholders in such events are found throughout various elements of 
society, e.g. governments, regulators, academic and industry experts, 
management teams, individual employees and the general public. 
Consequently, various incentives exist to prevent accident recurrence, e.g.: 
the moral and ethical imperative to prevent injuries and death; avoidance of 
the financial losses associated with replacing assets, damaged reputation 
and litigation; the legal requirements to meet regulatory standards.  
Satisfying the demand to prevent accidents requires the determination of why 
certain combinations of events, conditions and actions led to specific 
outcomes, i.e. accident analysis (Hollnagel et al., 2008). At a fundamental 
level, accident analysis involves applying knowledge of accident causation to 
the data collected during an investigation in order to understand what 
happened and why. Accident analysis is an integral part of the larger 
accident investigation process, which involves other activities such as 
investigation planning and coordination, data collection and the production of 
recommendations (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). Furthermore, it can 
influence the collection of data (i.e. as information is analysed, new lines of 
enquiry can develop) and provide the basis for safety recommendations, as 
indicated by the generic accident analysis procedure described by Salmon et 
al. (2011 p.9) (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 - Generic accident analysis process. From Salmon et al. (2011). 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the nature and understanding of accident causation 
has changed dramatically over the last century. The systems approach to 
accident analysis is now, arguably, the dominant paradigm within safety 
research. Based on systems theory, it views accidents as emergent 
phenomena, which result from uncontrolled system component interactions, 
and necessitates a holistic examination of socio-technical systems (STS). 
Advocates of the systems approach (e.g. Dekker, 2011; Hollnagel, 2012; 
Leveson, 2012) propose that traditional theories of accident causation (which 
suggest that accidents are caused by linear sequences of cause-effect 
events) are no longer capable of accounting for the complexity of modern-
day STS. To facilitate the application of the systems approach, a number of 
systemic accident analysis (SAA) models and methods have been produced.  
As indicated in Figure 1, the use of analytical methods plays an important 
role in the analysis process, as they provide a structured means of applying 
accident causation theory. Various researchers (e.g. Leveson, 2001; 
Rasmussen, 1997) have been employing and recommending the use of SAA 
techniques for over a decade. However, these analysis tools are yet to be 
widely adopted by the practitioner community. This suggests that a research-
practice gap (RPG) exists in the domain of SAA. The key implication of such 
a gap is that practitioners may be applying outdated knowledge of accident 
causation during their investigations and, therefore, producing ineffective 
safety recommendations. 
It seems clear, therefore, that the SAA RPG needs to be addressed. 
However, there is no defined explanation for the presence of this gap, nor is 
there an understanding of the extent of the gap or how it could be bridged. 
Tackling these knowledge gaps provides the motivation for the studies 
presented in this thesis.  
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1.2   Research aims 
This research aims to further the current understanding of the SAA RPG by 
meeting the following objectives: 
• Provide a description of the SAA RPG by identifying and evaluating the 
factors which contribute to it 
• Consider the extent of the RPG by comparing the analysis processes and 
methods used by the research and practitioner communities 
• Examine issues associated with bridging the SAA RPG 
1.3   Research approach 
1.3.1   Research paradigm 
Scientific research should be conducted systematically, with scepticism and 
an ethical approach, if it is to be considered as good quality (Robson, 2002 
p.18). Clearly it is important to produce a high standard of research and 
adopting a suitable philosophical standpoint is a key element in achieving this, 
particularly as it can guide the choice of methods (Snape and Spencer, 2003). 
A wide range of ontological positions exist which have differing and, in some 
cases, extreme views of science (e.g. positivism and constructivism). A 
pragmatic approach to research can, however, be maintained by adopting a 
realist perspective (Robson, 2011). Various forms of realism exist, e.g. 
‘critical realism’, ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘scientific realism’, with each 
brand emphasising different characteristics of the realism paradigm (Robson, 
2011). However, the underlying concept of realism acknowledges the 
existence of both the real world that operates independently through natural 
necessity and the individual person with a personal perspective of the world 
(Bhaskar, 1975). Therefore, it aims to achieve a balance between the post-
positivist and constructionist paradigms (Robson, 2002 p.42-43). Taking this 
ontological position allows the researcher to consider a wide range of 
methods, as described in Figure 2. Due to these advantages, the research 
presented in this thesis was conducted from the realist perspective. 
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Figure 2 - A representative range of methods and their related research 
paradigms. From Healy and Perry (2000). 
1.3.2   Mixed methods approach  
The mixed methods approach to research combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, approaches, concepts and/or language into 
a single study (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It has been described as 
the third research paradigm (e.g. Johnson et al., 2007) and offers an 
expansive and creative form of research which includes the use of inductive 
and deductive approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The use of a 
mixed methods strategy precludes the adoption of a quantitative or 
qualitative purist research philosophy (e.g. positivism or constructivism) and 
is compatible with the realism approach adopted in this thesis (Healy and 
Perry, 2000).  
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) recommend a pragmatic approach in 
order to combine the insights provided by qualitative and quantitative 
research into a workable solution. In other words, research approaches 
should be mixed in ways that offer the best opportunities for answering 
research questions (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Various benefits are 
provided by taking a mixed methods approach, such as: the improved validity 
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of findings resulting from method triangulation, the weaknesses of one 
method can be overcome by the use of another technique and it provides a 
depth and breadth of research which is difficult to achieve with a single 
method (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Menon and Cowger, 2010; 
Royce et al., 2010). The drawbacks of a mixed methods approach include: 
the difficulty of integrating different types of data, an increased resource 
demand and the requirement to learn a wide range of methods (Brannen, 
2005; Bronstein and Kovacs, 2013; Bryman, 2007). However, the benefits of 
performing mixed methods research were considered, in this instance, to 
outweigh the drawbacks and the decision was taken to utilise this approach. 
Each study was performed sequentially, however, where necessary, different 
methods were used concurrently within the studies. The selection and usage 
of the various methods employed within this research are described in detail 
within the study-related chapters (Chapters 3-6). However, to illustrate the 
nature of the mixed-methods approach taken, Table 1 presents the methods 
utilised in this research. 
Study Qualitative methods used Quantitative methods used 
1 Document analysis Document citation analysis 
2 Semi-structured interviews Analysis model awareness questionnaire 
3 Application of accident analysis methods n/a 
4 
Analysis workshop Analysis method evaluation 
questionnaire Group interview 
Table 1 - Methods used during research 
1.3.3   Ethical approval 
This research was approved by the Loughborough University Ethics 
Committee. All study participants were provided with an information sheet 
(which detailed the purpose of the given study, the nature of their 
involvement and data protection information) and gave their written consent 
to take part. 
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1.4   Thesis structure 
This thesis contains eight chapters which are briefly summarised below.  
1.4.1   Chapter 1 
This introductory chapter outlines the problem statement, the research aims 
and approach and the structure of the thesis. 
1.4.2   Chapter 2 
An overview of the literature that creates the context for the research 
contained in the thesis is presented in this chapter. The reviewed topics 
include: key accident causation theories, the systems approach to accident 
analysis, the evolution of accident analysis models and methods and the 
current evidence indicating the presence of an SAA RPG. 
1.4.3   Chapter 3 
In this chapter the SAA literature and analysis techniques are evaluated in 
order to understand how their characteristics contribute to the SAA RPG. 
Initially, the SAA literature is examined to determine how it incorporates and 
presents the core concepts of systems theory. The development process, 
systems approach characteristics and usage characteristics of the three most 
popular SAA techniques are then evaluated. The findings of the study are 
discussed to highlight a number of factors which may influence the SAA RPG. 
The method evaluation component of this study was published in two 
conference proceedings and, subsequently, as a book chapter (see 
Underwood and Waterson, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Underwood and Waterson 
(2012a) can be seen in Appendix 1.1. 
1.4.4   Chapter 4 
This chapter follows on from the research presented in Chapter 3 and 
examines the SAA RPG from a different perspective. Safety experts were 
interviewed to understand the factors stemming from practice which 
contribute to the SAA RPG. In combination with the findings of Study 1, an 
overall description of the SAA RPG is provided and the factors which 
contribute to it are discussed. 
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The findings of this study were published in the Accident Analysis & 
Prevention journal: Underwood and Waterson (2013a) is presented in 
Appendix 1.2.  
1.4.5   Chapter 5 
The extent of the SAA RPG is investigated in this chapter. The academic 
debate on the ability of the most popular analysis technique, the Swiss 
Cheese Model (SCM), to conduct SAA is presented. A major accident case 
study is then analysed using a practitioner-developed SCM-based model and 
two SAA methods (AcciMap and the Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling 
and Processes model). The analysis outputs and usage of the techniques are 
compared and the issue of whether or not the SCM can offer a systems 
approach to accident analysis is discussed. An assessment of the extent of 
the SAA RPG is then presented. 
The findings of this study were also published in the Accident Analysis & 
Prevention journal, as part of a special issue on ‘systems thinking in 
workplace safety and health’: Underwood and Waterson (2013b) is presented 
in Appendix 1.3. 
1.4.6   Chapter 6 
This chapter follows on from the findings of Study 2 (see Chapter 4), which 
indicate that SAA methods must meet the needs of practitioners if they are to 
be employed. A practitioner evaluation of the Systems Theoretic Accident 
Modelling and Processes model (STAMP) is presented in this chapter. Six 
trainee accident investigators performed a STAMP analysis on data collected 
during an accident investigation simulation and assessed the effectiveness 
and usability of the method. The findings of the study are discussed with 
regards to how the usage characteristics of STAMP may affects its use by 
practitioners. 
1.4.7   Chapter 7 
A discussion of the research contained in the thesis is provided in this 
chapter. Initially, a brief summary of the studies is presented. The 
overarching topics of whether the SAA RPG needs to be bridged, how this 
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can be achieved and if it is possible to bridge the gap are then examined. 
Finally, the limitations of the research, as a whole, are discussed. 
1.4.8   Chapter 8 
This chapter presents the overall conclusions of the research and the 
contribution to knowledge provided by this thesis. Future work is then 
proposed which could follow on from this thesis along with suggestions for 
broader SAA RPG research. A graphical summary of the thesis is provided in 
Figure 3. 
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Chapter 1 – Thesis overview
• Problem statement
• Research aims
• Research approach
• Thesis structure
Chapter 2 - Accident causation and analysis, the systems approach and research-practice gaps
• Theories of accident causation
• The systems approach
• Accident analysis models and methods
• The systemic accident analysis research-practice gap
Chapter 7 – Discussion
• Summary of research
• Does the SAA research-practice gap need to be bridged?
• Bridging the SAA research-practice gap
• Can the SAA research-practice gap be bridged?
• Methodological considerations
Chapter 3 - Study 1: Evaluating the systemic accident analysis models, methods and literature
• Identify the key components of systems theory
• Examine the SAA literature
• Identify and evaluate popular SAA models and methods
Chapter 4 - Study 2: Factors contributing to the SAA research-practice gap
• 42 semi-structured interviews with safety experts
• Understand how the awareness of, and need for, SAA within the practitioner community and their 
current analysis approaches may hinder the adoption and use of SAA
• Probe deeper into the issues stemming from research which contribute to the SAA RPG
Chapter 5 - Study 3: Systemic accident analysis vs. the Swiss Cheese Model
• Analyse a major accident with an SCM-based model and two SAA methods
• Compare the analysis outputs and usage of the techniques
• Discuss whether or not the SCM can apply the systems approach and the extent of the SAA RPG
Chapter 6 - Study 4: Evaluating a systemic accident analysis model
• STAMP analysis workshop conducted, method evaluation questionnaire and focus group employed
• STAMP used and evaluated by practitioners
• Usage characteristics of STAMP discussed
Chapter 8 – Conclusions and future work
• Conclusions
• Knowledge contribution
• Future work
 
Figure 3 - Thesis structure
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Chapter 2 – Accident causation and analysis, the 
systems approach and research-practice gaps 
2.1   Chapter overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature pertaining to four topics 
which create the context for the research presented in this thesis. Initially, 
some of the key accident causation theories are described, in order to 
highlight the changing perspectives on accidents which have occurred over 
the last century. This culminates with a detailed description of the systems 
approach to accident analysis, including the development and key 
components of systems theory. The evolution of accident analysis models 
and methods is subsequently presented to describe how accident causation 
theory has been applied by researchers and practitioners. This leads to the 
final topic: the current evidence indicating the presence of an SAA RPG. 
2.2   Theories of accident causation 
The literature on accident causation and system safety is extensive but 
fragmented (Le Coze, 2013b; Saleh et al., 2010). However, what can be 
discerned from studying the literature is that various theories, concepts and 
categorisations of accident causation have been created and developed over 
time. Why has this progression occurred?  The answer lies in the 
continuously changing nature of accident causation. The mechanisms of 
accident causation have evolved due to the ever-increasing complexity of 
STS. This increased system complexity is a culmination of various factors, 
such as: the rapid pace of technological advances, competitiveness of the 
business environment and more complex relationships between humans and 
technology (Leveson, 2012; Rasmussen, 1997). The ability of humans to 
design technology, which is so complex that it is not fully understood, has 
been a reoccurring issue throughout history; the result being increased risk 
and accidents until scientific and engineering knowledge has caught up 
(Leveson, 2012 p.4). Therefore, the development of accident causation 
theory is a product of analysts identifying and going beyond the limitations of 
contemporary theories. An overview of the literature is presented in the 
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remainder of this section, highlighting some of the important themes and 
ideas. 
2.2.1   The three ages of safety 
Until the nineteen century, the prevention of accidents was viewed from a 
practical, rather than scientific, perspective (Hale and Hovden, 1998). Three 
ages of scientific study followed, described by Hale and Hovden (1998) as 
the age of technology, human factors and safety management, respectively. 
This categorisation illustrates how the understanding of accidents has 
changed over time and provides a useful context for studying the 
development of other accident causation theories, as detailed in the rest of 
Section  2.2.  
The age of technology, lasting until after World War 2, saw interest in 
accidents stem from a technical standpoint. For example, during most of the 
nineteenth century UK factory inspectors were only concerned with accidents 
resulting from inadequate/absent machinery guarding; other accidents were 
considered as unpreventable or the concern of the victim (Hale and Glendon, 
1987). This suggests that accident causation was perceived as the result of a 
simple cause, i.e. a failure of something; a perspective Hollnagel (2012) 
describes as ‘simple linear thinking’. The second (human factors) age 
originated from the post-World War 1 research conducted into personnel 
selection, training and motivation as accident prevention measures (Hale and 
Hovden, 1998). From the 1960’s the rising influence of ergonomics and 
developments in probabilistic risk assessments revealed that technical 
prevention measures were no longer considered sufficient to prevent 
accidents. Accidents were no longer viewed as either purely technical or 
human in nature, i.e. human factors were seen as a major influence on 
accident causation. The dominance of the technical age of safety had come 
to an end and the human factors age came to the fore. 
The age of safety management began in the 1980’s when optimising the 
interface between individuals and technology was no longer considered 
adequate to maintain safety. Safety was seen as a management issue and 
research into the topic focused on issues such as quality assurance, self-
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regulation and safety culture (DeJoy et al., 2004; Kjellén and Hovden, 1993). 
As such, accidents were perceived as ‘organisational’ in nature and views of 
accident causation moved towards complex linear thinking and beyond to 
dynamic systems thinking (Hollnagel, 2012). Whilst the three ages of safety 
describe the changing perspectives of accident causation it is notable that 
they supplement, rather than substitute, each other, i.e. technical and human 
factors safety is still important (Hovden et al., 2010). 
2.2.2   Man-made disasters 
The man-made disasters (MMD) theory, devised by Turner (1978), was one 
of the first scholarly accounts which suggested that industrial accidents could 
be carefully analysed, rather than treated as sudden ‘Acts of God’ (Saleh et 
al., 2010). The overarching message of MMD theory is that the safe 
operation of technological systems can be subverted by ‘normal’ processes 
of organisational life, despite the best intentions of those involved (Pidgeon 
and O'Leary, 2000). Three key contributions to the understanding of 
accidents are provided by MMD theory: (1) MMD are a class of events which 
are underpinned by common patterns and can be analysed to improve 
system safety; (2) accidents develop over long incubation periods, during 
which a long chain of concealed errors and partially understood events 
increase system vulnerability; (3) accidents cannot be described as purely 
technical, i.e. they arise from interactions between the human and 
organisational elements of STS (Aini and Fakhrul-Razi, 2010; Pidgeon and 
O'Leary, 2000; Saleh et al., 2010). The theory of MMD was subsequently 
used as the foundation for an extensive amount of research into accident 
causation (e.g. Le Coze, 2013a; Pidgeon, 1997; Reason, 1990; Saleh et al., 
2010). 
2.2.3   Normal accident theory 
In his work on normal accident theory (NAT), Perrow (1984 p.4) states that 
most high-risk systems exhibit special characteristics which make accidents 
in them inevitable. The two system characteristics which were deemed by 
Perrow (1984) to influence the causation of accidents were ‘interactive 
complexity’ and ‘coupling’. Interactive complexity refers to how system 
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components interact with one another. Systems with a high degree of 
interactive complexity can have independent failures, each insignificant in 
itself, which interact in unexpected and even incomprehensible ways (Perrow, 
1994). Factors which produce complex interactions include: the presence of 
multi-functional components, many control parameters with potential 
interaction and a limited understanding of processes (Hollnagel and Speziali, 
2008; Shrivastava et al., 2009). Such systems are difficult to understand and 
are unstable due to their narrow limits of safe operation (Perrow, 1984). 
However, accidents in a highly complex system will only spread and become 
serious if the system is also tightly coupled. Coupling in a system essentially 
refers to the slack available to recover from an accident. Various issues 
contribute to a tightly coupled system, such as processes which occur rapidly 
and cannot be stopped, failed components that cannot be isolated and there 
being only one way to maintain safe operations (Perrow, 1984 p.5). The 
worst combination for accident potential that a system can have, therefore, is 
high interactive complexity and tight coupling (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). 
Perrow (1984) examined the characteristics of a number of systems, of which 
nuclear power plants were considered to be the most prone to accidents (see 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 - System interaction-coupling matrix. From Perrow (1984). 
Given that accidents in highly complex and tightly coupled systems are 
inevitable, according to NAT, Perrow (1984) suggests that such systems 
should be abandoned or radically redesigned to lower their level or 
complexity and/or coupling. Perrow (1984) also suggests that building 
technical redundancy into a system will only increase the level of complexity. 
Importantly, NAT describes major accidents as 'systems accidents', rather 
than the failure of system components (operators, equipment, procedures, 
environment etc.) where no significant unexpected interaction of failures 
occur (Perrow, 1994). In other words, it is how failures combine with each 
other which will affect the outcome of an accident, rather than the individual 
failures themselves. Notably, the idea that system complexity can create 
unexpected/incomprehensible component interactions is in contrast with 
MMD theory, which suggests that ‘warning sign’ events are present but either 
missed, overlooked or ignored before an accident happens (Hopkins, 2001). 
2.2.4   High reliability theory 
Despite its recognised importance, NAT has received criticism for its 
oversimplification of technical solutions to, and fatalistic view of, accidents 
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which are of limited use to safety professionals (e.g. Marais et al., 2004; 
Saleh et al., 2010; Shrivastava et al., 2009). This led to the development of 
an alternative theory which, rather than focussing on how accidents occur, 
concentrates on what organisations do to successfully promote and ensure 
safety in complex systems. This high reliability theory (HRT) is based on the 
studies of various successful organisations, such as naval aircraft carriers 
(e.g. Rochlin et al., 1987), air traffic control systems (e.g. La Porte, 1988) and 
nuclear power plants (e.g. Bourrier, 1996). These types of organisations must 
not have major accidents as their work is too important and the effects of 
significant failures too disastrous, i.e. they must be highly reliable (LaPorte 
and Consolini, 1991). Although variation exists in the literature regarding the 
definition of a high reliability organisation (HRO), the characteristics of an 
HRO can be summarised as: (1) a preoccupation with failure and 
organisational learning; (2) a commitment to and consensus on production 
and safety as concomitant organisational goals; (3) centralised and 
decentralised operations (for normal and hazardous situations respectively) 
and deferring to experts when required; (4) organisational slack and 
redundancy (Saleh et al., 2010). According to HRT, organisations will remain 
safe if they are totally committed to high reliability practices (Rosa, 2005). 
Due to their differing theoretical standpoints, an extensive (and on-going) 
HRT-NAT debate exists within the scientific literature (e.g. Hopkins, 2013; 
Sagan, 1993; Shrivastava et al., 2009). 
2.2.5   Drift into failure 
The study of how people and organisations can, over time, incrementally 
adjust their perception of risk to the point where hazardous activities are 
considered normal has been studied (at least) since the 1970’s (e.g. Millman, 
1977). The seminal work of Vaughan (1996) provides a detailed example of 
how such ‘normalisation of deviance’ can contribute to accidents. The historic 
ethnography presented by Vaughan (1996) describes how NASA’s decision 
to proceed with the final launch of space shuttle Challenger was not simply a 
result of managerial wrongdoing. Rather, NASA was exposed to numerous 
production pressures which became institutionalised and had a nuanced, 
unacknowledged and pervasive effect on decision making. Signals of danger 
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were normalised so that they became aligned with organisational goals and 
were considered accepted behaviour. Vaughan (1996) suggests that these 
issues can apply to all types of organisations and that accidents result from 
the ‘banality of organisational life’ combined with a highly complex and 
competitive environment, rather than individual failures or intentional 
managerial misconduct.  
The normalisation of deviance can, therefore, result in the ‘drift’ of an 
organisation towards (and beyond) the limits of safety, i.e. a drift into failure. 
This issue was also addressed by Rasmussen (1997), who remarks that 
there will be a natural migration of activities toward the boundary of 
acceptable performance due to the constraints and pressures placed on 
individuals and systems. This migration will occur as individuals vary their 
performance to increase their productivity and adapt to changes in local 
conditions. Whilst the local violations of an individual may not be visible in 
other parts of the system, they will re-shape the boundary of acceptable 
performance of other people and, ultimately, contribute to a systematic 
degradation of a system’s defences (Rasmussen, 1997) (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5 - Organisational drift mechanisms. From Rasmussen (1997). 
The concept of ‘drift into failure’ was further elaborated on by Dekker (2011), 
who suggests that such a process is affected by five factors: (1) scarcity of 
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and competition for resources; (2) decrementalism of operational practices, 
i.e. normalisation of deviance; (3) sensitive dependence on initial conditions, 
i.e. the butterfly effect; (4) unruly technology; (5) contribution of the protective 
structure (e.g. regulations, safety committees etc.) via poor knowledge, lack 
of access and information, conflicting goals and decisions that only make 
local sense. Research into organisational drift continues to take place across 
a number of industries, such as road transport (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012b), 
rail (e.g. Leach and Berman, 2012) and healthcare (e.g. Samaras, 2012). 
2.2.6   Resilience engineering 
It is usual and traditional for safety efforts to focus on reducing unwanted 
events, e.g. accidents (Hollnagel et al., 2011). However, proponents of 
resilience engineering (RE) (e.g. Hollnagel et al., 2006; Hollnagel et al., 2011) 
suggest that it is easier and more effective to improve safety by increasing 
the number of things that go right, rather than reducing the number of things 
that go wrong. Moving away from the common understanding of ‘freedom 
from unacceptable risk’, RE favours defining safety as the ability to succeed 
under varying conditions (Hollnagel et al., 2011). In order for a system to be 
resilient it must be able to respond to events, monitor on-going developments, 
anticipate future threats and opportunities and learn from past successes and 
failures. Whilst RE has become an established approach in the field of safety 
science it has drawn criticism on several issues, e.g. the introduction of a 
new vocabulary to safety research and a lack of analytical frameworks for 
investigating resilience (Le Coze, 2013a; Saurin and Carim Júnior, 2011). 
The development of the theories described in Section  2.2 is graphically 
represented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 - Development of accident causation theories 
2.3   The systems approach 
Despite the advent of RE, significant effort is still directed towards the study 
of accidents and, at present, the systems approach to understanding major 
accidents is arguably the dominant research paradigm (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; 
Leveson, 2012; Salmon et al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2012). Utilising concepts 
of system theory, it views accidents as the result of unexpected, uncontrolled 
relationships between a system’s constituent parts. Systems must, therefore, 
be analysed holistically as whole entities, rather than considering their parts 
in isolation. Traditional theories of accident causation suggest that complex 
systems accidents are caused by sequences of causal events which are 
initiated by a single ‘root cause’ event, such as catastrophic equipment failure 
or an unsafe human action. However, as system complexity has increased 
over time, many accidents (e.g. space shuttle Columbia; Comair flight 5191) 
have not simply resulted from such trigger events. Instead these accidents 
emerge as complex phenomena within the normal operational variability of a 
system (de Carvalho, 2011). 
Describing accidents in a sequential (cause-effect) fashion is, therefore, 
arguably inadequate. It can also lead to equipment or humans at the ‘sharp 
end’ of a system being incorrectly blamed for an accident. This represents a 
missed opportunity to learn important lessons about system safety and how 
to prevent accident recurrence. The use of the systems approach, via SAA, 
attempts to avoid these limitations and it has been used as the conceptual 
foundation for various SAA techniques, such as: AcciMap (Rasmussen, 
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1997), the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004; 
2012) and STAMP (Leveson, 2004; 2012). 
2.3.1   Development of systems theory 
The origins of systems theory can be traced back to the theoretical biology 
studies of von Bertalanffy in the 1920’s, in which he discussed the idea of 
organism-level behaviour (Seising, 2010). This research culminated in the 
publication of ‘An outline of general system theory’ in 1950, which proposed 
that the traditional reductionist view of science, i.e. examining separate 
elements in isolation, could not account for the behaviour of a system when 
considered as a whole (von Bertalanffy, 1950). Similar discoveries had been 
made in psychology, economics and philosophy and, along with scientists 
working in the fields of cybernetics and general semantics, von Bertalanffy 
identified a need for a ‘general superstructure of science’ (von Bertalanffy, 
1950). This ‘new basic scientific discipline’, termed ‘General System Theory’ 
(GST) was established as a set of logico-mathematically underpinned 
principles designed to describe the behaviour of systems, regardless of the 
nature of their components (von Bertalanffy, 1950). From methodological and 
epistemological perspectives, GST represents a means of instigating and 
controlling the transfer of systems principles across scientific disciplines by 
using unambiguous, exact mathematical laws.  
After the introduction of GST, other researchers elaborated mathematically-
based systems theories (e.g. Klir, 1969; Mesarovic and Takahara, 1975) 
which have been incorporated into numerous disciplines, such as 
engineering, operations research, economics and ecology. Other non-
mathematical theories have been developed in a variety of fields, such as 
sociology, political sciences, anthropology and psychology (Schwaninger, 
2006). A notable application of GST, with regards to the understanding of 
systemic accident causation, is the concept of the STS. Pioneered by 
members of the Tavistock Institute (e.g. Emery, 1959; Trist, 1959), STS 
research considers the properties of complex systems consisting of 
interrelated human and technological components. Work in this field has 
primarily focused on the implications of organisational change (e.g. 
introducing new/re-designed technology and work practices) and STS are 
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typically studied at the primary work, whole organisation and/or macrosocial 
system level (e.g. Geels, 2005; Kroes et al., 2006; Waterson, 2009b)((Davis 
et al., 2013; Trist, 1981). However, there is a clear link between STS and 
accident analysis research, as significant effort has been dedicated to 
examining the safety implications associated with STS (e.g. Salmon et al., 
2012a; Stanton et al., 2012). Recent examples of systems theory application 
still cover a wide range of disciplines, such as plant systems biology (Lucas 
et al., 2011), project management (Kapsali, 2011), educational science 
(Nicolescu and Petrescu, 2013), sustainability (Xing et al., 2013) and tourism 
(Peeters, 2012). 
2.3.2   Core components of systems theory 
A wealth of literature regarding systems theory exists. Defining its core 
components, however, is a difficult task as there appears to be no firm 
agreement amongst researchers (Waterson, 2009a). Nevertheless, some 
broad interrelated themes can be identified within the literature. 
 System structure 2.3.2.1  
Systems are generally based on a hierarchy of subsystems, which are 
formed in order to perform specific functions; a characteristic known as 
‘differentiation’ or ‘division of labour’ (Skyttner, 2005). In order to understand 
a system, it is necessary to examine each relevant hierarchical level and its 
relationship with adjacent levels. Moving up the hierarchy provides a deeper 
understanding of a system’s goals, whereas examining lower levels reveals 
how a system functions to meet those objectives (Vicente, 1999). 
Furthermore, determining the boundary of a system, i.e. distinguishing 
between what is part of the system and part of the environment, is an 
important aspect of specifying its hierarchy (Jönsson, 2007 p.41).  
 System component relationships 2.3.2.2  
When an isolated component is exposed to the system environment it 
becomes directly or indirectly connected to and, therefore, influenced by 
every other component (Skyttner, 2005). The resultant interaction of system 
components produces emergent, rather than resultant, behaviour. The main 
distinction between emergent and resultant behaviour is that the latter is 
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predictable from the system’s constituent parts, whereas the former is not 
(Reason, 2008 p.94). Therefore, STS will display characteristics and operate 
in ways not expected or planned for by their designers (Wilson, 2013). Such 
behaviour cannot be explained by studying system components in isolation: 
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Consequently, a system must 
be studied holistically, i.e. all components, human and technical, need to be 
considered as well as the relationships between them (Read et al., 2013).  
 System behaviour 2.3.2.3  
Inputs are converted into outputs, via transformation processes, in order to 
achieve a system’s goals, e.g. safe operations. If system goals are to be 
reached and safety maintained, a system’s components must be controlled 
via regulatory feedback mechanisms when deviations in behaviour occur 
(Skyttner, 2005). Dynamic system behaviour means that a goal can be 
achieved from a variety of initial starting conditions (equifinality). Alternatively, 
systems can produce a range of outputs from an initial starting point 
(multifinality). This dynamic behaviour also means that systems can adapt 
over time to changing conditions and may migrate towards a state of 
increased risk and drift into failure (Dekker, 2011; Leveson, 2011). 
Furthermore, open systems (e.g. STS) interact with their environment and, 
consequently, their level of entropy (i.e. the amount of order within a system) 
can increase or decrease. The various elements of the systems approach are 
presented in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 - The systems approach 
2.4   Accident analysis models and methods 
To facilitate the accident analysis process, a wide range of models and 
methods have been created. Analysis models provide a conceptual 
representation of accident causation whereas analysis methods provide a 
means of applying this theory. These tools enable the application of accident 
causation knowledge either retrospectively, as accident analysis, or 
prospectively, as risk assessments during system development and 
operation (Qureshi, 2007). Safety researchers have, over the last century, 
produced a large quantity of these models and methods, in order to 
determine how major accidents occur. Well known examples of retrospective 
techniques include: 
• Domino model (Heinrich, 1931) 
• Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) (Johnson, 1973) 
• Five Whys method (Ohno, 1988) 
• SCM (Reason, 1990) 
• Why-Because Analysis (Ladkin and Loer, 1998) 
• Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann 
and Shappell, 2003) 
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Popular examples of tools used for prospective analysis include: 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Watson, 1961) 
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975) 
• Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) (Kletz, 1983) 
• Tripod Delta (Hudson et al., 1994) 
• Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 
1998) 
The processes of accident analysis and risk assessment are closely linked, 
e.g. results of accidents investigations are often used to inform risk analyses 
(Goossens and Hale, 1997; Rasmussen and Grønberg, 1997). Indeed, 
Hollnagel (2008) suggests that they are two sides of the same coin, i.e. they 
consider the same events after or before they have happened. As such, 
some models and methods can be used for both retrospective and 
prospective purposes, such as FTA (e.g. Vestrucci, 2013; Yang et al., 2013), 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (e.g. Arendt and Lorenzo, 1991; Cicek 
and Celik, 2013) and ETA (e.g. Ronza et al., 2003; Zhang and Tang, 1993). 
However, they remain separate areas of study and, due to the resource 
constraints of this PhD, the scope of research contained in this thesis is 
limited to the topic of retrospective accident analysis. 
Recent research demonstrates that, despite the array of available techniques, 
new tools are still being developed (e.g. Chen et al., 2013; Le Coze, 2013a; 
Mullai and Paulsson, 2011; Rathnayaka et al., 2011). A key driver for the 
continued rise in analysis model and method numbers is the changing nature 
of accident causation resulting from the ever-increasing complexity of STS 
(see Section  2.2). As researchers have sought to account for these changes 
(by devising new theories of accident causation and models to apply them), 
the ensuing development of analysis techniques can be described as having 
gone through three major phases, i.e. sequential, epidemiological and 
systemic; a categorisation that relates to the different underlying assumptions 
of accident causation (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004). Katsakiori et al. (2009) 
suggest that this distinction is not obligatory, as other classification systems 
based on differing accident characteristics exist (e.g. Kjellén, 2000; Laflamme, 
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1990; Lehto and Salvendy, 1991). However, it aids in the understanding of 
researchers’ desire to introduce systems theory concepts into accident 
analysis, as detailed in the following sections. 
2.4.1   Sequential techniques 
The sequential class of models and methods describe accidents as the result 
of time-ordered sequences of discrete events. They assume that an 
undesirable event, i.e. a ‘root cause’, initiates a sequence of events which 
leads to an accident and that the cause-effect relationship between 
consecutive events is linear and deterministic. This implies that the accident 
is the result of this root cause which, if identified and removed, will prevent a 
recurrence of the accident. Examples include the Domino model, FTA and 
the Five Whys method.  
These methods work well for losses caused by physical component failures 
or the actions of humans in relatively simple systems and generally offer a 
good description of the events leading up to an accident (Leveson, 2004). 
However, the cause-effect relationship between the management, 
organisational and human elements in a system is poorly defined by these 
techniques and they are unable to depict how these causal factors triggered 
the accident (Le Coze, 2005; Rathnayaka et al., 2011). From the end of the 
1970’s it became apparent that the sequential tools were unable to 
adequately explain a number of major industrial accidents, e.g. Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl and Bhopal (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004). Consideration 
for the role that organisational influences play in accidents was required and 
resulted in the creation of the epidemiological class of analysis tools. 
2.4.2   Epidemiological techniques 
Epidemiological models and methods view accidents as a combination of 
‘latent’ and ‘active’ failures within a system, analogous to the spreading of a 
disease (Qureshi, 2007). Latent conditions, e.g. management practices or 
organisational culture, are likened to resident pathogens and can lie dormant 
within a system for a long time (Reason et al., 2006). Such organisational 
factors can create conditions at a local level, i.e. where operational tasks are 
conducted, which negatively impact on an individual’s performance (e.g. 
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fatigue or high workload). The scene is then set for ‘unsafe acts’, such as 
errors and violations, to occur. Therefore, the adverse consequences of 
latent failures only become evident when they combine with unsafe acts, i.e. 
active failures, to breach the defences of a system. The contribution of latent 
environmental factors has been acknowledged by researchers (e.g. Haddon, 
1980; Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1978) since the work on military and domestic 
accidents conducted by Gordon (1949). However, the most well-known 
epidemiological technique is the SCM developed by Reason (1990; 1997), 
which has formed the conceptual basis for various analysis methods, e.g. 
HFACS, Tripod Delta and the Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology 
(SOAM) (EUROCONTROL, 2005). 
The epidemiological class of techniques better represent the influence of 
organisational factors on accident causation, when compared with the 
sequential tools. Given that they require an individual to look beyond the 
proximal causes of an accident and examine the impact of a system’s latent 
conditions, a more comprehensive understanding of an accident can be 
achieved. However, many are still based on the cause-effect principles of the 
sequential models, as they describe a linear direction of accident causation 
(Hollnagel, 2004). Leveson (2004) also observes that, besides preventing 
future losses, the basic reason for conducting accident analysis is the 
assignment of blame. This highlights a second important limitation of the 
sequential and epidemiological models: they guide analysts to search for the 
‘root cause’ of an accident, whether it is at the ‘sharp’ or ‘blunt’ end of a 
system. Stopping an investigation when a suitable culprit is found may result 
in too superficial an explanation to correctly inform the development of safety 
recommendations (Leveson, 2004). For these reasons, a number of 
researchers (e.g. Leveson, 2001; Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2002) began to argue that the epidemiological techniques were 
no longer able to account for the increasingly complex nature of STS 
accidents. 
2.4.3   Systemic techniques 
Whilst the systems approach has been advocated in accident analysis 
research (at least) since the 1980’s (e.g. Leplat, 1984), the identification of 
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epidemiological model limitations renewed the interest in its application. As 
described in Section  2.3, systems theory describes accidents as whole-level, 
emergent system behaviour resulting from the interdependent relationships 
of its constituent parts (rather than sequences of cause-effect events). 
Proponents of the systems approach suggest that adopting this view of 
accident causation resolves the limitations of the previous generations of 
models by removing blame from individual components and looking at how 
the complex nature of the entire system resulted in an accident (e.g. Dekker, 
2006 p.90-91; Holden, 2009; Leveson, 2004). A variety of models and 
methods were subsequently created to facilitate SAA, e.g. STAMP, FRAM 
and AcciMap.  
A number of studies have been conducted to assess the benefits of using 
SAA methods in comparison with established non-systemic analysis 
techniques, e.g. FTA (Belmonte et al., 2011) and the Sequentially Timed 
Events Plotting method (Herrera and Woltjer, 2010). These studies and 
others like them (e.g. Arnold, 2009; Ferjencik, 2011; Hickey, 2012; Salmon et 
al., 2010a) suggest that, while the non-systemic methods are suitable for 
describing what happened in an accident, the SAA techniques provide a 
deeper understanding of how dynamic, complex system behaviour 
contributed to the event. This is further exemplified by studies which have 
used SAA methods to generate insights which go beyond the findings 
presented in official accident investigation reports (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2010; 
Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). This improved understanding of accident 
causation justifies the desire of researchers to perform SAA. 
The development of accident analysis techniques is shown alongside the 
evolution of accident causation theory in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8 - Development of accident causation theories and analysis techniques
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2.5   The systemic accident analysis research-practice gap 
2.5.1   Existing evidence of a research-practice gap 
Despite the proposed advantages of SAA, there is evidence within the 
scientific literature to suggest that methods and tools employing a systemic 
perspective are not being adopted in practice. Some researchers (e.g. 
Carhart and Yearworth, 2010; Dien et al., 2012; Leveson, 2012)1 comment 
that the most commonly used tools for accident analysis are based on linear, 
reductionist models of systems and causality. Furthermore, other researchers 
note that SAA and its related techniques, e.g. STAMP, are yet to gain 
acceptance outside of the research community (e.g. Hollnagel et al., 2008; 
Okstad et al., 2012; Read et al., 2013; Salmon et al., 2012a; Salmon et al., 
2012b). These observations are supported by the sequential understanding 
of accident causation presented within various elements of the practitioner-
focused safety literature (e.g. Energy Institute, 2008; Health and Safety 
Executive, 2004; Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011) and the focus on 
‘sharp end’ factors within investigation reports (e.g. Cedergren and Petersen, 
2011; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011). The seemingly different analysis 
approaches taken by the researcher and practitioner communities suggest 
that an RPG exists in the domain of SAA. However, as noted in Section  1.1, 
there is no defined explanation for the presence of this gap, nor an 
understanding of its extent or how it could be bridged.  
As described in Sections  2.3 and  2.4.3, the need for SAA has been widely 
acknowledged throughout the research community. There is also evidence to 
suggest that a desire to adopt SAA techniques exists within sections of the 
practitioner community. For example, accident investigators within aviation 
                                            
1 Since commencing the PhD in October 2010, a number of publications (e.g. Hollnagel, 
2012; Leveson, 2012; Read et al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2012) have been released which 
relate to the research contained in this thesis. These recent publications are cited in this 
chapter, as they support the evidence that was available at the start of the PhD and which 
motivated the research contained in the thesis. However, had they been available at an 
earlier time, some of them would have also influenced the data collection process. 
Consequently, the impact of such publications on the studies presented in the thesis will be 
discussed, where relevant, in the study-based chapters (Chapters 3–6). This is done to 
demonstrate that, at the time the PhD studies were conducted, they were based on an up-to-
date knowledge of the accident analysis literature and, therefore, that they provided an 
original contribution to knowledge (which is evidenced by the fact that three of the four 
studies presented in the thesis have been written as peer-reviewed publications). 
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have begun to recognise the need to look beyond sequential analysis 
methods (Martinez, 2011 p.8). Furthermore, Steele and Pariès (2006) 
suggest that many practitioners acknowledge the limitations of traditional 
models and are keen to apply new techniques. Given that a demand to apply 
SAA seems to exist in both the researcher and practitioner communities, the 
RPG needs to be examined in more depth. 
2.5.2   Studying the research-practice gap 
An RPG signifies the impairment of transferring a new idea, practice or object 
between the research and practice communities. The transference process 
itself, sometimes termed the ‘diffusion of innovation’, has been the focus of  
numerous studies across various domains for over 50 years, e.g. healthcare 
(Wolfe, 2012), sports medicine (Richardson, 2011), human factors (Waterson 
and Anderson, 2013), management science (Bansal et al., 2012) and human 
resource management (Aguinis and Lawal, 2013). A number of theories and 
models about the nature of innovation diffusion have also been produced (e.g. 
Bass, 1969; Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Rogers, 2003; Wandersman et al., 
2008). Figure 9 shows Roger’s (2003) interpretation of the diffusion process. 
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Figure 9 - Diffusion of innovation process. Adapted from Rogers (2003). 
Researchers in different traditions have conceptualised, explained and 
investigated the diffusion of innovations in various different ways 
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(Greenhalgh et al., 2005). In addition to the diffusion of innovation literature, 
research concerned with the adoption and utilisation of innovations exists in 
well-established fields such as: technology adoption (e.g. Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2011; Karahanna et al., 1999; Katz and Shapiro, 1986), STS 
research (e.g. Coiera, 2007; Eason, 2007; Luna-Reyes et al., 2005) and 
participatory-based research (Holmström et al., 2009; Kenny et al., 2012; 
Moore et al., 2012). 
Although there is a wealth of innovation diffusion research to draw from when 
studying RPGs, it is important that the context in which the theory is applied 
matches the context in which it was developed (Fichman, 1992). Therefore, 
whilst aspects of this research were utilised when considered suitable (e.g. 
utilising a quasi-action research approach in Study 4), it was judged 
appropriate to base the work of this PhD within the context of the existing 
safety literature. Within the domain of safety, the study of factors which can 
impact on the adoption and usage of accident analysis techniques has mainly 
focused on two topics: (1) evaluating analysis methods and (2) examining 
issues which influence the analysis processes used by investigators. 
Previous studies have developed methods to evaluate various theoretical 
and practical aspects of analysis tools (e.g. Benner, 1985; Harvey, 1985; 
Katsakiori et al., 2009; Lehto and Salvendy, 1991; Sklet, 2004; Wagenaar 
and van der Schrier, 1997). Other research has applied different analysis 
methods to accident case studies to examine whether they can provide 
additional safety insights (e.g. Herrera and Woltjer, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2010; 
Johnson and Holloway, 2003) and/or if they are suitable for use in a given 
industry (e.g. Salmon et al., 2010a; Woltjer et al., 2006). Collectively, this 
research examines the strengths and weaknesses of various techniques to 
inform their selection and usage. A wide range of analysis method 
characteristics are addressed in the literature which include issues such as 
validity and reliability, usability and resource requirements. Whilst various 
SAA methods have been used to perform accident case study analysis (e.g. 
Herrera and Woltjer, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2010; Salmon et al., 2010a), few 
studies have formally examined these techniques via defined, structured 
approaches (e.g. Branford, 2007; Sklet, 2004) or compared systemic 
 Chapter 2 31 
techniques against each other (e.g. Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; 
Waterson and Jenkins, 2011). Moreover, none of these studies have 
examined the techniques to understand why they have not been accepted by 
the practitioner community. Therefore, an opportunity exists to develop a 
more detailed understanding of the SAA methods and how their 
characteristics may contribute to the RPG.  
Generic factors which can influence a practitioner’s approach to accident 
analysis have been identified, such as investigator bias, availability of data 
and resource constraints (e.g. Johnson, 2003; Kouabenan, 2009; Lundberg 
et al., 2010; Rollenhagen et al., 2010). These influences can arguably lead 
practitioners away from the theoretical ideal of accident investigation and 
therefore contribute to an RPG (Lundberg et al., 2010). However, the 
analysis processes of practitioners and the issues which affect them have yet 
to be examined with regards to how they may contribute to a gap. This 
represents another opportunity to establish the nature of the SAA RPG. The 
need to examine the characteristics of the SAA methods, the factors which 
influence the analysis activities of practitioners and the contribution they 
make to the SAA RPG provides the starting point for the research contained 
in this thesis. These issues are addressed in the following two chapters. 
2.5.3   The wider research-practice gap context 
Although the work contained in this thesis is placed within the context of the 
safety literature it is useful to understand how it relates to the RPG literature 
in general. Due to resource constraints, a comprehensive review of RPGs will 
not be given here. However, examining some of the recent literature (2011 
onwards), which specifically addresses RPGs, highlights some important 
points (see Appendix 2.1 for search criteria and results). Firstly, as shown in 
Figure 10, RPGs in healthcare have received the majority of interest from 
researchers.   
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Figure 10 - Research-practice gap literature summary
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Notably, only four articles (Groth and Swiler, 2013; Hanson et al., 2012; Lord 
et al., 2011; Noonan et al., 2011) were related to safety and none addressed 
the SAA RPG. In fact, a search of the Science Direct and Web of Science 
databases indicates that no research articles have been published on the 
overall nature of RPGs in accident analysis or investigation since 2000, apart 
from those associated with this thesis (Underwood and Waterson, 2013a; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2013b) (see Appendix 2.1 for search criteria and 
results). This suggests, therefore, that the knowledge presented in this thesis, 
as well as providing an original contribution to the field of accident analysis, 
adds to the existing RPG research. 
Secondly, analysis of the recent literature reveals that a wide range of issues 
are cited as factors which contribute to the existence of RPGs (see Table 2). 
Furthermore, a number of solutions for bridging these gaps are provided (see 
Table 3). 
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Reasons for gap % of articles citing reason 
Research not 
linked to 
practice 
Inadequate research 6.9 
25.3 
Theory is not empirically validated 6.9 
Practitioner needs not considered 5.7 
Historic lack of researcher interest in certain 
practice activities 3.4 
Researchers lack practical experience 2.3 
Resources 
Resource limitations 13.8 
17.2 Cost of implementing research too great 2.3 
Guidance material not designed for practitioners 1.1 
Training 
Inadequate training 5.7 
17.2 
Lack of training 4.6 
Insufficient theory in practitioner training 3.4 
Practitioner training format 3.4 
Communication 
Theory can be too complex 3.4 
14.9 
Inadequate communication of research 2.3 
Practitioner lack of awareness of research 2.3 
Inadequate communication at organisational level 1.1 
Lack of access to research information 1.1 
Lack of communication networks 1.1 
Lack of knowledge sharing 1.1 
Researchers cannot decide what information to 
communicate 1.1 
Too much research information available 1.1 
Practice not 
influenced by 
research 
Insufficient practitioner knowledge 10.3 
13.8 Practitioners rely on experience rather than theory 2.3 
"One size does not fit all" approach to applying 
research 1.1 
Practitioner 
biases 
Cultural attitude of practitioners 4.6 
6.9 Learning style 1.1 
Personal preference 1.1 
Industry 
influences 
Nature of industry 2.3 
4.6 Practice affected by industry needs 1.1 
Regulations do not reflect research 1.1 
Table 2 - Reasons cited for research-practice gaps 
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Methods of bridging the gap % of times method cited 
Increase 
amount of 
research 
applied by 
practitioners 
Improve practitioner training 23.3 
31.7 
Organisational commitment to change 3.3 
Base practice on research 1.7 
Create research 'champions' in practice 1.7 
Work systems and technologies based on 
research 1.7 
Improve 
communication 
of knowledge 
Knowledge exchange meetings involving 
researchers and practitioners 6.7 
25.0 
Increase dissemination of information 5.0 
Literature developed for practitioners 5.0 
Increase availability of research information 3.3 
Create journal clubs for practitioners 1.7 
Informal networks 1.7 
Integrate research databases 1.7 
Researcher-
practitioner 
engagement 
Create research-practice partnerships 13.3 
25.0 
Recruit practitioners into research 5.0 
Researchers spend time in practitioner 
environment 3.3 
Incentivise researchers to engage with 
practitioners 1.7 
Job swaps 1.7 
Practice-
focused 
research 
Research designed around conditions experience 
in practice 6.7 
18.3 Set new research agendas 6.7 
Models consider practitioner needs 3.3 
Increase researcher awareness of subject 1.7 
Table 3 - Methods of bridging research-practice gaps 
Given that the SAA RPG has not been examined in any great detail, it has 
yet to be determined whether all of the suggested reasons for RPGs existing 
listed in Table 2 will be present. Also, it is not known which of the methods for 
bridging the gap described in Table 3 will be relevant. However, as indicated 
by the research presented in Section  2.5.2, some of the contributing factors 
described in Table 2 are also observed in accident analysis, e.g. investigator 
bias and resource constraints. Therefore, it is possible that the SAA RPG 
shares other characteristics with gaps in different domains. Identifying areas 
of similarity via a more detailed examination of the SAA RPG may be able to 
provide insights into how the gap should be bridged, if indeed it needs to be; 
a topic which is addressed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3 – Study 1: Evaluating the systemic accident 
analysis models, methods and literature 
3.1   Chapter overview 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the SAA literature and analysis 
techniques in order to understand how their characteristics contribute to the 
SAA RPG. This evaluation begins by examining how the SAA literature 
incorporates and presents the core concepts of systems theory. A systematic 
search is then conducted to identify examples of SAA models and methods. 
The three most popular techniques are assessed via an evaluation 
framework, which considers their development process as well as their 
systems approach and usage characteristics. The findings of the study are 
subsequently discussed to highlight a number of factors which may influence 
the SAA RPG. 
3.2   Introduction 
As described in Section  2.5.1, a need exists to examine the SAA RPG. As 
the gap has yet to be studied in any great detail what is needed to ascertain 
the factors that contribute to it?  An appropriate starting point is the 
systematic evaluation of the SAA methods to examine how their theoretical 
and practical characteristics may hinder their adoption and usage (see 
Section  2.5.2). Indeed, the importance of understanding how an innovation’s 
characteristics affects its integration into practice has been discussed at 
length within the RPG literature (e.g. Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Damanpour 
and Schneider, 2009; Rogers, 2003; Smit et al., 2013; Tornatzky and Klein, 
1982; Zaltman et al., 1973).  
Previous studies (e.g. Salmon et al., 2010a; Sklet, 2004) have examined 
some characteristics of SAA models and methods, such as their training and 
usage resource requirements (see Section  2.5.2). Whilst these studies 
provide an insight into some of the characteristics which may influence the 
SAA RPG, they do not examine their contribution to the gap. Furthermore, 
the research conducted to date is far from extensive, e.g. it is not yet clear 
how many SAA techniques have been developed by the research community 
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or how they compare with one another. Therefore, a more detailed 
investigation of the SAA technique characteristics is required to understand 
how they influence the SAA RPG. 
Additionally, the SAA innovation is not just a range of analysis techniques. It 
also includes a body of literature which presents systems theory and its 
applicability to accident analysis. Therefore, examining the characteristics of 
the systemic methods only provides a partial description of the SAA 
innovation: it is also important to understand how much of the systems 
approach is incorporated within the SAA literature, how it is presented and 
how this may affect the RPG. 
3.2.1   Study aim and objectives 
The overall aim of the study was to evaluate the characteristics of the ‘SAA 
innovation’ to understand how they contribute to the SAA RPG. As the 
innovation consists of two key elements (the SAA literature and systemic 
analysis techniques), a number of objectives were established to achieve this 
aim:  
• Identify the key components of systems theory 
• Examine the SAA literature to identify which systems theory components 
are contained in the literature and how they are portrayed 
• Review the scientific literature to identify the available systemic models 
and methods 
• Conduct a citation analysis to assess the relative popularity of the SAA 
techniques within the research community 
• Evaluate the most popular systemic analysis tools to identify factors which 
may influence their adoption and usage 
3.3   Methods 
3.3.1   System theory component identification 
In order to understand how much systems theory is incorporated within the 
SAA literature and techniques, it was necessary to identify the core 
components of systems theory. This was achieved via electronic database 
searches, reference and citation tracking and personal knowledge of the 
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relevant literature, in order to promote a systematic approach (Fink, 2010; 
Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005; Hart, 1998). In order to understand the 
fundamental aspects of systems theory, the original article on ‘General 
System Theory’ (von Bertalanffy, 1950) was initially studied. Citation tracking 
of the article was subsequently employed using the ISI Web of Knowledge, 
Scopus and Google Scholar databases to gain an insight into the 
development and applications of the theory. This information was 
supplemented with electronic searching for systems theory related 
documents using the Science Direct, PsychINFO, MEDLINE and Google 
Scholar databases. The search was restricted to articles published in English 
since 1950. The bibliographies of seminal documents (e.g. Senge, 2006; 
Skyttner, 2005) were examined and references focused on systems theory 
were included in the search results. The literature gathered via these differing 
search methods was examined using an inductive thematic analysis 
approach, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006), in order to identify the 
core components of systems theory. The findings of this analysis are 
summarised in Section  2.3.2 in order to provide a context for the PhD 
research. However, the methods used to obtain this information are 
presented here to demonstrate the systematic nature of the approach taken. 
3.3.2   SAA literature identification 
The search for systems theory interpretation within the accident analysis 
literature was restricted to 22 safety, systems engineering and ergonomics 
related journals. This sample of journals was selected in order to generate 
pertinent results and was searchable within the ScienceDirect database2. 
The search string incorporated the terms ‘accident’, analysis’, ‘systems’ and 
‘theory’, as well as synonyms and truncated phrases (see Appendix 3.1 for 
details of the search criteria). To promote the creation of relevant results the 
search was restricted to the document title, abstract and key words list. The 
time span of the search commenced from the first available publication of 
each journal, to capture the highest number of relevant articles and enable a 
more comprehensive analysis of systems approach application. Review and 
                                            
2 The search was restricted to the use of the ScienceDirect website as other databases (e.g. 
Web of Science and Google Scholar) did not have the functionality required to effectively 
discriminate between safety and non-safety related articles. 
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model evaluation articles (e.g. Katsakiori et al., 2009; Qureshi, 2007; Sklet, 
2004) were also used to identify key documents within the field. Reference 
and citation tracking was subsequently employed using the ISI Web of 
Knowledge, Scopus and Google Scholar databases to discover additional 
articles. Only documents printed in English were included in the search 
results. A theoretical (i.e. deductive) thematic analysis of the literature, as 
defined by Braun and Clarke (2006), was conducted using the core 
components of systems theory (see Section  2.3.2) as a coding template. 
3.3.3   SAA model and method identification 
A systematic electronic search for documents referencing SAA techniques 
was conducted in the 22 safety journals used to perform the SAA literature 
identification (see Section  3.3.2). All of the journals were examined within the 
ScienceDirect database in order to generate relevant results2. All available 
issues of the journals were interrogated with a search string which included 
synonyms and truncations of ‘accident’, ‘analysis’, ‘model’ and ‘system’ (see 
Appendix 3.1 for details of the search criteria). In order to increase the 
relevance of the results, the search was restricted to the document title, 
abstract and key words list. The results were combined with those gained 
from reference and citation tracking of key review and model evaluation 
articles (e.g. Sklet, 2004) and personal knowledge of the literature. A manual 
examination of the documents followed, in order to identify examples of 
systemic analysis tools.  
Only models and methods explicitly described as being based on systems 
theory were considered for further analysis. Some methods purport to be 
systemic tools, however, in reality they are either sequential or 
epidemiological in nature, e.g. SOAM, which is underpinned by the SCM. 
This exclusion criterion was, therefore, set in order to ensure the shortlisted 
models were relevant to the study of the SAA RPG. In addition, only 
techniques that were specifically designed for use in accident analysis or risk 
assessment were included in the subsequent evaluation. Whilst some 
systemic models have been applied to accident research, e.g. causal loop 
diagrams (e.g. Goh et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2012), they are generic tools 
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which have been utilised in other research fields. This exclusion criterion was, 
therefore, employed to maintain a focused scope to the study.  
A search of the Science Direct, PsychINFO, MEDLINE and Google Scholar 
databases was subsequently conducted to identify the number of citations 
received by each SAA technique. The search terms ‘accident’, ‘disaster’ and 
‘incident’ and their truncations were combined with the full name or known 
acronym of the model to reduce the likelihood of detecting articles unrelated 
to accident analysis (see Appendix 3.1 for details of the search criteria). The 
most frequently cited techniques were shortlisted for further analysis, via the 
evaluation framework described in Section  3.3.4. Other selection criteria 
have been used in previous studies, such as whether the tool was recently 
developed (e.g. Sklet, 2004). However, citation count ranking was chosen as 
it provides a measure of a model’s relative popularity and, therefore, the 
likelihood of its awareness within the practitioner community.  
3.3.4   Model evaluation 
As described in Section  2.5.2, a number of studies have developed methods 
to systematically evaluate various theoretical and practical aspects of 
accident analysis tools (e.g. Benner, 1985; Katsakiori et al., 2009). Some of 
these methods incorporate elements of the systems approach, such as the 
amount of the system hierarchy examined by the analysis technique (e.g. 
Sklet, 2004). None, however, consider the systems approach in its entirety. 
An evaluation framework, based on both theoretical and practical 
considerations, was designed to resolve this; the details of which are 
described in the remainder of Section  3.3.4. 
 Model development process 3.3.4.1  
Consideration was given to the development of the analysis tools, which 
Bamber (2003 p.240) states involves four stages: (1) clearly define the 
analysis problem(s); (2) build a system diagram; (3) evaluate and test the 
system model using previously solved situations; (4) use the model on new 
problems. In addition, Wahlström (1988 p.163) comments that a modelling 
approach should be selected, a distinction made between the model and 
environment and that sub-models, variables and their relationships should be 
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identified before the model is constructed. Cumulatively, these stages 
represent the general scheme that is followed when producing any system 
model (Wahlström, 1988 p.163). If the development of an SAA technique has 
not fulfilled a given stage of this process it may help to explain why it has not 
been accepted by the practitioner community. The following components 
were, therefore, included in the framework: 
• Problem definition – is the reason for creating the model well defined, e.g. 
the need for a more detailed analysis of system control mechanisms? 
• Modelling approach selection – what conceptual approach has been 
adopted? 
• System model creation – how is the system graphically represented by 
the model? 
• Model validation – how has the validity and reliability of the model been 
tested and demonstrated? 
• Model usage – how has the model been used previously? 
Based on the model development stages suggested by Wahlström (1988 
p.163), it should also be determined whether an SAA technique has 
adequately examined the system’s environmental boundary, hierarchy and 
component relationships. However, as these criteria are core elements of the 
systems approach they will be addressed in the following section of the 
evaluation framework. 
 Systems approach characteristics 3.3.4.2  
The ability of an analysis model to employ the systems approach is governed 
by the number of the core systems theory concepts it incorporates (see 
Section  2.3.2). Therefore, the shortlisted techniques were analysed to identify 
how they address a system’s structure, component relationships and 
behaviour: 
• System structure – how does the model represent a system’s hierarchy 
and component differentiation? 
• System component relationships – how are the interactions between 
system components analysed? 
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• System behaviour – how does the model address the various factors 
which affect safety, e.g. controlling the transformation of system inputs? 
 Model usage characteristics 3.3.4.3  
Establishing whether a given analysis technique is theoretically underpinned 
by systems theory concepts is only one factor that will determine if an 
individual can effectively perform SAA. A number of researchers have 
identified a range of other issues which can hinder the usage of analysis 
methods (e.g. usability and resource requirements) (Benner, 1985; Katsakiori 
et al., 2009) and the evaluation framework was designed to reflect this. This 
final section of the framework was developed in two stages. Initially, existing 
evaluation methods were reviewed (e.g. Benner, 1985; Katsakiori et al., 2009; 
Sgourou et al., 2010; Sklet, 2004) and the relevant usage-related 
components were selected. The second phase involved a review of these 
components after each model evaluation. Exclusion of criteria was 
determined by whether they received little or no coverage in the systemic 
model literature. This exclusion process does not in itself distinguish between 
relevant and irrelevant factors; rather it highlights the issues that have 
received the most attention from researchers. Consequently, the analysis 
models were examined with regards to: 
• Timeline consideration – how does the model incorporate the concept of 
time in the accident development process?   
• Avoidance of blame – does the model direct the analyst towards 
identifying a root cause? 
• Model compatibility – can the model be used in conjunction with other 
analysis techniques? 
• Recommendation production – Does the model aid the analyst in 
producing safety recommendations and provide generic insights into 
accident causation? 
• Resources required – what resources and data does the analyst require 
in order to use the model? 
• Usability – what features of the model affect the analysis efficiency and 
effectiveness? 
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The evaluation framework is graphically summarised in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 - Study 1 evaluation framework 
The shortlisted SAA techniques were examined by performing a combined 
deductive and inductive thematic analysis of the literature pertaining to their 
development and usage, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006). The 
different evaluation framework criteria provided a coding template for the 
deductive analysis. An inductive approach was also taken to ensure that 
additional topics of interest would be recorded during the analysis. The 
analysis was conducted using NVivo 9. 
3.4   Findings 
3.4.1   Systems theory interpretation 
This section provides details on the various aspects of systems theory 
discussed within the accident analysis literature.  
 System structure 3.4.1.1  
Consideration of system structures within the literature is limited. The 
information that does exist focuses on defining the system hierarchy and its 
environmental boundary. 
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Defining the system hierarchy has been conducted at different levels of 
abstraction and from varying perspectives. For example, Abrahamsson et al. 
(2010) provide a general view by stating that real world systems can usually 
be modelled in a number of ways, depending on the purpose of the model 
and the requirements of the analyst, but will include a definition of the 
system’s elements and its boundary. A general perspective is also provided 
by Lind (1988 p.273) who states that representing a system’s hierarchy is 
achieved by studying its whole-part relationships. Other researchers offer a 
more safety-focused view of system hierarchies. For example, Leveson et al. 
(2009) propose that a primary characteristic of systemic analysis is the 
modelling and analysing of organisational safety structures. Furthermore, 
systems are modelled as a hierarchy of organisational levels, all of which 
contribute to accident causation and collectively define acceptable system 
performance and safety (Dekker, 2006; 2011 p.154; Leveson, 2011). A more 
detailed account of STS organisational hierarchies is provided by 
Rasmussen (1997) in the form of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
(see Figure 12). Rasmussen (1997) remarks that system models must be 
built using a system oriented approach based on control theoretic concepts. 
The RMF represents a control structure embedded within an STS and, as 
such, details six different organisational levels which affect the control of 
safety: (1) the system technology; (2) frontline staff; (3) management; (4) the 
company as a whole; (5) industry regulators; (6) the government.  
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Figure 12 - Risk management framework. Adapted from Rasmussen (1997). 
Defining the environmental boundary of a system is deemed as an important 
part of specifying the component hierarchy (Jönsson, 2007). This is a 
problematic process, however, as the boundary is unclear, inherently 
exclusionary and requires flexibility from the analyst (Dekker, 2011 p.136; Le 
Coze, 2005). Furthermore, the system ‘environment’ is generally referred to 
in a conceptual sense within the literature. However, in reality it has various 
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facets. It is the physical landscape and climate, yet it also has political, 
societal, economic and technological dimensions. This is evidenced by 
researchers (e.g. Leveson, 2004; Rasmussen, 1997) who comment on 
issues such as the rapid pace of technological development, the 
aggressiveness of commercial markets and the changing regulatory and 
public views of safety.  
Finally, the RMF, at a high level of abstraction, goes some way to addressing 
the differentiation, or specialisation, of the various system components. For 
example, company management is shown to be responsible for implementing 
organisational policy, whereas regulators are established to enforce 
governmental laws. There is, however, little specific attention given to the 
impact of differentiation on safety within the literature. 
 System component relationships 3.4.1.2  
Considerably more attention has been paid to the concepts of holism and 
component relationships, when compared with the various aspects of system 
structure.  
Various researchers, (e.g. Dekker, 2006 p.91; Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 
1997), comment that systemic analysis concentrates on the whole system, 
rather than individual components. Indeed, Leveson et al. (2009) suggest 
that this is a primary characteristic of SAA. Only by considering the design 
and analysis of systems as whole entities can the emergent properties which 
give rise to accidents be studied (Dekker, 2006 p.96; Leveson, 2009 [cited in 
Leveson, 2011]). Consequently, the need to incorporate holism and, 
therefore, emergence into analysis tools has been made explicit by some 
researchers (e.g. Carhart and Yearworth, 2010; Dekker, 2006 p.91; Hollnagel 
and Goteman, 2004; Leveson, 2004).  
The idea that safety and accidents are emergent phenomena of a system is 
widely acknowledged within the literature. Researchers (e.g. Cassano-Piche 
et al., 2009; Holden, 2009; Hollnagel et al., 2008; Leveson et al., 2009; 
Marais et al., 2004; Woo and Vicente, 2003; Woods and Cook, 2002), 
describe safety as such, whereas other authors (e.g. Hollnagel, 2004 p.59; 
Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) refer specifically to accidents. The emergent 
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properties of a system are a result of the relationships between its 
components and cannot, therefore, be understood by examining the 
components in isolation (Dekker, 2011 p138; Sinclair, 2007). Indeed, much of 
the meaning of system components arises from their relationships (Lind, 
1988). As a result, the systems approach places a high importance on 
studying component interaction (Carhart and Yearworth, 2010). Accident 
analysis tools should, therefore, facilitate the study of interactions between all 
elements of the STS (Bamber, 2003; Leveson, 2004). 
 System behaviour 3.4.1.3  
The majority of interest in system behaviour is centred on the nature and 
control of processes as well as the influence of the environment. 
Various researchers (e.g. Carhart and Yearworth, 2010; Dekker, 2006 p.92; 
Hollnagel, 2004 p.62; Le Coze, 2005) comment that the processes and 
interactions of system components are non-linear in nature. This means that 
system inputs (causes) are not proportional to the outputs (effects) and that 
one cause can have numerous different effects (Hollnagel, 2004 p.62; Le 
Coze, 2005). This discussion within the literature, in a general sense, covers 
the issues of component inputs and outputs, their transformation processes 
and multifinality.  
Consideration of system entropy is largely implicit within the literature, as a 
number of researchers refer to the fact that STS interact with their 
environment (e.g. Dekker et al., 2011 p.138; Le Coze, 2005; Mayntz, 1997 
[cited in Choularton, 2001]). Due to this interaction, Jönsson (2007) states 
that it is insufficient to ignore the environmental context of a system. This is 
supported by the notion that environmental conditions can affect the goal 
seeking nature of systems. The environment places requirements for 
successful adaptation on the system and thereby interacts with the system 
goals, although requirements and goals are not always aligned (Dekker, 
2011 p.154; Lind, 1988 p.275). 
Alongside the idea that emergent system properties exist as a result of 
component interactions (see Section  3.4.1.2), the significance of feedback 
and control is the most frequently discussed systems approach issue. The 
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feedback and control present in an organisation are deemed to be critical 
influences on system capability and failure (Mayntz, 1997; Sinclair, 2007; 
Woods and Cook, 2002). Goh et al. (2010) even describe feedback as the 
‘foundation of systems thinking’. Rasmussen (1997) takes the view that risk 
management is a control problem and must be conducted by taking a 
systems approach based around control theoretic concepts, e.g. the 
discrepancy-reducing feedback loop. The explicit need for analysis models to 
consider control, as well as emergence, is discussed by several researchers. 
For example, Dekker (2006 p.91) comments that the fundamental concepts 
underpinning systemic models are emergence and control. Considering 
safety as an emergent property necessitates analysis models treating 
accidents as examples of inadequate control; tools which do not do this are 
inherently limited (Carhart and Yearworth, 2010; Leveson, 2004).  
The study of system behaviour dictates that consideration must be given to 
changes that occur over time. The fact that STS are influenced by their 
environment and internal processes means that their behaviour is dynamic 
and path dependent (Dekker, 2011 p.149). The constantly changing 
environment and the subsequent impact on system functions also cause 
hazards and their management to change (Woods and Cook, 2002). 
Although these new demands on system safety may be met, they may also 
stress the functioning of a system to the point of failure (Sinclair, 2007).  
3.4.2   Model identification and evaluation 
A total of 13 systemic models were identified within the 449 non-duplicated 
articles collected during the literature search described in Section  3.3.3. 
Performing a citation search for these techniques revealed a total of 476 
documents3, which were manually searched for explicit references to the 
models. The three most frequently cited models (STAMP, FRAM and 
AcciMap) accounted for 89.8 % of the 302 explicit references identified within 
the 476 documents and were selected for additional evaluation (see Table 4). 
The remaining models were discounted from further analysis. The rest of 
                                            
3  Document count excludes the articles in which the models and methods were first 
published in, duplicate articles and those unrelated to accident analysis 
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Section  3.4.2 provides details of the STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap 
evaluations. 
Model Created by Year Explicit citations 
% 
explicit 
citations 
STAMP Leveson 2004 157 52.0 
FRAM Hollnagel 2004 60 19.9 
AcciMap 
Rasmussen 
and 
Svedung 
1996 54 17.9 
Deviation 
model/deviation 
concept 
Kjellen 1984 17 5.6 
Formal System Model Watson 1984 8 2.6 
Occupation Accident 
Genesis model LaFlamme 1990 3 1.0 
Delft Framework Hale et al. 1997 2 0.7 
Car-Driver Model Rockwell 1972 1 0.3 
Systems Model of 
Software 
Development Failure 
McBride 2008 0 0.0 
IPICA Ferjencik 2011 0 0.0 
WSR Model Hall and Silva 2008 0 0.0 
STAMP-VSM Kontgiannis and Malakis 2011 0 0.0 
Risk Management 
Systems Model Bamber 2003 0 0.0 
Table 4 - SAA model citation analysis 
 STAMP model development process 3.4.2.1  
Problem definition 
Accidents, from the systems approach perspective, occur due to the 
inadequate control of external disturbances, component failures or 
dysfunctional component interactions (Leveson, 2004). Therefore, 
understanding why accidents occur requires analysis of the control structure 
and its ineffectiveness, rather than individual element failure. STAMP is 
designed to meet this need. 
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Modelling approach 
Three basic concepts are used by STAMP to analyse the breakdown of 
control structures: (1) constraints, (2) control loops and process models; (3) 
levels of control. Inclusion of these features allows the model to describe 
systems and accidents in terms of ‘a hierarchy of control based on adaptive 
feedback mechanisms’ (Leveson, 2004). A key element of the STAMP 
analysis approach is the idea that systems behave dynamically. The model, 
therefore, assesses why such changes in system state are present and how 
they could lead to conditions where an accident could occur (Ferjencik, 2011).  
System model creation 
No formalised procedure exists for creating a system model with STAMP and 
variation exists in the guidance that is provided (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; 
Hollnagel, 2008; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 
2012; Qureshi, 2007)4. The typical graphical representation of the system is 
a tiered control structure, based on the RMF (see Figure 12), consisting of 
nodes (system components) linked by arrows, which symbolise feedback 
loops (see Figure 13). A STAMP analysis also involves examining control 
loop performance using a control flaw classification scheme (see Figure 14), 
which can result in the creation of multiple diagrams (e.g. Arnold, 2009; 
Ouyang et al., 2010). At present, a method for providing a structured 
presentation of STAMP’s analysis results is not available (Hollnagel and 
Speziali, 2008). 
                                            
4 Kontogiannis and Malakis (2012) was in press at the time of the STAMP evaluation 
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Figure 13 - General STS hierarchical safety control structure. Adapted from 
Leveson (2004). 
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Figure 14 - STAMP control flaw classification. From Leveson (2004). 
Model validation 
Within the studies utilising STAMP, little work has been done to formally 
validate the model. Johnson and Holloway (2003) identified inter-rater 
reliability issues, as well as several validity and reliability related factors 
centred on the lack of structured analysis guidance. However, the authors 
state that their lack of prior experience in using STAMP may have influenced 
these findings and that the model was still under development at the time of 
testing. This developmental nature is still evident in subsequent studies (e.g. 
Ferjencik, 2011; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 
2012) and an evaluation of STAMP conducted by Hollnagel and Spezali 
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(2008) led the authors to declare that the model must still be considered as 
such. 
Model usage 
The generic approach to system analysis taken by STAMP makes it suitable 
for examining any type of STS and has resulted in its use in a variety of 
domains. Retrospective analysis has been conducted on aerospace 
(Johnson and Holloway, 2003; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008), water supply 
contamination (Leveson et al., 2003), train derailment (Ouyang et al., 2010) 
and military fratricide (Leveson et al., 2002) accidents. Leveson’s (2004) 
notion that STAMP is also applicable for prospective risk assessment has 
been demonstrated by the development of the STAMP-based System-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) technique. This tool has been used, so 
far, to determine risk in aerospace operations (e.g. Ishimatsu et al., 2010; 
Owens et al., 2008; Stringfellow Herring et al., 2007). 
 STAMP systems approach characteristics 3.4.2.2  
System structure 
Consideration for system structure is a key feature of the STAMP approach. 
The system hierarchy is modelled as a control structure, based on the RMF, 
where each level represents a control process and control loop (see Figure 
13) (Stringfellow Herring et al., 2007). Although Leveson (2004) makes 
various references to different environmental conditions, e.g. physical and 
operational, there is no explicit description of how STAMP represents the 
system boundary. Given that the model is based on the RMF it can be 
argued that the internal and external environments consist of the same 
elements considered by AcciMap (see Section  3.4.2.8). Consideration for 
component differentiation is implicitly addressed by STAMP, which analyses 
the varying contributions to safety made by the system components within 
the control structure. 
System component relationships 
STAMP places a clear emphasis on the interrelated nature of a system’s 
components (Leveson, 2004). Such interactions are defined with respect to 
their impact on safety constraint control and are graphically represented by 
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the feedback loop arrows connecting the system components (see Figure 13). 
Analysis of the whole system is encouraged by STAMP, as it focuses on the 
vertical relationships between groups at different levels in the hierarchy 
(Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). Indeed, Leveson (2004) comments that 
any analysis model which considers the entire STS must treat the system as 
a whole.  
System behaviour 
Examining system behaviour is a fundamental aspect of a STAMP analysis. 
The model treats a system as a dynamic process that continually adapts to 
achieve its ends and react to internal and external environmental changes 
(Leveson, 2004). Therefore, it deals with the inputs, outputs and 
transformation processes which influence the ability of the system to achieve 
its goals. This view of system behaviour, however, primarily focuses on how 
a system controls its processes. Entropy, via discussion of external 
environmental disturbances, is considered at a high level of abstraction by 
Leveson (2004). However, internal environmental conditions, such as 
company policies, have received the majority of attention from researchers 
(e.g. Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; Ouyang et al., 2010). STAMP analyses 
the control structure of a system at the time of an accident and, consequently, 
incorporation of equifinality and multifinality is not addressed by the model. 
 STAMP usage characteristics 3.4.2.3  
Timeline consideration 
A STAMP analysis does not incorporate a timeline: a control structure 
diagram represents a ‘snapshot’ of the system’s dynamic control 
relationships and organisational constraints (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). 
Creating a number of diagrams would, therefore, be necessary to show the 
changes in system state over time. Whilst not formally required by the 
STAMP analysis process, previous studies suggest that generating a 
sequence of events is a useful starting point prior to defining the control 
structure (see Johnson and Holloway, 2003; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; 
Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012). 
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Avoidance of blame 
Leveson’s (2004) comment that STAMP ‘does not assign blame for the 
accident to a specific person or group’ explicitly states the perspective of the 
model with regards to ‘root cause’ identification. Instead, the model views the 
cause of accidents as a lack of control of emergent behaviour throughout a 
system. 
Model compatibility 
STAMP was designed as a standalone accident analysis tool but Leveson 
(2004) suggests that it can be used as a basis for creating new hazard 
analysis and prevention techniques. However, besides STPA, it is unclear 
whether STAMP has been used to develop any hazard analysis tools. The 
ability to fuse STAMP with other models has been explored in retrospective 
analysis studies by Ferjencik (2011) and Kontogiannis and Malakis (2012). 
Ferjencik (2011) selected STAMP to augment the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
method, due to the inability of RCA to describe complex system relationships. 
Conversely, the Viable Systems Model was chosen by Kontogiannis and 
Malakis (2012) because of a perceived weakness of STAMP, i.e. a lack of 
consideration for general patterns of organisational breakdown. Both studies 
propose that combining STAMP with these other models produced greater 
safety insights than if the analysis tools had been used in isolation. 
Recommendation production  
STAMP does not automatically produce safety recommendations. 
Furthermore, although the model allows analysts to identify the flaws in the 
system control structure, it provides no means of prioritising them. However, 
STAMP was not designed to fulfil this need, as there is no scientific basis for 
such a prioritisation, and legitimate disagreements over the prioritisation 
process may exist due to the differing perspectives of stakeholders, e.g. 
regulators and line-management (Johnson and Holloway, 2003). STAMP has, 
however, been used by researchers to create general insights into different 
types of accidents (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). 
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Resources required 
Conflict exists within the literature regarding the training and expertise 
requirements of STAMP. It is claimed that the model requires considerable 
effort to use and is only suitable for experienced users with extensive 
theoretical and domain knowledge (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Johansson 
and Lindgren, 2008). However, Johnson and Holloway (2003) comment that 
STAMP is simple, easy to follow and quick to learn. The data used in STAMP 
analyses, to date, has been based on secondary information garnered from 
accident reports. Leveson (2004) suggests that the use of comprehensive 
investigation reports is sufficient to build a STAMP model and its use during 
an investigation should help guide the analysis. This indicates that STAMP is 
compatible with primary as well as secondary sources of information, which 
typically provide quantitative and qualitative data. 
Usability  
The experience of using STAMP differs amongst analysts, as reflected by the 
various positive and negative comments found within the literature. The 
model has been classed as effective and easy to use as well as only suited 
to experienced users and part of the ‘laborious’ STAMP analysis process 
(Ferjencik, 2011; Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Johnson and Holloway, 2003; 
Ouyang et al., 2010). A number of specific limitations have been identified: 
an undefined model structure; a lack of detailed guidance on constraint flaw 
classification and identification of contextual factors affecting people at the 
regulatory and operational levels; presentation of results (Johnson and 
Holloway, 2003; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 
2012). The lack of formal guidance, however, provides flexibility for the 
analyst and encourages them to consider interactions across the whole 
system, look beyond the proximal accident events and consider the context 
of the actors involved (Hovden et al., 2011; Johnson and Holloway, 2003; 
Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012). In addition, the ability to visually represent 
complex system structures and the constraints between actors is considered 
by Johnson and de Almeida (2008) to be a great benefit of STAMP. 
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 FRAM model development process 3.4.2.4  
Problem definition 
The need to consider accidents as emergent phenomena resulting from 
dynamic, non-linear system behaviour led to the creation of FRAM. Hollnagel 
and Goteman (2004) argue that this perspective is required as searching a 
chain of events for a root cause results in an infinite regress, which is 
deemed practically and intellectually unacceptable. Given that sequential and 
epidemiological models are unable to meet this requirement, the preference 
for systemic tools is based on this reason alone (Hollnagel, 2004 p.159).  
Modelling approach 
The approach proposed by Hollnagel (2004 p.159-160) as a ‘suitable 
candidate’ for the basis of a systemic model is that of stochastic resonance 
(see Figure 15). 
Signal with 
random 
noise added
Detection 
threshold
Signal
Random 
noise
Stochastic resonance
Time  
Figure 15 - Stochastic resonance. Adapted from Hollnagel and Goteman 
(2004). 
STS are composed of sub-systems and functions which, although designed 
otherwise, will exhibit varying degrees of performance variation (represented 
by the ‘signal’ in Figure 15) (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004). The 
performance variability of any given system component can ‘resonate’ with 
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that of the remaining elements (represented as the ‘random noise’ in Figure 
15) and produce emergent variation that is too high to control. Given that this 
performance variability resonance is not truly stochastic, as it is a 
consequence of functional coupling in the system, Hollnagel (2004) uses the 
term ‘functional resonance’ instead. FRAM, by considering accidents as the 
product of resonant system function variability, emphasises their dynamic, 
non-sequential nature (Hollnagel et al., 2008). 
System model creation 
The construction of a FRAM model follows a defined procedure, as described 
by Hollnagel (2004 p.186). Firstly, the relevant system functions are identified, 
labelled (according to their performance goal) and characterised by six basic 
parameters (input, output, time, control, preconditions, and resources). These 
functions and their features are graphically represented as hexagons with six 
sub-nodes respectively. The second stage involves determining the potential 
for performance variability by categorising each function (and labelling its 
hexagon) as either human, technological or organisational and assessing it 
via an 11-point common performance conditions checklist based on the 
CREAM method. This categorisation process is followed by the description of 
the dependencies between system functions in order to identify potential 
unwanted resonant connections. This is achieved by noting whether the 
variability of one function can affect any of the other functions. Graphically 
this means connecting the inputs and outputs of one function hexagon to the 
relevant inputs and outputs of the other functions, thereby producing a 
‘FRAM network’ (Belmonte et al., 2011) (see Figure 16). The final part of the 
analysis involves determining the countermeasures required to dampen 
function variability. However, this process is conducted once the FRAM 
model has been completed in the previous stage. 
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Figure 16 - FRAM diagram format (I = input, O = output, T = time, C = control, 
P = preconditions and R = resources) 
Model validation 
No formal evaluation of the validity and reliability of FRAM has been 
conducted to date and the developmental nature of the model has been 
highlighted in the literature (see Herrera and Woltjer, 2010; Stringfellow, 
2010). Various issues have been raised, including: the need for a more 
structured approach to identifying performance variability and creating safety 
recommendations; the need to evaluate the suitability of FRAM for use during 
early stages of accident investigation; the need for guidance on how to 
address system migration to high risk operations. Research conducted by 
Belmonte et al. (2011) suggests that predictive FRAM models can be 
‘calibrated’ by inputting data from real-world or simulated scenarios. This 
suggests that internal validity can be tested. However, no further studies 
have been conducted to demonstrate this. Despite the lack of formal testing, 
Woltjer (2006) suggests that FRAM provides a useful means of 
understanding current complex accidents and assessing risk.  
Model usage 
FRAM was developed to act as an accident analysis and risk assessment 
tool. Consequently there are number of examples for both methods of 
application. The generic nature of the technique has seen it utilised in a 
number of domains. Examples include aircraft collisions (de Carvalho, 2011; 
Herrera and Woltjer, 2010; Hollnagel et al., 2008; Sawaragi et al., 2006), 
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financial services (Sundström and Hollnagel, 2011), emergency management 
(Woltjer et al., 2006), rail network control (Belmonte et al., 2011), patient 
safety (Alm and Woltjer, 2010) and air traffic control and navigation 
(Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004; Macchi et al., 2009). 
 FRAM systems approach characteristics 3.4.2.5  
System structure 
FRAM takes a different approach to defining the system structure, compared 
with STAMP and AcciMap, as it is not based on the RMF. The model 
provides a representation at the level of individual functions and, therefore, 
there is no explicit description of the overall system structure (Hollnagel and 
Goteman, 2004). The system boundary is also defined from a functional 
perspective. Hollnagel (2004 p.189) comments that the system boundary is 
relative to the chosen point of view, i.e. the functions contained in the model 
represent the internal environment. Consideration by FRAM for system 
element differentiation is clear. The functions included in an analysis are 
selected because of the specific role they play in the unwanted, i.e. unsafe, 
system operation. In addition, each function is defined by six standard 
characteristics, thereby facilitating comparisons throughout the system 
structure. 
System component relationships 
Component interrelationships and interdependence is explicitly addressed by 
the third stage of a FRAM analysis, i.e. establishing the dependencies 
between system functions. Indeed, Belmonte et al. (2011) comment that the 
main contribution of the model is that it highlights the complex interactions 
that arise in STS. Despite the lack of an overall system structure description, 
analysis of interactions across various system levels may occur depending 
on the functions under consideration. This allows for a holistic view of 
function variability and how their interactions can produce accidents (de 
Carvalho, 2011). Analysing the whole system for unexpected connections is 
also promoted by Hollnagel (2004 p.197). 
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System behaviour 
The creation of a FRAM model, by definition, incorporates all facets of 
system behaviour. Indeed, the graphical nature of the model explicitly 
accounts for the inputs, outputs, goal and regulation of each system function. 
Transformation processes are also graphically accounted for, given that: (1) 
the system function labels help describe the processes and (2) the treatment 
of a system input requires certain resources and preconditions, which are 
represented as characteristic sub-nodes. System entropy is directly 
addressed by Hollnagel (2004 p.125), who comments that ‘inputs are 
transformed into outputs, usually with increasing order or decreasing entropy 
as a result’. The concepts of equifinality and multifinality are also embodied in 
the notion of functional resonance, i.e. the performance variation in each 
system function can produce safe and unsafe outcomes. 
 FRAM usage characteristics 3.4.2.6  
Timeline consideration 
The graphical representation of system functions provided by a FRAM 
analysis does not include a sequence of events or timeline. The functions 
generally follow a left-right temporal relation but this is not always possible to 
apply and their relative position, therefore, carries no meaning (Hollnagel and 
Goteman, 2004). An analysis conducted by Herrera and Woltjer (2010) 
introduced instantiations of FRAM models to describe the change in system 
function interaction across different time periods; a process also advocated 
by de Carvalho and Ferreira (2012)5. This development goes some way to 
creating an accident timeline, albeit defined by changes in function 
performance rather than specific events. 
Avoidance of blame 
FRAM refrains from looking for ‘root causes’ by considering that accidents 
occur as a result of resonant variations in normal system function 
performance. This viewpoint is taken in order to contextualise the accident 
and understand why it happened, rather than simply determine what 
happened (Herrera and Woltjer, 2010). 
                                            
5 de Carvalho and Ferreira (2012) was in press at the time of the FRAM evaluation 
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Model compatibility 
Several studies have suggested that using FRAM alongside other analysis 
techniques could be beneficial. Belmonte et al. (2011) propose that 
sequential-based fault tree events can be thoroughly analysed with FRAM. 
Herrera and Woltjer (2010) comment that combining FRAM with other 
models during an analysis provides differing but complementary perspectives 
of an accident, which may enhance understanding of the incident. This idea 
is supported by de Carvalho (2011) and de Carvalho and Ferreira (2012), 
who suggest that using FRAM with cognitive analysis techniques can provide 
an understanding of how human performance is chosen to meet operational 
and personal objectives. 
Recommendation production 
FRAM does not automatically produce recommendations for safety 
interventions. The model does highlight which parts of a system require 
remedial action, however, it is the responsibility of the analyst to determine 
what types of interventions are necessary. The model has been used in 
various studies to identify general safety insights into various types of system 
by considering specific accidents, e.g. air traffic management (de Carvalho, 
2011; Herrera and Woltjer, 2010) and financial services (Sundström and 
Hollnagel, 2011). Belmonte et al. (2011) also suggest that hypothesised 
FRAM networks can be tested by inputting real-world or experimental data, 
thereby allowing knowledge of different types of accident to be developed. 
Resources required 
The application of FRAM is structurally simple but, due its different theoretical 
grounding, requires an initial learning period coupled with extensive domain 
and human factors knowledge (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). Due to the 
time consuming nature of a FRAM analysis a prototype software tool (the 
FRAM visualizer) was developed, although it appears the development of the 
tool has been discontinued (see http://code.google.com/p/framvisualizer/). It 
is understood that FRAM has not been used in active investigations and 
hence its compatibility with primary data has not been tested, although it 
seems it would be compatible with such information. Previous studies have, 
 Chapter 3 63 
however, used investigation reports as data sources (e.g. de Carvalho, 2011; 
Herrera and Woltjer, 2010) which suggests that acceptably comprehensive 
analyses can be performed solely with secondary data.  
Usability  
No formal usability assessment has been conducted on the FRAM model, 
however various researchers have highlighted both benefits and drawbacks 
of using the technique. Herrera and Woltjer (2010) remark that the model 
guides the analyst towards explicitly identifying the systemic factors 
associated with the accident and why they occurred. The authors also 
mention, however, that there is a need for a structured approach to generate 
the subsequent safety recommendations. A lack of guidance is also 
highlighted by Stringfellow (2010), who suggests that FRAM does not support 
the analyst in discovering resonance modes within the system. Hollnagel et 
al. (2008) state that the technique is easy to learn and use but, given that 
development of the supporting analysis software has ceased, use of FRAM 
can be time consuming. In addition, Johansson and Lindgren (2008) 
comment that analyst requires extensive theoretical and domain knowledge. 
 AcciMap model development process 3.4.2.7  
Problem definition 
Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) state that the limitations of the traditional 
cause-consequence chart are the reasons for creating the AcciMap method. 
The various purposes of the technique are: to aid accident analysis; identify 
decision makers who can potentially improve safety; act as a 
communications aid for cross-disciplinary research and design; provide a 
visual representation of complex system accidents (Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2002).  
Modelling approach 
The approach to modelling taken by AcciMap is based on the idea that safety 
is impacted by decisions taken at every level of the system hierarchy. The 
tool is, therefore, designed to perform a vertical analysis of an STS for a 
particular accident case. This includes studying the events, acts and 
decisions that contributed to the accident. 
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System model creation 
An AcciMap diagram is generated by mapping nodes and arrows on to the 
organisational hierarchy defined by the RMF. These nodes and arrows 
represent the causal flow of events and system states (Ladkin, 2005) (see 
Figure 17). 
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5. Physical 
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actor activities
4. Technical and 
operational 
management
3. Local area 
government, 
company 
management 
(planning and 
budgeting)
2. Regulatory 
bodies and 
associations
1. Government 
(policy and 
budgeting)
Consequence
Precondition 
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further
Indirect 
consequence
Task or action
Direct 
consequence
Task or action
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event
Direct 
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Function
Order
Decision
Order
Decision Priorities
Precondition 
evaluated no 
further
SYSTEM LEVEL
 
Figure 17 - AcciMap diagram format. Adapted from Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002). 
Consideration for particular levels of the system hierarchy depends on the 
system being analysed but generally incorporates all the sections identified 
by the RMF (Salmon et al., 2010a; Stringfellow, 2010). The use of the RMF 
structure is for the purposes of clarity and analysts can add extra notations, 
which refer to detailed narratives in an accident report, to justify their 
depiction of the accident scenario. This is exemplified by the AcciMaps 
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presented by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) and Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002). 
Model validation 
The AcciMap concept was not originally presented as a fully developed and 
tested model and few efforts have subsequently been made to formally 
validate the tool (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). The most thorough 
attempt was conducted by Branford (2007), who standardised the use of the 
model and tested its validity and reliability through a series of controlled 
experiments. Branford’s (2007) findings highlight the subjective nature of 
AcciMap analysis and the resulting need to capture the underlying processes 
of its use. Various other criticisms have been levelled at the technique, such 
as its susceptibility to hindsight bias (Salmon et al., 2010a). However, 
Waterson and Jenkins (2011) comment that extensive validation may not be 
necessary if AcciMap is used as an exploratory tool. 
Model usage 
The generic nature of AcciMap makes it applicable for analysis in any 
industry (Salmon et al., 2010a). This is evidenced by the variety of domains 
considered in previous studies utilising the method, e.g. food production 
(Cassano-Piche et al., 2009), oil and gas (Hopkins, 2000), emergency 
services (Jenkins et al., 2010), aerospace (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008) 
and outdoor activities (Salmon et al., 2010a). Use of AcciMap has been 
almost entirely retrospective in nature. One example of prospective use was 
identified, in which a ‘generic AcciMap’ was developed to study the 
transportation of dangerous goods (see Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). 
 AcciMap systems approach characteristics 3.4.2.8  
System structure 
The system hierarchy is addressed by graphically incorporating all levels of 
the RMF (see Figure 12). This results in the system structure being described 
from an organisational perspective, with the different levels being defined by 
their influence on the control of safety. The model also accounts for the 
physical, technological, regulatory and commercial internal environments. A 
key system boundary seems to exist within the societal environment, where 
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the general public represent the ‘external’ environment and the various 
decision makers involved in safety exist in the ‘internal’ environment. 
Consideration for system component differentiation is given, at a high level of 
abstraction, by the various characteristics of the hierarchical levels and the 
elements which exist in each tier. 
System component relationships 
Analysis of the whole system and the component interactions which lead to 
accidents is inherently promoted by the model, given that it considers safety 
as an emergent property (Salmon et al., 2010a). The nature of the AcciMap 
graphical representation requires the analyst to consider component 
interaction within and across all levels of the system hierarchy (see Figure 
17). The directional nature of the arrows connecting the nodes implies a 
counterfactual interpretation of cause-effect relationships (Ladkin, 2005). 
System behaviour 
The creation of an AcciMap necessitates that the analyst considers the 
behaviour of the system and its components. The causal links between 
nodes show that outputs of one system element act as inputs to other 
components (see Figure 17). The nodes themselves represent processes, 
internal environmental conditions and regulation mechanisms that 
contributed to the accident.  
System entropy is implicitly accounted for by enabling analysts to consider 
the influence of various internal environmental factors. The influence of the 
external social environment, i.e. that of public opinion, is indirectly accounted 
for via the inclusion of regulatory/governmental bodies in the system 
hierarchy. Public opinion, according to the RMF, influences the policies 
created at this level of the system (see Figure 12). AcciMap does not 
explicitly consider the multi- and equifinality aspects of system behaviour. 
However, as the model is focused on specific issues relating to a given 
accident scenario, this is a moot point. 
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 AcciMap usage characteristics 3.4.2.9  
Timeline consideration 
AcciMap does acknowledge the chronology of accident events, however, it is 
only possible to preserve the strict time dimension within one system level 
during a given phase of the model creation (Hale, 2009). Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002) state that this event sequence is established in the 
‘physical process and actor activities’ level in the system hierarchy. This 
sequence is similar to a timeline, in that it describes how accidents develop 
over time (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). 
Avoidance of blame 
Through inclusion of an event sequence, the analyst is directed towards an 
‘initiating event’ of an accident. However, the AcciMap approach places these 
events into a context which enables an understanding of why they happened. 
This contextual detail helps to avoid unfairly blaming front-line operators by 
providing the background of how their actions came about (Branford, 2011). 
Indeed, Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) comment that the focus of AcciMap 
analysis is not the search for management errors ‘and the like’. Rather, it is 
aimed at identifying the causal flow of events and the management and 
regulatory bodies that may have contributed, in order to improve system 
design and safety. 
Model compatibility 
AcciMap can operate as a standalone analysis technique or part of a suite of 
risk management methods (see Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). However, 
it is understood that no research has attempted to incorporate it with other 
models in order to conceptually enhance either tool. 
Recommendation production 
AcciMap does not automatically produce safety recommendations, nor does 
it provide guidance on how to generate them (Branford et al., 2009; Salmon 
et al., 2010). However, the way causal effects are graphically represented 
means analysts can systematically identify factors that, if corrected, could 
prevent a range of potentially hazardous situations from arising (Branford et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, the ‘big picture’ approach provided by AcciMap can 
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be useful for determining where safety improvements can be made (Branford, 
2011). Beyond looking at the causes of a specific accident, Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) note that researchers have used AcciMap to identify more 
generic insights into wider classes of failure. This can be achieved by 
developing a ‘Generic AcciMap’, i.e. an amalgamation of accident scenarios 
which forms a basis for generalisation (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). 
Resources required 
Use of AcciMap requires significant resources for data collection and analysis 
activities, as well as formal education and training (Salmon et al., 2010a; 
Sklet, 2004). Although Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) detail the structure 
of an AcciMap, there is no specific guidance regarding how accident data 
should be selected and manipulated to contribute to the diagram. The vast 
majority of studies have been based on secondary data extracted from 
existing official accident investigation reports (e.g. Branford, 2011; Cassano-
Piche et al., 2009; Salmon et al., 2010a). Such information typically includes 
witness testimonies, technical engineering data and expert opinions and 
suggests that AcciMap would be compatible with primary data of this nature.  
Usability  
No formal usability testing has been conducted for the AcciMap. However, 
several features of the method are highlighted in the literature as improving 
the ease of accident analysis. The model provides a clear and concise 
summary of the accident, which can act as a useful ‘conversation piece’ to 
support discussion (Branford, 2011; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). 
AcciMap also enables the analyst to visualise the entire system structure and 
propagation of events across its hierarchy (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). 
This, in turn, facilitates a better understanding of political and organisational 
influences and the devising of high-level safety interventions (Branford et al., 
2009; Kirwan, 2001). The lack of usage guidance and standardised error 
classification have been raised as issues which reduce the accessibility of 
the model and produce inconsistent application across studies (Branford et 
al., 2009; Salmon et al., 2010a). However, this also means that analysts have 
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a large range of options for configuring an AcciMap diagram (Waterson and 
Jenkins, 2011). 
A summary of the STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap evaluations is presented in 
Tables 5-7. 
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Model development process 
Evaluation criteria 
Model 
STAMP FRAM AcciMap 
Problem definition Analysis of control structure deficiencies 
Need to analyse emergent 
behaviour 
Aid accident analysis, identify 
relevant decision makers, act 
as a communications aid, 
graphically represent system 
accidents 
Modelling approach selection 
Analysis of feedback 
mechanisms within control 
hierarchy 
Analysis of resonant 
performance variability of 
system functions 
Vertical system analysis of 
events, acts and decisions 
System model creation 
Format 
Nodes (control structure 
components) linked by 
directional feedback loops 
Nodes (system functions) 
linked by lines representing 
function dependencies 
Nodes (events etc.) linked by 
causal arrows mapped on to 
RMF 
Procedure Not defined Defined procedure Not defined 
Model validation 
Validation 
process 
Minimal formal testing (inter-
analyst reliability tested) No formal testing 
Validity and reliability formally 
tested 
State of 
validation Validity and reliability problems caused by subjective nature of analysis 
Model usage 
Type of use Retrospective and prospective Retrospective and prospective Retrospective 
Domain 
application 
Aerospace, public water 
supply, rail transport 
Aerospace, financial services, 
emergency management, rail 
networks, patient safety 
Construction, food production, 
oil and gas, emergency 
services, aerospace, outdoor 
activities 
Table 5 - Model development process evaluation summary 
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Systems approach characteristics 
Evaluation criteria 
Model 
STAMP FRAM AcciMap 
System 
structure 
System 
hierarchy 
Defined by system control structure, 
based on RMF 
Defined by individual accident-related 
system functions 
Organisational perspective defined 
by influence on control, based on 
RMF 
Environmental 
boundary 
Implicitly defined by society external 
to system, i.e. general public 
Implicitly defined by functions selected 
for analysis 
Implicitly defined by society external 
to system, i.e. general public 
Component 
differentiation 
Abstract definition based on position 
within control structure 
Explicitly defined by functional role in 
accident 
Abstract definition based on 
differing impacts on safety 
System 
component 
relationships 
Component 
relationships 
Explicitly represented by feedback 
loops 
Explicitly represented by function 
dependency links 
Explicitly represented with causal 
arrows 
Holism Addressed by analysis across system levels 
Addressed by analysis across system 
levels (depending on functions included 
in analysis) 
Addressed by analysis across 
system levels 
System 
behaviour 
Inputs and 
outputs 
Implicitly represented by feedback 
loops Explicitly represented by nodes Explicitly represented by nodes 
Goal seeking Implicitly represented by feedback loops Explicitly represented by nodes Not represented 
Transformation 
processes Implicitly represented by nodes Explicitly represented by nodes Explicitly represented by nodes 
Entropy Implicitly represented by feedback loops Implicitly represented by nodes Implicitly represented by nodes 
Regulation Explicitly represented by feedback loops Explicitly represented by nodes Explicitly represented by nodes 
Equi- and 
multifinality Not represented 
Implicitly represented by considering 
both normal and resonant performance Not represented 
Table 6 - Systems approach characteristics evaluation summary 
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Model usage characteristics 
Evaluation criteria 
Model 
STAMP FRAM AcciMap 
Model compatibility Used with other models in retrospective analysis 
Not tested (but suggested by 
researchers) 
Not tested (although forms 
part of risk management 
toolset) 
Safety 
recommendations 
Automatic 
generation No No No 
Provides general 
insights Yes Yes Yes, via 'Generic Accimap' 
Resources 
Training required Unclear (conflict in the literature) Yes Yes 
Level of analyst 
expertise required Extensive domain and theoretical knowledge Formal education 
Input data 
compatibility Secondary quantitative and qualitative data (possibly compatible with primary data) 
Usability 
Formally tested No No No 
Pros 
Effective and easy to use, 
visual representation of 
system structure and 
constraints, applicable to any 
domain, flexibility of model 
creation 
Explicit identification of 
systemic factors, easy to learn 
and use 
Clear and concise visual 
summary, helps high-level 
intervention design, applicable 
to any domain, flexibility of 
model creation 
Cons 
Time consuming, lack of 
guidance, undefined model 
structure 
Lack of guidance, time 
consuming 
Lack of usage and error 
classification guidance 
Table 7 – Model usage characteristics evaluation summary
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3.5   Discussion 
3.5.1   Systems theory interpretation in the SAA literature  
The SAA literature does, on a general level, provide information about the 
various features of the systems approach. However, the coverage of these 
topics is varied and is, in some instances (e.g. environmental boundaries), 
predominantly conceptual and/or generalised in nature. For example, 
relatively little attention is paid to system hierarchies and there are differing 
views of how system structures are defined. This contrasts with the focus 
given to holism and the more consistent views surrounding safety and 
accidents as emergent properties of system behaviour. There is also 
extensive use of abstract language to describe the various elements of the 
systems approach. This varied and, at times, highly theoretical presentation 
exemplifies a lack of clarity regarding SAA that exists within accident analysis 
research. Indeed, no single definition of the systems approach has been 
adopted by the SAA research community.  
Therefore, any practitioner wishing to utilise the literature to gain an overall 
understanding of SAA would need to consult a range of documents. This may 
not be possible due to the time and cost constraints associated with 
accessing and studying the literature (Chung and Shorrock, 2011). Also, the 
varying levels of conceptualisation within the literature may limit its 
applicability and, therefore, its relevance to practitioners; an issue which is 
reflected in other research disciplines such as human factors (e.g. Salas, 
2008) (see Table 2). It is arguable that these issues may restrict the adoption 
of SAA within industry. 
The different interpretations of the system theory components are, however, 
unsurprising. The lack of clarity in the SAA literature may well be affected by 
the variation within the existing systems theory research (see Section  2.3.2), 
i.e. different SAA researchers basing their systems theory interpretations on 
different elements of the literature. In addition, the individual experiences and 
biases of SAA researchers would be expected to affect their interpretations. 
For example, Nancy Leveson’s computer science and engineering 
background (see http://sunnyday.mit.edu/) may help account for the 
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substantial use of technical language associated with STAMP (see Figure 
14). Nonetheless, the varied presentation of SAA represents a possible 
barrier to its acceptance within the practitioner community. 
3.5.2   SAA model evaluation 
The evaluation summary provided in Tables 5-7 highlights both common and 
disparate features of the STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap models. The 
remainder of Section  3.5.2 discusses how these similarities and differences 
may impact on the adoption and usage of these techniques. 
 Model validation 3.5.2.1  
A lack of validation seems the most likely aspect of model development 
which would affect the selection of the three SAA techniques by practitioners. 
Indeed, the other development criteria have been met: the creators of the 
models have explained the objectives and analysis approaches of the 
techniques, provided a means of modelling any system and have seen their 
tools applied across multiple domains. Although all three models explicitly 
incorporate several systemic concepts and, therefore, provide a degree of 
face, content and construct validity, as described by Branford (2007 p.97-98), 
these forms of validity cannot be proven. Despite this, the research 
community is still advocating the use of systemic models, based on the 
assumption that they are conceptually valid.  
However, Reason (2008 p.95) comments that there is no single right view of 
accidents and finding the ‘truth’ is less important than practical utility. In this 
context, it is arguable that empirical, rather than theoretical, validity is the 
dominant influence on practitioners’ model selection. Whilst empirical 
validation of systemic tools has occurred within research, via a number of 
accident analysis case studies (e.g. de Carvalho, 2011; Salmon et al., 2010a), 
it is far from extensive. As most practitioners in safety-oriented businesses 
tend to prefer well established methods and concepts, it is unlikely that they 
would use a relatively unproven systemic technique unless a business case 
could be produced to justify otherwise (Johansson and Lindgren, 2008). 
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 Systems approach characteristics and analyst bias 3.5.2.2  
Whilst all three techniques are based on systemic concepts, they all have 
different aims and approaches to modelling accidents. Differences are also 
observable in the way they incorporate the various aspects of systems theory. 
They all explicitly address the concepts of system component relationships, 
holism and regulation. This indicates these system theory elements are 
considered most relevant for analysing STS accidents and is consistent with 
their level of coverage within the literature (see Section  3.4.1). The remaining 
aspects of systems theory are, however, given varying degrees of 
consideration by the models, ranging from explicit, graphical representation 
to exclusion. The differing characteristics of the models demonstrate that, 
along with the variation in the SAA and wider systems theory literature, there 
is a lack of consistency regarding the application of the systems approach. 
The differences in the analysis models are, however, to be expected. It is 
doubtful that Nancy Leveson or Erik Hollnagel would have developed STAMP 
and FRAM, respectively, if they thought that AcciMap provided the ideal 
method for SAA. So, how would these differences affect the adoption and 
usage of SAA techniques by practitioners? 
There is little information available concerning the relative benefits of the 
SAA tools. Therefore, it is arguable that selection of one model over another 
will depend on the analyst’s personal preference, i.e. how well the method 
suits their way of thinking with respect to accident causation and analysis. 
This may (at least partly) explain the relative popularity of the SAA methods 
within the research community and also suggests that SAA concepts and 
methods will not be suited to every practitioner, thus contributing to an RPG. 
In addition, an individual’s previous experience will also affect their analysis 
approach and, arguably, their choice of model (Svenson et al., 1999). For 
example, an analyst who is experienced in the use of sequential techniques 
may resist employing the SAA models.  
 Usage guidelines 3.5.2.3  
The perceived benefits and drawbacks of the limited model application 
guidance provided in the literature (see Sections  3.4.2.3,  3.4.2.6, and  3.4.2.9) 
are indicative of the varying usability needs of researchers who used the 
 Chapter 3 76 
techniques. It is arguable that individuals who prefer the flexibility offered by 
a lack of usage guidance are more likely to adopt a systemic technique, as 
opposed to methods employing a more structured and/or taxonomic 
approach (e.g. HFACS). However, greater analysis flexibility is likely to 
decrease the inter-rater reliability of the methods. Therefore, for practitioners 
who work as part of an investigation team and/or need to conduct accident 
trend analysis, a lack of usage guidance and detailed causal taxonomies may 
hamper their analysis efforts. Consequently, they may be discouraged from 
adopting the SAA models. 
 Resource constraints 3.5.2.4  
Practitioners working in any industry will be faced with various resource 
constraints, e.g. time and financial budgets. Given that effective use of 
systemic tools requires a substantial amount of theoretical and multi-
disciplinary knowledge, the time and cost required to train an individual (or a 
team) to conduct SAA may be unjustifiable. In addition, the use of systemic 
models is comparatively time-demanding in relation to other methods used in 
industry, which creates an extra barrier to their application (Johansson and 
Lindgren, 2008). 
 Assignment of blame 3.5.2.5  
The systems approach actively promotes the avoidance of blaming a single 
individual for causing an accident. Each of the three SAA models embodies 
this notion by looking for safety deficiencies throughout a system, rather than 
search a for ‘root cause’. However, one of the principle reasons for 
conducting accident analysis is the assignment of blame and searching for a 
human error makes it easier to find out who should be held accountable 
(Leveson, 2004; Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2011). Given that the financial 
and legal implications of apportioning blame can be vast, analysts may be 
incentivised to use non-systemic techniques to ease the identification of 
culpable personnel. 
3.5.3   Developments in the literature 
Since the literature and model evaluations were performed for this initial 
study a number of SAA-related articles and books have been published. It is 
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important to discuss the findings of this study within the context of these 
newer publications, as they help inform the understanding of the SAA RPG. 
Various studies have been conducted which utilise the SAA methods to 
retrospectively analyse accidents in various domains, e.g. rail (Salmon et al., 
2013), military aviation (Stanton et al., 2012), led outdoor activities (Salmon 
et al., 2012a) and maritime aviation (Hickey, 2012). All of the studies support 
the notion that SAA provides deeper insights into accidents and that systemic 
techniques are, therefore, appropriate tools for accident analysis. This does 
not offer any new information with regards to how the characteristics of the 
SAA innovation may contribute to the SAA RPG. It does, however, 
demonstrate a continued interest from researchers to conduct SAA which, in 
itself, is a factor that influences the gap.  
The nature of accident analysis and the systems approach has continued to 
be studied by various researchers, e.g. Read et al. (2013), Le Coze (2013a; 
2013b) and Wilson (2013). Examining this literature reveals that the systems 
approach is still presented in a varied manner. For example, Wilson (2013) 
suggests that there are six key components to the systems approach, 
compared to the four proposed by Read et al. (2013). Hollnagel (2013) states 
that the term ‘system’ is rarely defined in an explicit manner and there are 
often considerable differences in how it is interpreted and applied. Indeed, Le 
Coze (2013b) states that the safety literature is fragmented and that there is 
no dedicated framework and synthesis of the research to facilitate learning 
from accidents. This is exemplified by the research of Read et al. (2013), who 
discovered that none of the rail level-crossing behaviour literature they 
reviewed embodied the core concepts of the systems approach. This 
observation is consistent with the findings of Salmon et al. (2012b), who state 
that road safety research is primarily focused on individual system 
components. Furthermore, as the understanding of STS continues to evolve 
(e.g. Davis et al., 2013; Klein, 2013; Siemieniuch and Sinclair, 2013), the 
variation in systems approach perspectives seems likely to increase. 
Therefore, the more recent literature contributes to the issues described in 
Section  3.5.1 which may influence the SAA RPG. 
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Two key documents which contribute to the SAA literature and, in particular, 
the usage of STAMP and FRAM are the books written by Leveson (2012) 
and Hollnagel (2012). Detailed information on systems theory and the 
conceptual foundations of STAMP is provided by Leveson (2012). An 
updated and more structured approach to applying the method is also 
described, i.e. the nine-stage Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) 
process. Similarly, Hollnagel provides the underlying concepts of FRAM and 
an updated application process for the method. Although both techniques still 
offer a flexible analysis approach, i.e. they are not constrained by detailed 
taxonomies, the improved guidance partly addresses the inter-rater reliability 
issues discussed in Section  3.5.2.3. Therefore, this new literature may 
reduce the extent of the SAA RPG. 
Two important studies, conducted by Stanton et al. (2012) and Salmon et al. 
(2012a), have compared the STAMP and AcciMap methods against one 
another (and other analysis techniques) by using them to analyse accident 
case studies. Stanton et al. (2012) used a structured evaluation framework to 
assess and compare the methods, similar in nature to the framework utilised 
in this study. Conversely, Salmon et al. (2012a) adopted a less defined 
approach. However, both studies provide similar findings. For example, 
Stanton et al. (2012) show that whilst STAMP and AcciMap apply the 
majority of the systems approach, they do so in different ways. Salmon et al. 
(2012a) also state that both techniques provide comprehensive analyses of 
the entire STS structure albeit that they achieve this in different manners, i.e. 
STAMP requires additional data and analysis to create the control structure 
diagram. The studies also comment on the limited reliability of the two 
methods resulting from their lack of guidance material and detailed 
taxonomies. The significant resource demands associated with learning and 
using the techniques is noted in both articles. Stanton et al. (2012) also 
comment on the limited validation that STAMP and AcciMap have received. 
In summary, Salmon et al. (2012a) suggest that AcciMap, due to its greater 
analysis flexibility, is the method best suited for single case analysis (they 
recommend that taxonomies be developed for the method in order to 
facilitate trend analysis). Stanton et al. (2012) do not state a preference for 
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either technique. The findings of these two studies (in terms of the method 
characteristics they identified and their impact on method adoption and 
usage) support those contained in this chapter and help to confirm which 
aspects of the systemic analysis tools may contribute to the SAA RPG. 
Finally, research has now been conducted which suggests that combining 
AcciMap with other techniques can provide insights beyond those produced 
by a single method (see Debrincat et al., 2013; Salmon et al., 2013). This 
indicates that analysts may now be equally likely to select STAMP, FRAM or 
AcciMap based on their compatibility with other methods and, therefore, that 
any contribution to the SAA RPG from this characteristic will be consistent 
amongst the three techniques. However, it is unclear whether this 
compatibility will, overall, increase or decrease the extent of the gap.  For 
example, the deeper analysis insights provided by the use of multiple 
methods may cause some practitioners to utilise the SAA techniques, 
thereby reducing the RPG. Conversely, the resultant increase in resource 
demands may dissuade other individuals from employing the systemic 
methods and increase the extent of the gap. 
3.6   Study limitations 
Whilst this chapter presents a systematic evaluation of the SAA literature and 
popular models and highlights a range of factors which can affect the SAA 
RPG, two key limitations exist. Firstly, it is not possible to discern the relative 
impact of the different issues discussed in Sections  3.5.1 and  3.5.2. However, 
this was beyond the scope of the study. Furthermore, as some of the 
identified themes are subjective in nature, e.g. the benefits/drawbacks of the 
limited usage guidance (see Section  3.5.2.3), ranking the influence of the 
SAA characteristics with the available data is arguably inappropriate. 
Secondly, the evaluation of STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap was based on an 
analysis of the literature, rather than applying the techniques to an accident 
case study in order to gain a first-hand perspective on how the techniques 
perform SAA. Whilst it is considered that this study provides useful 
information regarding the three methods, it also believed that additional 
insights can be gained by performing such an analysis. This need is 
addressed by the research conducted in Study 3 (see Chapter 5). 
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3.7   Conclusion 
Whilst the systems approach is being promoted within the research literature 
as the conceptually preferred means of analysing major accidents, systemic 
techniques developed to perform SAA are not being used widely within 
industry. This study examined various characteristics of the SAA literature 
and the three most popular SAA models (STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap) to 
ascertain their contribution to the RPG. 
The findings of this study show that the research literature has not presented 
a consistent or clear approach to applying systems theory within accident 
analysis. This may be an influential factor in the lack of SAA performed by 
practitioners. A lack of model validation, analyst bias, limited usage guidance, 
high resource requirements and the implications of not apportioning blame 
for an accident were identified as the key issues which may influence the use 
of the SAA techniques within industry. 
3.7.1   Future work 
Whilst this chapter provides an insight into the SAA innovation characteristics 
and how they affect the SAA RPG, as described in Section  2.5.2, the 
analysis processes of practitioners have yet to be examined with regards to 
how they may contribute to a gap. This forms the motivation for Study 2. 
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Chapter 4 – Study 2: Factors contributing to the SAA 
research-practice gap 
4.1   Chapter overview 
This chapter follows on from the research presented in Chapter 2 and 
examines the SAA RPG from a different perspective. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 42 safety experts to understand which factors 
stemming from practice contribute to the SAA RPG. In combination with the 
findings from Study 1, an overall description of the SAA RPG is provided. 
The factors which contribute to the gap are subsequently discussed, thereby 
highlighting their impact on the RPG. 
4.2   Introduction 
The findings of Study 1 revealed that SAA is not presented consistently or 
clearly via the research literature and that there are a number of factors 
which may affect the adoption and usage of SAA methods. A question that 
naturally follows is: are these issues relevant to practitioners?  Also, what 
other issues might affect the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA and its 
methods?  Indeed, the use of an analysis technique is affected not only by its 
features but also by the characteristics of the users, the tasks they carry out 
and the technical, organisational and physical environments in which the 
method is used (Thomas and Bevan, 1996). Given that the analysis 
processes of practitioners (and the issues which affect them) have yet to be 
examined, with regards to their contribution to the SAA RPG, an opportunity 
exists to answer these questions (see Section  2.5.2). By doing so, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the SAA RPG can be obtained.  
4.2.1   Study aims and objectives 
The overall aims of the study were to identify and examine the factors 
stemming from practice which contribute to the SAA RPG and, in 
combination with the findings of Study 1, present a general description of the 
gap. The following objectives were established to achieve this: 
• Understand how the awareness of, and need for, SAA within the 
practitioner community could inhibit its adoption and usage 
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• Understand how the factors influencing current analysis approaches may 
hinder the adoption and usage of SAA 
• Probe deeper into the issues stemming from research (see Chapter 3) 
which may contribute to the SAA RPG 
4.3   Methods 
4.3.1   Method selection 
The use of semi-structured interviews was selected as the most appropriate 
method to achieve the aims of the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
lack of information regarding SAA within the practitioner literature prevented 
the use of document analysis alone. Secondly, Study 1 included a thematic 
analysis of the scientific literature and other SAA research has centred on 
user evaluations of SAA methods (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 
2012). Consequently, interview data was viewed as the most suitable form of 
information to supplement the existing findings. Finally, semi-structured 
interviews provide the ability to examine topics of interest in varying degrees 
of depth; an approach which suited the exploratory nature of this study 
(Robson, 2002). 
4.3.2   Sampling strategy 
Due to the study resource constraints, it was not possible to create a 
statistically representative sample. Therefore a convenience sample, 
considered to be indicative of the accident investigation community, was 
created. The sample included participants employed as full-time accident 
investigators, health and safety professionals (e.g. company safety 
managers), human factors specialists and accident analysis researchers. 
However, these participant categories were not mutually exclusive, e.g. some 
practitioners had research experience. Therefore, participants were allocated 
to the category associated with their current role as it was felt that their role 
would have the most influence on their analysis approach, e.g. due to 
resource constraints. Also, gaining a detailed understanding of how a 
participant’s background influenced their analysis approach was beyond the 
study scope. Human factors experts were recruited as they are often 
employed on a consultancy basis to provide input into accident investigations 
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or safety-critical system design. The views of researchers were also sought 
to enable a comparison with the practitioners’ perspectives and further 
explore the research-based factors that may influence the SAA research–
practice gap. Participants were required to have experience of investigating 
accidents and/or performing risk assessments within at least one safety-
critical industry. No specific inclusion criteria were set regarding the level of 
their experience. Participant recruitment was halted when an appropriate 
level of thematic data saturation was judged to have been achieved. 
4.3.3   Participants 
Interviews were conducted with 42 participants (age range: 28–79 years; 
mean age: 46.4 years) based in ten countries. The nine full time accident 
investigators, 17 health and safety professionals, ten human factors 
specialists and six researchers had experience of working in at least one of 
25 industries (see Appendix 4.1 for a more detailed description of the 
participants’ location and experience). Of these industries, those that had 
been worked in by at least five participants included: rail, aviation, maritime, 
oil and gas, defence, healthcare, nuclear power and manufacturing. The 
interviews lasted between 28 and 128 min (mean interview length: 70 min). 
4.3.4   Interview question design 
The interview questions were designed to understand the following topics: (1) 
the participants’ knowledge of SAA and accident causation; (2) the analysis 
methods and processes they currently use; (3) the barriers they feel prevent 
information flowing between the research and practice communities. In order 
to provide a comprehensive examination of these topics, the question list was 
informed by the interview study of Lundberg et al. (2010) and the findings of 
Study 1 and other SAA studies (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 
2012) (see Appendix 4.2 for interview questions). The questions were 
reviewed by a senior human factors researcher prior to the start of data 
collection and no amendments were suggested. 
In addition to the interview questions, participants were asked to complete an 
analysis model awareness table (see Appendix 4.3) which was specifically 
designed to assess their level of awareness and usage of well-known 
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systemic and non-systemic techniques. The STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap 
methods were included as they were identified as the most frequently cited 
systemic analysis tools (see Section  3.4.2). The SCM, MORT, FTA and 
Domino model were also included as they are examples of traditional 
techniques commonly mentioned in the scientific literature (e.g. Katsakiori et 
al., 2009; Qureshi, 2007; Sklet, 2004). 
4.3.5   Data collection and analysis 
Five pilot interviews were conducted and analysed. The interview questions 
were reviewed and amended, where necessary, after each interview. The 
main interview study was subsequently performed with a minor iteration of 
the question list performed halfway through the process (the wording of two 
questions was changed). Upon the conclusion of the data collection phase a 
deductive and inductive thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), was performed on the interview transcriptions using NVivo 9.  
4.3.6   Research–practice gap evaluation framework 
As described in Chapter 2 (see Section  2.5.2), RPGs signify the impairment 
of transferring new information between the research and practice 
communities. Rohrbach et al. (1993) summarised the stages involved in 
achieving long-term commitment to new ideas, which arguably relate to 
transferring SAA knowledge and techniques from research into practice. The 
first stage involves creating awareness of an innovation, e.g. SAA, within the 
practitioner community. The second and third steps involve practitioners 
committing to adopt and subsequently using the innovation. These stages 
were used as a framework to evaluate whether issues discovered in the data 
could affect a given stage and, therefore, contribute to the formation of a gap. 
4.4   Findings 
4.4.1   Key themes 
The themes which were considered to be key issues, i.e. topics that were 
mentioned by at least 20% of the participants, are presented in Table 8. The 
majority of these themes focus on two aspects: ensuring that the SAA 
methods meet the needs of the practitioners (themes 2–4, 8); communicating 
SAA research in a more effective manner (themes 5, 7, 9–12). Whilst the 
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number of participant comments indicates the importance of a given theme, 
the non-representative nature of the sample means that this cannot be 
meaningfully tested (see Section  4.6 for more information). Therefore, the 
key themes listed in Table 8 are described alongside others that were 
deemed to influence SAA awareness, adoption and usage and contribute to 
the RPG. 
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Theme (relevant chapter section) 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
Human 
factors 
expert 
Researcher Total 
1. Requirement for accountability influences 
analysis approach ( 4.4.3.3) 56 41 30 67 45 
2. Model not practitioner focused ( 4.4.3.1) 33 24 80 50 43 
3. Empirical validation requirements ( 4.4.3.4) 11 35 60 50 38 
4. Analyst chooses a technique that suits the 
situation ( 4.4.4.1 and  4.4.6.2) 56 35 30 17 36 
5. Previous experience and training affects 
analysis approach ( 4.4.4.2) 67 18 30 50 36 
6. Model suits user's way of thinking ( 4.4.3.2) 22 24 30 67 31 
7. Research considered too conceptual 
( 4.4.2.5) 56 12 30 17 26 
8. Analysis time requirements ( 4.4.4.1) 44 6 40 33 26 
9. Company policy affects analysis ( 4.4.5.1) 22 18 50 17 26 
10. Amount of training given ( 4.4.2.3) 33 24 30 0 24 
11. Previous training and experience affects 
model preference ( 4.4.3.2) 11 24 20 50 24 
12. Lack of communication between researcher 
and practitioner communities ( 4.4.2.5) 56 18 10 0 21 
Table 8 - Key themes 
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4.4.2   SAA awareness 
 Current level of SAA awareness 4.4.2.1  
The scientific literature presented in Section  2.5 describes a general lack of 
systemic analysis model usage with industry. This situation does not 
necessarily stem from low levels of SAA awareness and comments from 
several senior practitioners indicate that awareness is growing within industry: 
“Lots and lots of people talk about this [systemic analysis approach] and it’s 
very current in a lot of the safety and high-hazard industry community.” 
(Health and safety professional) 
Furthermore, notable remarks from two participants provide evidence that 
systemic models are currently employed in certain industry sectors. One 
individual commented that both AcciMap and FRAM are used within their 
national transport accident investigation agency. A second participant with a 
background in human factors described the AcciMap training provided by 
their organisation to accident investigators within the rail industry. However, 
the analysis model awareness table responses obtained from the participants 
suggest that the majority of practitioners remain unaware of the most 
frequently cited systemic analysis models, i.e. STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap 
(see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 - Analysis model awareness 
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This is in contrast to the responses of the researchers who were interviewed 
and indicates that knowledge and use of these models is greater within the 
scientific community. The research-based participants only accounted for 14% 
of the sample and, therefore, this comparison must be made tentatively. 
However, it is indicative of the lack of SAA model usage within industry 
portrayed in the scientific literature and provides further evidence that an 
RPG exists. 
In addition, a different understanding of SAA seems to exist between the two 
communities. When asked to provide a description of the ‘systems approach 
to accident analysis’, the two most common characteristics mentioned by 
participants referred to ‘component interactions’ and ‘analysing the whole 
system’, which are key elements of SAA. However, relatively fewer 
practitioners referred to these characteristics when compared with the 
researchers (see Table 9).  
Systems 
approach 
characteristic 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
Human 
factors 
specialist 
Researcher 
Component 
interactions 22 27 30 67 
Analysing the 
whole system 22 20 40 50 
Table 9 - Participant understanding of SAA 
Five practitioners described SAA as a ‘systematic’ approach, rather than 
providing examples of ‘systemic’ analysis characteristics, which suggests a 
degree of confusion may exist regarding SAA terminology. Furthermore, five 
practitioners were unable to provide a definition. 
 The demand for SAA information 4.4.2.2  
Whilst there is a clear theoretical argument for the use of SAA (see 
Sections  2.3 and  2.4.3), various factors exist which may negate the need or 
opportunity for a practitioner to seek out a systemic analysis tool. Some 
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practitioners simply have no desire to change their current approach and 
therefore have no need for new information: 
“I can’t say that I’ve actively gone and looked at the new techniques that are 
out there as the ones I’ve always used have worked.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
Additionally, day-to-day workload demands were considered by some 
individuals to restrict their learning opportunities: 
“I don’t have nearly enough time to keep up with the [research] paperwork in 
this area; hardly any at all. That’s a problem that most practitioners have; 
they’re so busy doing investigations it’s very difficult to keep up with the 
theoretical side.” (Accident investigator) 
These comments highlight factors which inhibit the search for SAA-related 
information. However, should a practitioner decide to use a systemic analysis 
technique, they are still faced with obstacles associated with accessing and 
utilising the relevant research. 
 Extent of training impacts awareness 4.4.2.3  
An individual’s awareness of analysis methods is dictated, at least in part, by 
the level of training they receive. The extent of training received has clear 
implications with regards to the opportunity to increase SAA awareness and 
comments from participants indicate that levels of training are role-dependent. 
Full-time investigators, for example, sometimes receive extensive training via 
university-level courses:  
“After you join, the first two years is spent doing a diploma, through a 
university here, in accident investigation.” (Accident investigator) 
However, it may also be the case that other practitioners with varying 
degrees of involvement with accident investigation receive less training: 
“We had analytical investigation methods training which was a week-long 
course. The course started as a week but latterly I think it went down to one 
and a half days.” (Human factors expert) 
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Several participants with experience in the rail and nuclear sectors remarked 
that individuals with lower levels of responsibility for accident investigation 
may not have received any relevant training. 
 Accessibility of SAA information 4.4.2.4  
Individuals who are not provided with SAA training can find gaining access to 
the relevant information problematic, which may limit their awareness. The 
time and costs associated with acquiring the necessary training, for example, 
may be excessive: 
“A lot of the time, when you hear about courses, it costs a lot of money to go, 
which dissuaded me from going.” (Health and safety professional) 
Furthermore, an accident investigator, a health and safety professional and a 
human factors expert all remarked that the cost of purchasing scientific 
journal articles and attending conferences may prohibit access to SAA 
information. As well as cost, intellectual property rights can form another 
barrier to acquiring scientific research information: 
“The academic community is very competitive. There’s intellectual property 
rights problems in industry too but normally if there’s a buck in it, or a 
common benefit, you’ll collaborate and create an alliance. I find it very hard to 
get an alliance of academics.” (Health and safety professional) 
 Communication of SAA information 4.4.2.5  
Each participant was asked to list the sources of information they utilise in 
order to keep their knowledge up-to-date. 40 participants provided answers, 
which are summarised in Table 10.  
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Source of information 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
(n = 9) 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
(n = 16) 
Human 
factors 
expert 
(n=10) 
Practitioner 
total 
Researcher 
(n = 5) 
Colleagues and network contacts 56 44 60 51 60 
Conferences 33 50 40 43 20 
Internet searches 22 13 10 14 0 
Investigation reports 11 19 0 11 0 
Online forums and networks 11 19 0 11 0 
Practitioner literature and organisations 33 44 70 49 20 
Research literature 22 6 50 23 100 
Research projects 0 19 10 11 60 
Textbooks 22 6 10 11 0 
Training and experience 44 31 20 31 20 
Does not search for information 0 6 0 3 0 
Table 10 - Sources of information 
 
 Chapter 4 93 
Table 10 indicates that the three most popular sources of new information for 
practitioners, in general, are: (1) speaking with colleagues and members of 
their extended networks; (2) attending conferences; (3) consulting industry 
literature and professional institutes. In comparison, Table 10 suggests that 
the majority of researchers tend to gain new knowledge via the scientific 
literature and by conducting research projects, as well as consulting 
colleagues. The data in Table 10 also suggests that most practitioners do not 
consult the scientific literature. Moreover, some of the practitioners 
specifically remarked on a general lack of communication between the 
research and practice communities: 
“I’m not aware of any real liaison between the two [communities].” (Human 
factors expert) 
“We hardly ever meet people on the theoretical side; it’s once in a blue moon.” 
(Accident investigator) 
When practitioners do engage with the research community the information 
presented is considered by some to be too conceptual and provides little or 
no practical benefit: 
“I know some accident investigators that have been to international 
conferences where there were lots of academics putting forward papers on 
approaches to accident investigation. The practitioners in the audience said 
‘this is actually meaningless and we don’t use it.’” (Accident investigator) 
Consequently practitioners can develop a sense of disregard for researchers 
which could further influence the apparent lack of SAA communication: 
“There is a mentality within practitioners where academics are seen as 
people sitting in an ivory tower and haven’t had any real experience of 
accident investigation so [practitioners think] ‘how can they comment on 
investigations?’” (Accident investigator) 
4.4.3   SAA adoption 
 Practicality of analysis method 4.4.3.1  
Even if sufficient awareness of research is obtained, barriers to its adoption 
may arise from a lack of consideration for practitioner requirements. The 
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features of an analysis method desired most by participants referred to 
aspects of usability, such as the simplicity of using a method (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19 - Preferred features of an anaysis method (% values = percentage 
of participants referring to a given feature) 
The importance of designing a usable technique was reflected in the 
comments of several individuals: 
“I think if you make it simple, people will use it. If it’s complicated, they won’t 
and it becomes another job that’s too difficult to do and it gets put on the 
shelf.” (Health and safety professional) 
Other practicality-related issues which may inhibit the adoption of research 
were also referred to by participants. Several accident investigators, for 
example, commented on a possible lack of appreciation for the practicalities 
of their role in the design of analysis methods. The potentially excessive cost 
of implementing research was also highlighted by a human factors expert. 
 Personal adoption criteria 4.4.3.2  
In addition to the practicalities of using an analysis technique, adoption may 
also be influenced by a number of factors based on an individual’s personal 
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preference and experience. A person’s decision to adopt a method may be, 
for example, based on how well it suits their way of thinking: 
“When I think of the SCM, I can really think of those barriers being broken 
and trying to find out why they have been broken. For me it’s a very natural 
way of investigating. Some people really hate it but for me it works.” 
(Accident investigator) 
The preference for a given model can also be influenced by an individual’s 
previous experience and training: 
“If I had trained with other people I would probably have a very different 
default model that I use. I think it’s mostly my [educational] upbringing that 
makes it very difficult to think of anything else.” (Researcher) 
Experience gained by analysis method usage was specifically highlighted by 
several participants who remarked that their decision to adopt a technique 
was based upon the outcome of an initial trial period.  
 Accountability influences analysis approach 4.4.3.3  
The analysis approach taken by a practitioner can be influenced by their 
need to assign liability for an accident. Some individuals remarked that they 
prefer, or are mandated, to avoid seeking blame in favour of focusing on 
safety improvements, as per the systems approach. However, other 
practitioners who are more concerned with the commercial and legal 
implications of accidents may seek to apportion blame: 
“The way the analysis was set up was really to assist with legal proceedings. 
That was the main driver... [it was] not always to find out what the root cause 
was. It would be more to do with whether a prosecution was likely to be 
successful or not.” (Human factors expert) 
This is particularly evident when those who are conducting an investigation 
may be deemed culpable and are incentivised to apportion liability elsewhere: 
“Because it’s the manager that carries out the industry’s own investigation 
they’re not really going to look at themselves and they’re certainly not going 
to look at their own management chain because that puts them in a 
threatening position.” (Accident investigator) 
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In addition to the influence on SAA adoption, the need to demonstrate liability 
can also influence the use of an analysis technique. One health and safety 
professional, for example, referred to the occasions where he was instructed 
by clients to use their analysis tools in particular ways in order to avoid ‘black 
spots’ on their safety records. 
 Model validation 4.4.3.4  
The extent of an analysis model’s empirical validation was considered by 
many practitioners to be a key influence on their adoption decision. Several 
participants commented on the need for extensive validation to demonstrate 
that a method has been ‘proven’ and can be ‘trusted’: 
“Has it been tried and tested?  Does it add value?  We have to ask these 
questions when we implement something.” (Health and safety professional) 
A number of individuals who provide consultancy services in accident 
investigation and risk analysis specifically commented on the importance of a 
method’s track record when attempting to establish the credibility of their 
work with clients. However, less consideration was given to the extent of a 
method’s theoretical validity: 
“Validity comes very much down the line. I think it’s very much about 
quickness and whether the technique is understood in the community, if I’m 
brutally honest.” (Health and safety professional) 
4.4.4   SAA usage 
 Usage resource constraints 4.4.4.1  
The level of effort given to an investigation will be based, at least in part, by 
the resources available to the investigation team: 
“There’s a 14 out of 15 chance that we’re not going to do a field-based 
investigation that we should do and that’s simply because of funding.” 
(Accident investigator) 
Consequently, this can affect whether an individual employs more complex 
analysis techniques, such as those based on the systems approach: 
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“[Name of method] is something that I’ve been trained in but I’d only use it if 
there had been a major incident, whereas the Five Whys method is probably 
a starting point for a nice and simple easy one. I think the more complex the 
incident, you’d pull in more of the techniques to give you the answer.” (Health 
and safety professional) 
In addition to whether or not an analysis method is used, the time and 
financial constraints involved in accident investigation can also affect how it is 
used. Several participants, for example, remarked that the depth of analysis 
they can achieve with their preferred technique is limited by the time 
available to them. 
 Model reliability 4.4.4.2  
If a systemic analysis technique is adopted by a practitioner there are factors 
related to reliability which will affect its usage. A number of participants 
remarked on the influence that an individual’s background and experience 
has on their analysis approach and how this can produce variation in 
investigation findings. Open discussions and analysis reviews which result in 
a consensus on the investigation findings can help minimise the biasing 
effects of individuals’ backgrounds; a process which is common with full-time 
investigators: 
“The inspector will do a very structured presentation to a group of inspectors 
where we challenge what he’s done, what he’s said and what evidence he’s 
got that’s sufficient to make the conclusions that he’s drawing together.” 
(Accident investigator) 
However, several participants commented on how the qualitative nature of 
the systemic analysis tools could increase the difficulty of reaching such an 
agreement: 
“If you turned up with an AcciMap and said ‘the system is safe because I’ve 
analysed it in an AcciMap’ you’d just get laughed out of the room. They’d pick 
it to pieces because it’s far more subjective.” (Human factors expert) 
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 Data requirements of SAA 4.4.4.3  
Several factors relating to the data requirements of SAA were considered by 
participants to impact on their ability to use the systemic analysis methods. 
For example, the system-wide data needed to perform SAA is not always 
available: 
“If I were to go and work in industry now I think I would have to revert back to 
more simple accident analysis methods just because the data wouldn’t be 
there to support them [the SAA methods].” (Researcher) 
Some practitioners mentioned that the accident information databases they 
are required to use employ coding taxonomies which reflect the theoretical 
(cause-effect) underpinnings of sequential techniques. This may influence 
the type of data that is collected and one individual observed that, even if 
they gather data relevant to SAA, they must transpose their findings into a 
non-systemic format. These issues appear to stem, in part, from the fact that 
researchers and practitioners have fundamentally different approaches to 
analysis and therefore different data requirements: 
“Sometimes I do feel there is an important division between how practitioners 
and some academics treat accident investigation. We’re always looking at 
specifics and therefore evidence will sometimes take us down a very specific 
path and we don’t need to consider the wider aspects and vulnerabilities of 
the system.” (Accident investigator) 
4.4.5   Organisational influences on the research–practice gap 
 Organisational policy 4.4.5.1  
Some individuals have the freedom to choose which analysis technique they 
adopt and use. However, in many cases, organisational policy dictates which 
methods are used: 
“We tend to find that when people come here [for investigation training] they 
want to know all about the models and how to use all of them but often they 
go back to an organisation that says ‘this is what we use’ so they don’t really 
get the opportunity.” (Researcher) 
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Practitioners who provide investigation services on a consultancy basis also 
commented that requests from some clients to use in-house analysis 
techniques can produce similar barriers to analysis tool usage. 
Organisational policy can also impact on the resources available for 
practitioners to learn and use new analysis methods and therefore create the 
issues described in Sections  4.4.2.3 and  4.4.4.1. 
A link between safety culture and organisational policy was referred to by 
several individuals who observed that their analysis approaches were, in part, 
dictated by the senior management and the safety culture they instilled. A 
number of participants also commented that safety-related changes they 
recommended to senior management teams, such as introducing new 
accident investigation policies, sometimes needed to be presented in cost-
benefit, rather than safety improvement, terms: 
“When I turned up at [company name] there was no health and safety. They 
didn’t care about which safety regulation said they had to do risk 
assessments. What I had to do was sell them the cost-effectiveness [of 
safety]. When I put it into a dollar sign they understood it and then their 
attitude became ‘this is good for the company and it prevents reputational 
damage as well.’” (Health and safety professional) 
4.4.6   Industry influences on the research–practice gap 
 Regulatory requirements 4.4.6.1  
The degree of regulation within a given industry can have a large influence 
on what type of analysis techniques are used in accident investigation and 
risk assessments: 
“Regulators [in the nuclear industry] dictate exactly what methods need to be 
used and they’re very slow to update their opinions on these things.” (Human 
factors expert) 
“There is a degree of flexibility. No one is telling me that I have to use the 
SCM and that is it. This is an International Maritime Organisation resolution, 
don’t forget, and is not mandatory.” (Accident investigator) 
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The comments of many practitioners indicated that SAA-based regulation is 
not in place across industry in general. This may be due to a lack of SAA 
awareness at the regulatory level, rather than a decision to reject it: 
“The regulation probably doesn’t recognise [the systems approach] or 
encourage it at the minute. I don’t know about the military or anyone like that 
but certainly in the railway industry it doesn’t seem to.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
 Industry characteristics 4.4.6.2  
In addition to the regulatory environment of an industry, the suitability of 
performing SAA within a given industry may depend on a range of domain 
characteristics, e.g. the degree of operational complexity: 
“If you look at highly dynamic, very complex systems then the systems 
approach is more appropriate. If you’re looking at things like the 
manufacturing industry, it’s probably less appropriate and things like the 
Bowtie method or something a bit more linear are probably more suitable.” 
(Human factors expert) 
“If you are in a highly defined, highly automated environment requiring 
software reliability, for instance in medical systems, then it makes absolute 
sense to use the STAMP technique. It’s an issue of ‘horses for courses.’” 
(Health and safety professional) 
 Resistance to change 4.4.6.3  
The effort and cost of implementing an innovation, such as SAA, within an 
organisation or throughout an industry by means of new regulations can 
create resistance to change. This inertia can increase with the level of 
regulation: 
“Once you get a nuclear power plant licensed you don’t ever want to change 
it because you’ve spent so much money. So, by its very nature, a very 
heavily regulated industry cannot be innovative.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
“I would say changing anything in healthcare at a national level is really, 
really difficult. It takes a long time and there’s a lot of consultation involved. If 
 Chapter 4 101 
we were going to change the way we work, there’s huge numbers of people 
who have a stake in what we do.” (Human factors expert) 
4.5   Discussion 
The topics presented in Section  4.4 describe a wide range of issues that can 
affect if, and how, research is applied by practitioners. All of the issues 
discussed in Chapter 3 (see Section  3.5), e.g. method resource requirements 
and analyst bias, were also highlighted by participants in this study, thereby 
providing a degree of validity to the findings of Study 1. The additional factors 
raised by the participants provide justification for looking beyond the results 
of Study 1 and, therefore, conducting this study. 
Whilst any of the factors presented in Section  4.4 may be sufficient to prevent 
a practitioner from conducting SAA, it is more likely that they all, to a greater 
or lesser extent, combine to inhibit the application of the systems approach. 
When considering all of these factors together they can be viewed as 
providing a wider context in which the research practice-gap is played out. 
Whilst not an exhaustive list, it is believed that the range of themes included 
in Section  4.4 is comprehensive enough to provide an adequate 
representation of the gap. The findings are graphically summarised in Figure 
20, which is based on the evaluation framework derived from the work of 
Rohrbach et al. (1993) (see Section  4.3.6). A discussion of the issues 
contributing to the SAA RPG and the implications for SAA is provided in the 
remainder of Section  4.5. 
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Figure 20 - The SAA RPG 
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4.5.1   Issues associated with the research–practice gap 
The majority of the issues raised by participants may contribute, at least in 
part, to a general gap between accident analysis research and practice. 
Therefore, these factors could hinder the success of any new analysis 
method, regardless of its theoretical underpinning. What then are the 
characteristic features of the SAA RPG?  This question is explored further 
within the context of SAA awareness, adoption and usage in the rest of 
Section  4.5.1. 
 SAA awareness 4.5.1.1  
The opportunity to learn about new analysis techniques, e.g. via training (see 
Section  4.4.2.3), access to and the communication of the relevant information 
(see Sections  4.4.2.4 and  4.4.2.5) will affect a practitioner’s awareness of 
any technique. However, it is worth commenting on how these issues relate 
to SAA. 
It is acknowledged within the literature that SAA requires extensive 
theoretical and domain knowledge, training and formal education (e.g. 
Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et al., 
2012a; Sklet, 2004) (see Section  3.4.2). It is therefore conceivable that 
practitioners will only be made aware of systemic analysis tools in the more 
in-depth training courses. In addition, it seems that the majority of SAA 
information is presented via the research literature and at conferences (e.g. 
Kazaras and Kirytopoulos, 2011; Salmon et al., 2010b). However, as these 
sources of information appear to be the third and fifth most popular resources 
for practitioners (see Table 10), it is arguable that SAA is not being promoted 
in the most effective way. 
The cost of training, research literature and conference proceedings can limit 
SAA awareness. However, information regarding SAA is freely available on 
the internet from sources such as Google Scholar, Nancy Leveson’s MIT 
website (http://sunnyday.mit.edu/) and Erik Hollnagel’s FRAM related website 
(http://www.functionalresonance.com/). This suggests that it is the issues 
surrounding SAA communication (see Section  4.4.2.5) that may be a more 
significant influence on awareness. Given that practitioners can lose interest 
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in research that is too conceptual it is possible that the considerable amount 
of accident causation theory present in the systems approach literature (see 
Section  3.5.1) may dissuade them from learning more about SAA. 
 SAA adoption 4.5.1.2  
As with the awareness of SAA, there are several factors related to the 
adoption of an analysis technique which are influenced by features of the 
systems approach. 
The importance of an analysis method’s usability was reflected in the 
comments of practitioners (see Section  4.4.3.1). Whilst there is varying 
opinion within the literature with regard to the usability of the systemic 
analysis techniques, their use has been viewed in some cases as time-
consuming  (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et 
al., 2011) (see Section  3.4.2). This issue can become increasingly 
problematic for individuals whose main responsibilities do not include the 
investigation of accidents, as they may have less time to conduct analyses. 
SAA may not be suited to and, therefore, adopted by them. 
The notion that more effective safety recommendations can be devised by 
the avoidance of blaming a suitable culprit is well established in the SAA 
literature (e.g. Leveson, 2004) and was echoed in the comments of several 
participants (see Section  4.4.3.3). However, searching for human error 
makes it easier to find out who is responsible for an accident and various 
practitioners emphasised that demonstrating accountability, particularly from 
a legal or commercial perspective, is still an objective of accident 
investigation (Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2011). Therefore, practitioners may 
be incentivised to use non-systemic analysis techniques to ease the 
identification of culpable personnel. 
Johansson and Lindgren (2008) state that most practitioners in safety-
oriented businesses tend to prefer well established methods; a point which 
was also raised by the participants. Although STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap 
have been applied across a variety of safety-critical domains this has mainly 
taken place within an academic context, e.g. accident analysis case studies 
such as Salmon et al. (2012a). The comments of participants, therefore, 
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suggest that SAA methods will require considerable empirical validation 
within an industrial setting if they are to gain acceptance from practitioners 
(see Section  4.4.3.4). 
 SAA usage 4.5.1.3  
If a practitioner takes the decision to adopt a systemic analysis method they 
are faced with several issues which can hinder the application of SAA. SAA 
is not a simple endeavour and requires significant analyst effort and access 
to various subject matter experts (Salmon et al., 2012b). SAA may, therefore, 
only be suited to major accident investigations where funding, time and 
personnel are sufficient to obtain the amount of information required for SAA. 
Indeed, both Leveson (2004) and Salmon et al. (2012b) suggest that the data 
requirements of STAMP and AcciMap are only typically met via the 
comprehensive reports produced after a large scale accident. Furthermore, 
individuals may not be able to gain access to the data required for SAA. For 
example, such information may exist outside of the organisation ‘affected’ by 
the accident (e.g. commercially sensitive documentation from an equipment 
supplier) or an individual may be in the ‘wrong’ position within an organisation 
to address the whole scope of an accident (e.g. unable to interview senior 
managers) (Dien et al., 2012). In addition to the varying levels of information 
access, the type of data that is collected can also influence the application of 
SAA. Accident data is reported, collected and compiled in databases over 
time in line with national regulations and established codification systems 
(Mullai, 2004; Mullai and Paulsson, 2011). However, in some cases these 
databases and coding schemes are not based around the systems approach 
(e.g. they just focus on local events at the ‘sharp end’ of a system) and the 
information required to populate them is, therefore, unlikely to enable 
thorough SAA (Roelen et al., 2011; Salmon et al., 2012b). 
 Organisational and industry issues 4.5.1.4  
A significant influence on a practitioner’s selection of a model is the safety 
culture of their organisation. The comments of a number of participants (see 
Section  4.4.5.1) reflect the findings of Lundberg et al. (2012), who suggest 
that four aspects of safety culture can influence the decision to implement 
safety-related changes: (1) institutionalised low safety standards; (2) 
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prioritisation of safety; (3) the decision making criteria to adopt changes; (4) 
the level of resources allocated to implement them. These factors clearly 
apply to the implementation of any new analysis method. However it is 
arguable that, in some cases, obtaining organisational (or regulatory) 
commitment to making a fundamental shift to employ SAA may be harder 
than implementing a modification of an existing sequential technique. 
The comments from practitioners (see Section  4.4.6.2) indicate that, 
depending on the industry in question, the use of SAA may not always be 
appropriate. This notion is supported by Hollnagel (2008), who suggests that 
systemic models are best suited to accidents within highly complex, 
intractable systems, e.g. nuclear power plants. Therefore, whilst the generic 
nature of the systemic models means that they can be applied in any domain, 
the idea that ‘one size does not fit all’ means that the resulting ‘competition’ 
from other analysis techniques represents a further barrier to SAA adoption 
(Mullai and Paulsson, 2011; Salmon et al., 2012a). This subject is discussed 
further in Chapter 7 (see Section  7.4). 
4.6   Study limitations 
Given that this study utilised a non-representative convenience sample, as 
described in Section  4.3.2, a number of limitations were placed on the 
findings. For example, statistically testing the relative importance of themes 
identified by the participants or the differences observed across roles, 
industries and countries would not produce results that could be generalised. 
This means that the representation of the RPG in Figure 20 can only present 
the contributing factors, rather than their relative influence. However, the use 
of a convenience sample resulted from the resource constraints of the study 
rather than a lack of consideration of sample design. Given the number of 
people who are involved in accident analysis, achieving a representative 
sample from which results could be generalised would be a significant 
challenge. Despite the limitations imposed by the nature of the sample, it is 
considered that the findings of this study offer some useful insights into the 
SAA RPG. 
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4.7   Conclusion 
This study examined various issues stemming from both the research and 
practice communities which may hinder the application of SAA. When 
considered together, these factors provide a description of the SAA RPG. 
Some of these factors are indicative of a general RPG in accident analysis, 
e.g. usage resource constraints. However, others are more pertinent to SAA, 
such as its lack of track record within industry and the possible incentive to 
use non-systemic techniques to facilitate the attribution of blame. Although a 
single factor may be sufficient to prevent a practitioner from conducting SAA, 
it is more likely that they all, to a greater or lesser extent, combine to inhibit 
the application of the systems approach. 
4.7.1   Future work 
So far, this thesis has described and discussed a number of features that 
contribute to the formation of an SAA RPG. A number of important questions 
naturally follow this discourse. Firstly, is the presence of the SAA RPG 
problematic, i.e. does the gap need to be bridged?  This question is 
addressed in Chapter 5, which considers the extent of the gap, and is 
discussed further in Chapter 7 (see Section  7.4). Secondly, if the SAA RPG 
is to be bridged, which of the issues presented in Section  4.4 should be 
tackled?  An initial step in answering this question can be made by 
considering the key themes contained in Table 8. As stated in Section  4.4.1, 
the majority of these themes focus on two aspects: (1) ensuring that the SAA 
methods meet the needs of the practitioners; (2) communicating SAA 
research in a more effective manner. The first of these solutions is examined  
in Chapter 6. Clearly it is important to understand the adaptations required of 
the SAA methods before any modifications are performed. Therefore, user 
evaluations should be conducted to ascertain the strengths and weakness of 
the analysis techniques: this is the focus of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 – Study 3: Systemic accident analysis vs. 
the Swiss Cheese Model 
5.1   Chapter overview 
The research presented in Chapters 3 and 4 provide a description of the SAA 
RPG and the factors which contribute to it. This chapter takes a step further 
by examining the extent of the gap to understand whether it needs to be 
bridged. The analysis model most widely used throughout industry is the 
SCM and this chapter begins by describing the academic debate that exists 
regarding its suitability for SAA. A major accident case study is then analysed 
using an SCM-based model, developed and used by practitioners (the ATSB 
investigation analysis model), and two SAA methods (AcciMap and STAMP). 
The analysis outputs and usage of the techniques are compared and the 
issue of whether the SCM can offer a systems approach to accident analysis 
is discussed. Finally, an assessment of the extent of the SAA RPG is 
presented. 
5.2   Introduction 
So far, this thesis has described and discussed a number of features that 
may prevent the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA techniques by 
practitioners. As suggested in Section  4.7.1, an important question that 
naturally follows this discourse is: does the SAA RPG need to be bridged?  
The proposed benefits of SAA presented in Section  2.3, i.e. gaining an 
improved understanding of accidents which may lead to more effective 
recommendations, suggest that it should be. Research that has compared 
SAA methods with non-systemic analysis techniques (e.g. Belmonte et al., 
2011; Herrera and Woltjer, 2010) indicates that these benefits can be 
achieved and, therefore, that SAA should be promoted throughout safety-
critical domains (see Section  2.4.3).  
However, emerging fields of research often define themselves in terms of 
existing traditional fields against which they are reacting and can describe 
these traditional fields in a simplified or even misleading way, neglecting the 
fact that different perspectives often have more commonalities than 
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disagreements (Hoffman and Militello, 2009; Saurin and Carim Júnior, 2011). 
This is evidenced by the lengthy academic debate on accident models and 
by new techniques often criticising or even disqualifying older ones (Ghirxi, 
2010; Jacobsson et al., 2009). A notable case in point can be found when 
considering the SCM. 
5.2.1   SAA vs. the SCM 
Undoubtedly the most popular accident causation model, the SCM has been 
widely adopted in various industries (e.g. aviation and healthcare) (Salmon et 
al., 2012a). Classified by some (e.g. Hollnagel, 2004) as an ‘epidemiological’ 
model, the SCM suggests that longstanding organisational deficiencies can 
create the necessary conditions for a frontline ‘active failure’ to trigger an 
accident. The presence of these conditions and events in the system 
represents the inadequacy/absence of defensive barriers (e.g. physical 
protection, training and procedures) designed to prevent accidents. The 
defences within a system and their associated inadequacies are graphically 
represented by layers of and holes in Swiss cheese (see Figure 21). When 
the ‘holes’ in a system’s defences align, an accident trajectory can pass 
through the defensive layers and result in a hazard causing harm to people, 
assets and/or the environment, as depicted in Figure 21 (Reason, 2008 
p.101). 
Hazard
Accident
Layers of 
defences
Some holes due to 
latent conditions
Other holes due 
to active failures
 
Figure 21 - Swiss Cheese Model. Adapted from Reason (2008). 
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The SCM has drawn criticism from a number of researchers (e.g. Dekker, 
2006 p.89; Hollnagel, 2012 p.14; Leveson, 2012 p.19) who describe it as a 
sequential technique which oversimplifies accident causation by not 
considering the complex interaction of system components. In addition, some 
authors (e.g. Dekker, 2006 p.89; Hickey, 2012 p.19) suggest that the 
sequential nature of accident causation is portrayed in the signature image of 
the SCM (see Figure 21). The implication is that the SCM no longer provides 
an appropriate description of accident causation. 
Other criticisms of the SCM focus on its application. For example, some 
researchers comment on the model’s lack of specificity about a number of its 
features, e.g. how the holes in the layers of cheese line up and how this 
affects its ease of use (Le Coze, 2013b; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). 
Furthermore, Shorrock et al. (2004) suggest that an overly prescriptive 
application of the SCM can lead to accidents being entirely (and incorrectly) 
attributed to senior management, i.e. overlooking the contribution of 
individuals at the frontline. 
5.2.2   Performing SAA with the SCM? 
The perceived drawbacks of the SCM described in Section  5.2.1 only 
represent one side of the academic debate, however. In contrast to the idea 
that the SCM is a sequential model, Reason et al. (2006 p.9) state that it 
describes accident causation as the ‘unlikely and often unforeseeable 
conjunction of several contributing factors arising from different levels of the 
system’. In other words, events and/or conditions happen together to produce 
an accident. As per SAA, the SCM provides a holistic multi-level analysis 
approach and later versions of the model also take account of the fact that 
‘active failures’ are not required for an accident to occur (see Reason, 1997 
p.17). Furthermore, the connection made by the SCM between normative 
serialisation (i.e. cause-effect) and the temporal orderliness of events that 
occurred is entirely unintended (Reason et al., 2006 p.16).  
The SCM is underspecified but Reason et al. (2006 p.21) state that it was 
never intended to be a used as a detailed accident analysis model and that 
criticising it for a lack of specificity seems unjustified. Regardless, this issue 
 Chapter 5 111 
has been resolved by the various methods which have been developed to 
operationalise its concepts, such as HFACS and Tripod Delta. Additionally, a 
number of organisations (e.g. the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
and EUROCONTROL) have purposely neutralised the language used in their 
SCM-based models to avoid attributing blame, an important aspect of SAA. 
Whist the development of accident models has been required to explain the 
increasing complexity of STS, the introduction of a new model does not 
necessarily mean that existing ones become obsolete (Hollnagel and Speziali, 
2008 p.37; Reason et al., 2006 p.21). Indeed, the SCM (and methods based 
on it) is still used by researchers to perform accident analysis (e.g. 
Szeremeta et al., 2013; Xue et al., 2013) with some suggesting that it offers a 
systemic view of accidents (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 2012). 
However, if the critiques of the SCM are justified then the continued use of 
this (arguably outdated) model means accident investigations may not 
achieve the necessary understanding of major accidents to prevent 
recurrence. Given that the SCM is in widespread use throughout various 
industries and SAA methods are yet to be widely adopted by practitioners, 
the outcome of this debate has clear ramifications with regards to improving 
safety. Therefore, it is important to understand whether or not the SCM can 
provide a systems approach and remain a viable option for accident analysis. 
Gaining this understanding will help define the extent of the SAA RPG and 
whether or not it needs to be bridged. 
5.2.3   Study aim and objectives 
The aim of this study is to consider whether the SCM can provide a systems 
approach to accident analysis and, in order to achieve this, has three main 
objectives: 
• Analyse a major accident (the train derailment at Grayrigg) using three 
techniques: an SCM-based model developed and used by practitioners 
(the ATSB investigation analysis model) and two SAA methods 
predominantly used by the research community (AcciMap and STAMP) 
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• Compare the outputs and application processes of the models, via an 
evaluation framework, in order to examine their theoretical and usage 
characteristics 
• Reflect on the similarities and differences between the models and the 
implications for applying the systems approach in theory and practice 
The intention is to examine this issue within an applied context, rather than a 
purely conceptual one. By giving a practical example of how the SCM 
compares to SAA techniques, it is hoped that the study will be able to 
demonstrate whether the SCM does apply the systems approach or not. 
Furthermore, a more detailed understanding of how AcciMap and STAMP 
apply the systems approach will be obtained, thereby addressing the second 
limitation of Study 1 (see Section  3.6). An overview of the ATSB model, 
AcciMap and STAMP, a description of the Grayrigg accident, details of the 
analysis processes used and the model evaluation criteria are provided in 
Sections  5.3,  5.4,  5.5.1, and  5.5.2 respectively. 
5.3   The analysis methods 
This section presents a description of the three analysis techniques selected 
for the study and the justification for their use. AcciMap and STAMP have 
already been described in Chapter 3. However, brief summaries of the 
methods are provided in Sections  5.3.2 and  5.3.3 in order to incorporate the 
relevant SAA literature that has been published since Study 1 was conducted 
and, therefore, present an updated description of the techniques. 
5.3.1   ATSB investigation analysis model 
The ATSB investigation analysis model (referred to hereafter as the ‘ATSB 
model’) is a modified version of the SCM. As per the SCM, the ATSB model 
provides a general framework that can be used to guide data collection and 
analysis activities during an investigation (ATSB, 2008 p.36). However, 
various alterations to the original SCM were made by the ATSB to improve its 
usability and the identification of potential safety issues. Such changes 
include an enhanced ability to combine technical issues into the overall 
analysis, the use of neutral language (which does not infer blame) and 
emphasising the impact of preventative, as well as reactive, risk controls. To 
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highlight the changes made, the ATSB (2008) presented a latter version of 
the SCM (see Figure 22) and their adaptation of it (see Figure 23). 
 
Figure 22 - Latter version of the SCM. Adapted from ATSB (2008). 
 
Figure 23 - ATSB adaptation of the SCM. Adapted from ATSB (2008). 
As indicated by Figure 23, the ATSB model views organisations as goal 
seeking systems whose performance can become unsafe from the result of 
interacting events and conditions. In this situation, risk controls are required 
to prevent an accident from occurring or minimise the severity of its 
consequences (ATSB, 2008 p.36). These risk controls are akin to the layers 
of defences portrayed in Figure 21. 
Whereas Figure 23 highlights some of the changes that the ATSB made to 
the SCM, the official representation of the ATSB model which is used during 
investigations is presented in Figure 24. The model represents the operation 
of a system via five levels of ‘safety factors’, where a safety factor is an event 
or condition that increases safety risk (ATSB, 2008). The first three levels 
correspond to ‘safety indicators’, i.e. safety factors dealing with the individual 
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or local aspects of an accident. The upper two levels address ‘safety issues’, 
i.e. safety factors associated with organisational or systemic issues.  
 
Figure 24 - The ATSB Investigation Analysis Model. Adapted from ATSB 
(2008). 
The ATSB model was selected for use in this study for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, although modified, it is based on the SCM and therefore, according to 
various SAA researchers (see Section  5.2.1), can be classed as a sequential 
model. Secondly, the model has been used in transport accident 
investigations by the ATSB since 2002 (ATSB, 2008). As such, the model 
has been empirically validated by a governmental investigation agency, 
which is highly regarded within the accident investigation community (ATSB, 
2008). Therefore, the ATSB model represents a ‘tried and tested’ analysis 
technique used by investigation experts. Furthermore, a publically available 
description of the model and its use is provided by the ATSB (2008), thereby 
enhancing its inter-rater reliability. 
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5.3.2   AcciMap 
AcciMap, developed by Rasmussen (1997) and Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002), was designed to take a control theory-based systems approach to 
accident analysis. Consequently, accidents are considered to result from the 
loss of control over potentially harmful physical processes. According to 
Rasmussen (1997), every organisational level in a system affects the control 
of these hazards and a vertically integrated view of system behaviour is 
required. The dynamic nature of STS means that an accident is likely to be 
prepared over time by the normal efforts of many individuals throughout a 
system and that a normal variation in somebody’s behaviour can ‘release’ an 
accident (Rasmussen, 1997). AcciMap was developed as a means of 
analysing the series of interacting events and decision-making processes 
which occurred throughout a STS and resulted in a loss of control (Branford 
et al., 2009). To do so, it combines the classic cause-consequence chart and 
the RMF, which depicts the control of STS over six organisational levels (see 
Figure 17). 
Although the AcciMap forms part of a broader risk management process, it 
has been used independently of this approach to analyse individual accidents 
(e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 2012) (Branford et al., 2009). The 
method was selected for use in this study for this reason and also because: it 
is one of the most popular SAA methods (see Section  3.4.2), it has been 
used previously to analyse rail accidents (e.g. Branford et al., 2009; Salmon 
et al., 2013) and guidance material is available which would improve the 
inter-rater reliability of the analysis (see Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). 
5.3.3   STAMP 
The STAMP model, based on systems and control theory, focuses on safety 
as a control problem (as per the AcciMap approach). Emergent system 
properties (e.g. safety) are controlled by imposing constraints on the 
behaviour and interaction of system components (Leveson, 2012). Three 
basic constructs are used by STAMP to determine why control was 
ineffective and resulted in an accident: (1) safety constraints; (2) hierarchical 
safety control structures; (3) process models. 
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Safety constraints can be passive, which maintain safety by their presence 
(e.g. a physical barrier), or active, which require some action to provide 
protection (i.e. detection, measurement, diagnosis or response to a hazard). 
Accidents occur only when system safety constraints are not enforced. 
Hierarchical safety control structures are used by STAMP to describe the 
composition of systems (see Figure 13). Each hierarchical level of a system 
imposes constraints on and controls the behaviour of the level beneath it. 
Control (two-way communication) processes operate between system levels 
to enforce the safety constraints. Process models are incorporated into 
STAMP as any human or automated controller requires a model of the 
process they are responsible for controlling, if they are to control it effectively 
(Leveson, 2012).  
The STAMP model was selected for comparison with the ATSB model and 
AcciMap for several reasons. It is the most frequently cited SAA model (see 
Section  3.4.2) and has been used previously to analyse rail accidents and 
incidents (e.g. Ouyang et al., 2010; Song et al., 2012). In addition, detailed 
guidance on the application of STAMP is provided by Leveson (2012) and, 
therefore, would enhance the inter-rater reliability of the analysis. 
5.4   The Grayrigg accident 
5.4.1   Case study selection 
The train derailment at Grayrigg was selected as the analysis case study for 
various reasons. Firstly, the event represented a major accident on the UK 
rail network; a complex system with many stakeholders, including 
infrastructure controllers, train and freight operating companies and 
maintenance contractor organisations. Therefore, it was appropriate to utilise 
systems thinking concepts to analyse the event. Furthermore, the rail 
industry in the UK is currently expanding and creating an increased usage 
demand on the network and continued pressure to reduce costs (Office of 
Rail Regulation, 2013). With these conditions, it is clear that safety research 
within this industry is an on-going requirement. This is evidenced by the 
current rail-based research within and outside of the UK (e.g. Dadashi et al., 
2013; Read et al., 2013; Salmon et al., 2013; Wilson, 2013). The accident 
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garnered significant media coverage and resulted in Network Rail (the 
organisation that manages the rail infrastructure in the UK) receiving the 
largest fine imposed since the Office of Rail Regulation was established. As 
such, the derailment represents one of the highest profile accidents in UK rail 
history. Finally, the event resulted in a full investigation by the Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch (RAIB), the independent railway accident investigation 
organisation for the UK. The RAIB investigated a wide range of factors 
across various parts of the rail network system, e.g. the activities of frontline 
staff, management teams and regulatory inspectors. Therefore, the scope of 
the investigation and the comprehensiveness of the final report (see RAIB, 
2011) provided a suitable data source for a systemic analysis.  
5.4.2   Description of the accident  
On 23rd February 2007 an express passenger train derailed as it entered the 
points (known as Lambrigg 2B points) located near Grayrigg in Cumbria, UK 
(RAIB, 2011). Points are an assembly of two movable (switch) rails and two 
fixed (stock) rails which are used to divert vehicles from one track to another 
(see Figure 25). For a detailed description of points components and 
operation see RAIB (2011 p.210-214). 
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Figure 25 - Layout of points showing switch and stock rails and stretcher bars. 
From RAIB (2011). 
All nine vehicles of the train derailed, eight of which subsequently fell down 
an embankment with five turning onto their sides (see Figure 26). The train 
was carrying four crew and at least 105 passengers at the time of the 
accident. One passenger was fatally injured; 28 passengers, the train driver 
and one other crew member received serious injuries and 58 passengers 
received minor injuries (RAIB, 2011).  
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Figure 26 - Aerial view of the derailed train (numbers represent train vehicle 
number). From RAIB (2011). 
The subsequent investigation determined that the train derailed as it passed 
over 2B points, which were in an unsafe state that allowed the left-hand 
switch rail to move towards the left-hand stock rail. The left-hand wheels of 
the leading vehicle were subsequently forced into the reducing width 
between the switch rails and derailed by climbing over the rails. All the other 
vehicles derailed as a consequence. The RAIB concluded that various 
operational and environmental aspects (e.g. the actions of the driver, the 
condition of the train, the weather) had no bearing on the accident (RAIB, 
2011 p.14). Therefore, the derailment was a maintenance related accident. 
The unsafe state of the points was caused by successive failures of all three 
permanent way stretcher bar (PWSB) assemblies and the lock stretcher bar 
assembly. Three factors were deemed to have combined to create this 
situation: (1) the failure of the joint connecting the third PWSB to the right-
hand switch rail which, together with (2) excessive residual switch opening 
(the gap between the rail heads of adjacent switch and stock rails on the 
closed side of points), caused the left-hand switch rail to be struck by passing 
train wheels (the resultant large cyclic forces caused rapid deterioration and 
the eventual failure of the remaining stretcher bars and their fasteners); (3) 
an inspection, scheduled for 18th February 2007, which should have detected 
the degradation, was not performed. 
The omitted inspection was due to be undertaken by the local track section 
manager (TSM), who had volunteered to perform a routine visual check of 
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the track. The RAIB concluded that restricted track access (resulting from a 
change in access policies in 2005 and the reduced daylight hours in winter) 
and limited staff availability contributed to the decision of the TSM to combine 
his own supervisory inspection with a basic visual inspection. The TSM, 
however, forgot to complete the points inspection. This omission was not 
identified in the maintenance review meeting on the following day and the 
maintenance records were incorrectly updated to show that the inspection 
had been completed. These events, which reduced the likelihood of any 
corrective action being taken, were also considered by the RAIB to have 
contributed to the accident. 
A number of ‘underlying’ factors (which the RAIB associates with the overall 
management systems, organisational arrangements or the regulatory 
structure) were considered to have influenced the derailment. Examples 
include: (1) an incomplete understanding within Network Rail of points 
maintenance requirements, which resulted in an absence of clear, properly 
briefed standards for maintaining loose PWSB fasteners and residual switch 
opening; (2) the performance measurement of points was not based on a 
thorough understanding of risk and control measures; (3) underestimating the 
risks associated with the design of points with non-adjustable stretcher bars 
(as per the points involved in the derailment), which adversely affected 
inspection regimes, reporting of faults and maintenance activity. The official 
findings of the RAIB investigation are provided in Appendix 5.1 for reference. 
5.5   Methods 
5.5.1   Accident analysis process 
The ATSB model and STAMP analyses of the Grayrigg derailment were 
performed by the first researcher (Underwood), as per the processes 
described in Sections 5.5.1.1 and  5.5.1.3 6. The AcciMap analysis of the 
                                            
6  The analysis process described in Section  5.5.1 represents the approach taken by 
Underwood and Waterson (2013b). However, prior to the publication of the article the 
analysis of the Grayrigg accident had been performed with all three analysis techniques by 
the first researcher, the outputs of which were reviewed by the second researcher. The 
revised approach presented in Section  5.5.1 was employed in response to the comments 
from the article reviewers, who suggested that a more robust approach would involve both 
researchers independently conducting analyses with each method and the reviewing the 
differences between the findings. This was beyond the resource constraints of the study and 
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accident was performed by the second researcher (Waterson) in accordance 
with the process described in Section  5.5.1.2. Both individuals (human 
factors researchers) have experience of applying accident analysis methods 
in various domains (e.g. rail, aerospace, healthcare) and used the RAIB 
(2011) investigation report as the data source for the analysis activities. The 
report was imported into NVivo 9 and the text contained within the document, 
considered relevant to each analysis, was qualitatively coded (see 
Sections  5.5.1.1- 5.5.1.3 for further details). This coded information was 
subsequently used to create the various analysis diagrams to ensure a direct 
link between the text in the report and the analysis outputs. Upon completion 
of the analyses, the researchers exchanged and reviewed the outputs and 
any discrepancies or disagreements were resolved through discussion until 
consensus was reached, as per the approach taken by Salmon et al. 
(2012a). As the researchers were familiar with all three methods and their 
application processes prior to commencing the study, it was judged that the 
cross-checking process was sufficiently robust. Only pre-derailment events 
were analysed due to study resource limitations. 
 ATSB model analysis process 5.5.1.1  
The guidance provided by the ATSB (2008) on the use of the ATSB model 
refers to its application within live investigations. Therefore, no specific 
guidance was available with regards to its use for the analysis of completed 
investigations. The analysis process consisted of applying the ATSB safety 
factor definitions, as a coding framework, to the information in the RAIB 
(2011) report (see ATSB, 2008 p.38-42). When a given piece of information 
was identified as a safety factor the text was coded with and subsequently 
captioned, colour-coded and mapped on to the relevant section of an 
analysis chart, as per the format used by the ATSB (see ATSB, 2008 p.46). 
                                                                                                                           
consequently the process described in Section  5.5.1 was adopted, i.e. the second 
researcher performing an AcciMap analysis of the accident which was reviewed by the first 
researcher. However, the data presented in this chapter, regarding the AcciMap analysis 
output and method evaluation, is primarily based on the original findings produced by the 
first researcher, which were very similar to those produced by the second researcher. This 
has been done to demonstrate that the first researcher has first-hand experience of using 
AcciMap and, therefore, can present the findings (e.g. the AcciMap analysis diagram, see 
Figure 29) in this chapter as original work. 
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Relationships between the safety factors were represented by arrows, to 
indicate the direction of influence, as per the ATSB (2008) approach.  
 AcciMap analysis process 5.5.1.2  
AcciMap analyses have been conducted in various formats since the 
method’s creation. This prompted Branford et al. (2009) to develop a 
standardised application process for the method, aimed at improving the 
consistency of its usage. However, it was judged that this process was too far 
removed from the original format introduced by Rasmussen (1997), which 
has been used in more contemporary research (e.g. Salmon et al., 2013; 
Stanton et al., 2012). Therefore the guidance offered by Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002) was selected for use in this study. Information within the 
investigation report was coded if it described: (1) the topography of the 
accident scene; (2) a decision/action taken by an actor in the system; (3) a 
direct/indirect consequence; (4) a precondition requiring no further evaluation. 
This information was subsequently captioned, mapped on to the relevant 
sections of an AcciMap diagram and linked by arrows to represent the 
influence a given factor had on another, as per the format in Figure 17. 
 STAMP analysis process 5.5.1.3  
The process of applying STAMP to analyse an accident consists of nine 
stages and is defined by Leveson (2012 p.349) as the CAST approach. The 
stages of CAST are summarised below: 
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the loss 
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements 
associated with the hazard 
3. Document the control structure in place to control the hazard and enforce 
the safety constraints 
4. Determine the proximal events leading to the loss 
5. Analyse the loss at the physical system level 
6. Analyse the higher levels of the control structure 
7. Examine the overall coordination and communication contributors to the 
loss 
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8. Determine the dynamics and changes to the system and its control 
structure over time 
9. Generate recommendations 
The first eight steps of the CAST process were completed in order, although 
this was not a necessity, as noted by Leveson (2012 p.350). The final stage, 
i.e. generating recommendations, was not performed as this was outside the 
scope of the study. The information required for each stage of CAST was 
used as a coding framework to facilitate the identification of relevant data 
within the RAIB (2011) report. For example, once a higher-system level 
component had been identified, text was coded if it described the 
component’s: safety-related responsibilities; unsafe decisions and control 
actions; the reasons for the unsafe decisions/actions; relevant contextual 
information (as per stage 6 of the CAST process). 
5.5.2   Analysis model evaluation 
The analysis techniques were evaluated using a modified version of the 
evaluation framework developed in Study 1 (see Figure 11) which focused on 
two topics of interest: (1) coverage of systems theory concepts and (2) model 
usage characteristics. As described in Section  3.3.4.2, the ability of an 
analysis model to employ the systems approach is governed by the number 
of the core systems theory concepts it incorporates; an issue of clear 
importance to this study. Furthermore, the usage characteristics of an 
analysis technique will affect whether an individual can effectively perform 
SAA or not (see Section  3.3.4.3), hence the inclusion of the second section 
of the framework. The following alterations to the Study 1 framework were 
made to ensure a greater relevance to this study: an examination of the 
model development process was not required and, therefore, the first part of 
the Study 1 framework was removed; the systems approach characteristics 
were revised to reflect the factors highlighted in the SAA literature, as 
identified in Study 1 (see Section  3.4.1) and described in the more recent 
literature (see Section  3.5.3); the usage characteristics included in the 
updated framework were, based on the findings of Studies 1 and 2, 
considered more appropriate to evaluate model usage. The evaluation 
framework is graphically depicted in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27 – Study 3 evaluation framework 
For the sake of clarity, the different elements of the evaluation framework are 
described in Sections  5.5.2.1 and  5.5.2.2. 
The outputs and usage of the models were assessed by both analysts in 
relation to the components of the evaluation framework, in order to facilitate a 
systematic comparison. As per the accident analysis process, any 
disagreements in the evaluations were resolved through discussion until 
consensus was reached6. 
 System approach characteristics 5.5.2.1  
System structure 
Systems are generally based on a hierarchy of subsystems which are formed 
in order to perform specific functions (Skyttner, 2005). In order to understand 
a system, it is necessary to examine each relevant hierarchical level and its 
relationship with adjacent levels. Moving up the hierarchy provides a deeper 
understanding of a system’s goals, whereas examining lower levels reveals 
how a system functions to meet those objectives (Vicente, 1999). 
Furthermore, determining the boundary of a system, i.e. distinguishing 
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between what is part of the system and what is part of the environment, is an 
important aspect of specifying its hierarchy (Jönsson, 2007).   
System component relationships 
The interaction of system components results in emergent behaviour, e.g. 
safety (Leveson, 2012). Therefore, STS will display characteristics and 
operate in ways not expected or planned for by their designers (Wilson, 
2013). Such behaviour cannot be explained by studying system components 
in isolation: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. A system must be 
studied holistically, i.e. all components, human and technical, need to be 
considered as well as the relationships between them (Read et al., 2013).   
System behaviour 
Inputs are converted into outputs, via transformation processes, in order to 
achieve system goals, e.g. safe operations. If system goals are to be reached 
and safety maintained, a system’s components must be controlled via 
feedback mechanisms when deviations in behaviour occur (Skyttner, 2005). 
Dynamic system behaviour means that a goal can be achieved from a variety 
of initial starting conditions (equifinality). Alternatively, systems can produce a 
range of outputs from an initial starting point (multifinality). This dynamic 
behaviour also means that systems can adapt over time to changing 
conditions and may migrate towards a state of increased risk and drift into 
failure (Dekker, 2011; Leveson, 2011). Furthermore, system components do 
not operate in a vacuum and their performance must be placed within context, 
i.e. how local goals, resources and environmental conditions influenced their 
behaviour. 
 Model usage characteristics 5.5.2.2  
Data requirements 
The output of any analysis is defined, in part, by the ability of a method to 
analyse and incorporate a given piece of evidence (e.g. photographic, 
documentary, witness testimony etc.). Furthermore, the information that a 
method requires to produce a thorough analysis (e.g. data related to 
technical failures, human factors, organisational practices etc.) can impact on 
the evidence collection process in an investigation. The importance of how a 
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method processes information and its data requirements has been 
recognised in previous method evaluation studies (e.g. Herrera and Woltjer, 
2010; Stanton et al., 2012; Waterson and Jenkins, 2010). 
Validity and reliability 
The closely related issues of validity and reliability are important factors in 
successfully applying any type of analysis method. Previous studies have 
acknowledged this significance by including validity and reliability (and topics 
related to them) as method evaluation criteria (e.g. Benner, 1985; Stanton et 
al., 2012; Wagenaar and van der Schrier, 1997). The need for valid and 
reliable methods was also identified as a requirement of practitioners who are 
engaged in accident analysis (see Section  4.4.3.1). 
Usability 
The usability of an SAA technique will clearly affect whether an analysis is 
performed effectively and efficiently and, therefore, it must be easy to 
understand and apply. The availability and clarity of guidance material as well 
as the training and resources required to use SAA methods have all been 
cited as factors which can influence their usability (e.g. Branford et al., 2009; 
Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Stanton et al., 2012). 
Graphical representation of the accident 
The graphical output of a method also affects the ability of an individual (or 
team of investigators) to successfully perform an analysis. Graphically 
representing an accident has been considered to be useful by both 
researchers (e.g. Sklet, 2004; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) and 
practitioners (e.g. ATSB, 2008) for a number of reasons. For example, it can 
be easier to see the relationships between system components and identify 
gaps/weaknesses in the analysis. Also, charting an accident can be useful for 
communicating the findings of complex investigations (ATSB, 2008). 
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5.6   Findings 
5.6.1   Applying the analysis models to the Grayrigg accident 
 ATSB model analysis output 5.6.1.1  
The analysis chart produced by the ATSB model analysis is presented in 
Figure 28. 
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Figure 28 – ATSB model analysis of the Grayrigg accident (dashed lines indicate a possible but not probable factor/relationship) 
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The derailment of the wheels of the leading vehicle was the single 
occurrence event attributed to the accident. However, various technical 
issues were included in the analysis chart to represent the gradual 
deterioration and failure of the points which led to the derailment. These 
technical problems were also incorporated to more clearly describe the 
multiple interactions between them and the individual actions and local 
conditions associated with the accident. Figure 28 shows that there were few, 
albeit important, individual actions/inactions that contributed to the accident, 
such as the missed inspection of the points by the TSM. Conversely, a larger 
number of local conditions and inadequate risk controls were identified as 
factors which negatively affected the work of the maintenance staff and 
condition of the points. However, as shown in Figure 28, some of the local 
conditions resulted from technical problems and individual actions. Few 
organisational influences were classified during the analysis. However, these 
factors were shown to have a wide ranging adverse influence on numerous 
risk controls. In particular, Network Rail’s approach to maintenance 
management was identified as a significant influence on the ineffectiveness 
of many risk controls. The analysis chart shows six levels of safety factors to 
account for the role that regulatory oversight played in the accident. Although 
this sixth ‘regulatory’ level goes beyond the official format of the ATSB model 
(see Figure 24), charting the influence of the regulators has occurred in 
previous ATSB investigations (ATSB, 2008 p.46). Therefore, given that the 
RAIB investigated the actions of the regulator, it was deemed acceptable to 
incorporate the additional safety factor level. However, as indicated on the 
analysis chart, the actions of the regulator were not considered to have a 
significant impact on Network Rail’s maintenance management.  
 AcciMap analysis output 5.6.1.2  
The AcciMap diagram resulting from the analysis is presented in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29 - AcciMap analysis of the Grayrigg accident 
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Similarly to the ATSB model analysis, the train passing over the failed 2B 
points and derailing were considered to be the critical event and its direct 
consequence respectively. Only two ‘equipment and surroundings’ related 
issues were identified during the analysis. However, they both influenced two 
key factors in the accident, i.e. the missed inspection by the TSM and the 
movement of the left-hand switch rail, which contributed to the points being 
impassable. Five human actor activities were included in Level 5 of the 
AcciMap diagram and focused on two important issues: (1) the reuse of 
threaded fasteners and (2) the undetected physical faults. These actor 
activities either directly or indirectly contributed to the physical processes 
associated with the points’ degradation. For example, the reuse of threaded 
fasteners directly contributed to the inability of the points to withstand the 
physical loads from rail traffic. Furthermore, the missed TSM inspection 
indirectly contributed to the failure of the points, as an opportunity to identify 
the required maintenance was missed. A relatively higher number of physical 
processes, in comparison with actor activities, were incorporated into the 
analysis diagram to describe the gradual deterioration and failure of the 
points. A number of influential decisions taken at Level 4 of the system, i.e. 
technical and operational management, were identified. These decisions had 
direct consequences which subsequently affected the physical processes 
and actor activities linked with the derailment, e.g. local track access policies 
restricted the time available to conduct inspections. Additionally, the relatively 
fewer risk assessment and maintenance management decisions attributed to 
the Level 3 company management influenced numerous direct and indirect 
consequences. These consequences, in turn, either directly or indirectly 
influenced activities at the lower system levels, as shown on the analysis 
chart. The AcciMap diagram did not include Level 1 of the system, i.e. 
national government, as no information was available in the report to 
populate this section of the chart. 
 STAMP analysis output 5.6.1.3  
The first stage of the STAMP analysis, as described in Section  5.5.1.3, 
required the identification of the system and hazard involved in the accident. 
These were defined as the ‘UK railway’ and ‘train derailment due to failed 
 Chapter 5 132 
points’ respectively. Two system safety constraints were subsequently 
associated with controlling the hazard: (1) the physical points components 
must operate within design limits; (2) maintenance and repair activities must 
correct any points defects. The hierarchical control structure, as it existed at 
the time of the accident, consisted of multiple organisational functions which 
had a responsibility for ensuring safety on the railway (see Figure 30).  
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Figure 30 - The control structure in place at the time of the Grayrigg accident 
Defining the control structure involves describing the roles and 
responsibilities of each component in the system, as well as the controls and 
feedback available to them. However, for the sake of clarity and because 
some of this information was not available in the RAIB (2011) report, this 
description has not been included in Figure 30. The proximate events leading 
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up to the accident are described, in terms of the condition of the points and 
the maintenance activities, in Table 11. These events, e.g. the missed 
inspection on 18th February 2007, acted as reference points to begin the 
analysis of the derailment at the physical system level and the lower levels of 
the control structure.  
Date Event 
1st December 2006 Supervisor’s inspection identified loose check rail bolts on crossing of 2B points 
6th-7th January 
2007 
Overnight repair of defects identified on 1st 
December 2006 
7th January 2007 
Basic visual inspection identifies third PWSB 
right-hand bracket joint fasteners had failed and 
were renewed 
8th January - 12th 
February 2007 
Third PWSB right-hand bracket failed again, third 
PWSB subsequently fractures 
14th January 2007 Routine patrol reported no defects 
21st January 2007 Routine patrol reported no defects 
25th January 2007 
Supervisor's inspection identified alignment 
defects with rectification required within six 
months 
28th January 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
4th February 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
11th February 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
11th-21st February 
2007 
Second PWSB joints failed and PWSB missing 
from points 
18th February 2007 Missed basic visual inspection 
21st-23rd February 
2007 First PWSB and lock stretcher bar failed 
23rd February 2007 Derailment 
Table 11 - The proximal events leading to the Grayrigg accident. Adapted 
from RAIB (2011 p.123-24). 
The subsequent analysis of the system components, considered to have had 
the most influence on the accident, is presented in Figure 31 and Figure 32.  
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Physical equipment
Safety requirements and constraints violated
• Enable trains to transfer between two sets of rails
• Residual switch opening of 1.5 mm
• No flange-back contact on the open switch rail
Controls
• Switch rails
• Lock stretcher bar
• Fasteners, brackets, bolts and torque nuts
• Switch rail extension piece
• Three permanent way stretcher bars (PWSB)
• PWSB-switch rail fasteners
• Detector rod
• Supplementary drive
Failures and inadequate controls
• Clamping force of third PWSB exceeded by the load 
imposed on the joint
• Unwinding of nuts from bolts 
• Failure and separation of third PWSB bar/right-hand 
switch rail joint
• Left-hand switch rail closes towards its stock rail
• Residual switch opening between 7-10 mm
• Increasing levels of flange-back contact
• Fracture of third PWSB
• Retention by the supplementary drive was lost
• Failure of rail brackets of first and second PSWB and their 
brackets
• Failure of fasteners common to lock stretcher bar and 
switch rail extension piece meant left-hand switch rail 
closure was undetected by signalling system
• Switch rail closed sufficiently to allow more than one of the 
train’s wheelsets to run into the narrowing track gauge 
between the two switch rails
Context
• PWSB on correctly set points have a long, albeit finite, life 
when subjected to normal service forces (in the order of 
tens of years)
• Points with non-adjustable PWSB bars can withstand 
forces from flange-back contact for a limited period of time 
only, which may be a matter of days depending on the 
degree of flange-back contact
• No evidence to suggest that any significant change in 
traffic took place at 2B points in the six months before the 
accident
Joint Points Team
Safety-related responsibilities
• Perform inspections and maintenance of the points 
• Rectify variety of minor points defects (but not 
stretcher bar bolts)
• Identify and report other defects and when no 
defects were found
• Walk through each section of track in the four-foot 
and observe the condition of the points components
• Observe rail condition, the presence of 
obstructions, the position and security of check 
rails, track geometry and track support
• Visually assess the free wheel clearance within 
points, and report for correction within 36 hours if 
less than 45 mm 
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• Re-use of threaded fasteners
• Patrollers who completed repairs to defects during 
or immediately after completion of the inspections 
did not record details of the defects and repairs on 
the inspection sheet
• Local custom and practice to not report when no 
defects were identified
• Patrollers differed in how they identified defects and 
recorded them on inspection record sheets
• Did not check residual switch opening
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• No Network Rail standards or procedures regarding 
the reuse of threaded fasteners
• No measurements were required as part of basic 
visual track inspections; inspection record sheets 
did not therefore provide a reliable guide to the 
extent of observed defects 
• All of the cracks within the PWSB swan neck 
assembly were not detectable by visual inspection 
until the PWSB section had fully fractured
• Loosening of nuts on the PWSB bracket-to-rail joint 
may not be immediately identifiable by visual 
inspection
• All of the PWSB fastener bolt preload is lost by the 
nut unwinding by 1/19 of a complete turn; ‘loose’ as 
defined by Network Rail was between ⅛ and ¼ of a 
turn
• The joint points team signal engineering team 
members had not received training on the setting 
up of the supplementary drive and the residual 
switch opening
• Basic visual inspection boundaries did not match 
those actually in use
• Discrepancy existed between the information 
generated by Ellipse (asset management system) 
and the actual work required
• No specific reference to checking the residual 
switch opening in the signalling maintenance 
specifications; staff had to refer to separate 
instructions which were not as readily available to 
them and whose content mainly related to 
installation rather than maintenance
• Signal engineers generally misunderstood that the 
residual switch opening setting was 6 - 8 mm and 
assumed that the required supplementary detection 
setting was the residual switch opening value
Context
• The patroller was not required to make 
measurements directly during the inspection.
• Track access restrictions meant that inspections 
and repairs were confined from first light to 
approximately 10:00 on Sunday mornings
• Patrollers had a range of inspection experience 
ranging from one and 34 years
• All eight patrollers had been trained, but in five 
cases their certificate of competency had lapsed
• None of the patrollers had a working knowledge of 
the relevant track maintenance standard but were 
aware of the contents of the associated work 
instruction and had access to that document
• A considerable amount of overtime for non-rostered 
staff was necessary to provide sufficient staffing for 
inspections
• Inspections were not always sufficiently staffedTrain movements
Track Section 
Manager
Network Rail 
management
 
Figure 31 - STAMP analysis of lower-level system components 
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Track Section Manager
Safety-related responsibilities
• Perform supervisor’s inspections
• Identifying work to be planned and carried out
• Review trends in condition
• Identifying items to be proposed for renewal
• Check that basic and special track inspections, 
maintenance and renewal work were effective
• Measurement free wheel clearance
• Determine and prioritise the actions needed to 
address defects identified
• Arrange entry of defects that required remedial work 
into Ellipse asset management system
• Manage track engineering staff in the joint points team
• Manage the competence of track engineering staff
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• Forgot that he had agreed to carry out basic visual 
inspection of track section, which included points, as 
well as his own supervisor’s inspection on 18th Feb 
2007
• Produced a report for his inspection, using a template 
which referenced the supervisory inspection boundary 
at 23 miles 1320 yards as the northern limit of his 
inspection, even though he had stopped 640 yards 
south of this point
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• Did not receive a copy of the inspection roster sheet, 
as per normal, and was therefore not reminded that he 
had agreed to inspect the points on 18th Feb 2007
• Began his inspection on 18th Feb 2007 with two 
specific objectives in mind: re-check a site of remedial 
tamping and inspect a section of track where severe 
rail head wear was occurring, i.e. possibly distracted 
from inspecting the points
Context
• Usually worked 50 to 60 hours per five day working 
week, including Sundays when rostered, to meet 
workload demands
• Did not manage to achieve all the inspections that he 
was required to do personally, although they were 
being carried out by his assistants.
• Volunteered to cover basic visual inspection the same 
time as undertaking a supervisor’s inspection in order 
to release two members of staff to undertake 
outstanding maintenance work
• Inspection and maintenance activity was undertaken 
at the specified frequency but was of varying quality, 
which affected the reliability of the outcome
Network Rail management
Safety-related responsibilities
• Specify and manage maintenance policies, regimes, work 
instructions, technical specifications and engineering 
standards
• Provide leadership and technical guidance to engineering 
and maintenance technical specialists 
• Accountable for the quality of technical advice and support 
provided to the business
• Ensure compliance of patrolling, inspections, examinations 
and maintenance to company standards and procedures
• Ensure infrastructure was compliant with company standards 
and available for operation
• Disseminate information regarding maintenance regimes 
throughout the organisation
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• No standards or procedures regarding the reuse of threaded 
fasteners were produced
• Evaluation of the effect of timetable changes did not 
consider or identify that any changes might lead to greater 
difficulty for maintenance and inspection staff in gaining 
access to the track
• Network Rail neither routinely nor regularly carried out 
surveys across a representative sample of point components 
to provide a reliable source of independent data on asset 
condition
• Management information systems (SINCS and Ellipse) were 
not configured to permit efficient analysis of types of failures 
and identification of trends across a large population of 
switches and crossings
• Management processes no longer required that independent 
inspections of asset condition were carried out, as had been 
the case when maintenance was carried out by contractors
• Key performance indicators did not include any specific 
reference to the condition of stretcher bars, brackets, 
fasteners or flangeway clearance
• Audit process did not include checks of asset condition or 
observation of inspection/maintenance activities
• Approach to the assessment of risk from points defects was 
based on the RSSB’s safety risk model and the linked 
precursor indicator model which did not provide an 
appropriate level of resolution to enable the risk impact of 
individual components to be identified or the input of data 
derived from ‘bottom-up’ analytical techniques
• Monitoring of the reliability of non-adjustable stretcher bar 
components was incomplete and it did not carry out a 
detailed assessment of the adequacy of the design and 
inspection/maintenance arrangements
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• There was an absence of awareness throughout Network 
Rail of the importance of the residual switch opening and its 
relationship with flange-back contact, and of the need to 
check and rectify residual switch opening
• Network Rail did not have any comprehensive data about 
the condition of stretcher bars, brackets and fasteners 
across its network at the time of the accident which 
contributed to an incomplete understanding of the 
performance of its switches and crossings assets at 
component level
• The high reliance on historical data at the system level and 
the limited application of predictive tools reduced the 
likelihood that Network Rail would recognise the 
performance of non-adjustable stretcher bar components as 
an important risk management issue
• Network Rail did not see switches and crossings with non-
adjustable stretcher bars to be a significant risk, providing 
they were properly set up, maintained and inspected
• At all levels of the organisation, managers considered the 
tightening of bolts on stretcher bars to be a routine, normal 
activity that had always been undertaken by maintenance 
staff
• Understanding of the performance of its existing points with 
non-adjustable stretcher bars was incomplete
• Senior managers had not recognised that at some locations 
the safe performance of existing S&C with non-adjustable 
stretcher bars had become over-reliant on routine inspection 
and maintenance activities
Context
• Inherited standards and working practices, e.g. joint points 
team working, from previous infrastructure owner, operator 
and maintenance organisation and sub-contractors 
• Network Rail standards for the maintenance of signalling 
assets recognised the value of predicting the hazards 
associated with failures of both systems and components 
(and failures to inspect or maintain), by using techniques 
such as failure modes and effects analysis, Hazard and 
Operability Study and Task Analysis. However, application of 
the standards was only mandated for changes to 
maintenance regimes, or for new assets.
• Until April 2006 there had been no requirement to report 
loose or missing bolts on stretcher bars. Once this became a 
requirement there is evidence of significant underreporting
Physical 
equipment
Joint Points 
Team
Train movements
 
Figure 32 - STAMP analysis of higher-level system components 
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Many of the actions and decisions taken by the higher levels of the control 
structure were summarised by the RAIB (2011) as Network Rail’s 
management arrangements. Therefore, these higher level components were 
amalgamated into a ‘Network Rail management’ component in order to 
facilitate the analysis.  
A number of long-standing and proximal issues were identified whilst 
assessing the overall coordination and communication throughout the system. 
Respective examples include: no training was provided to the maintenance 
teams concerning the required setting for residual switch opening; the points 
failure was undetectable by the signalling system. Network Rail experienced 
large changes to its control structure since it took over the running of the rail 
infrastructure in 2002. However, it was not possible to identify whether these 
changes resulted in the system migrating to a higher state of risk and 
increasing the chance of an accident. 
5.6.2   Comparing the analysis models 
 Systems approach characteristics 5.6.2.1  
System structure 
All three techniques require the analysis of the whole system hierarchy which 
was responsible for preventing the accident, up to and including the 
regulatory level. However, the ATSB model and AcciMap require the 
description of events, actions and conditions, rather than system components. 
Therefore, their analysis charts provide little information about the structure 
of the system in question, or its boundary. Conversely, the STAMP analysis 
requires the documentation of the system control structure and provides a 
clear visual description of the system hierarchy. The boundary of the system 
(and those of its sub-systems) is defined by the boundary of responsibility for 
a given hazard and safety constraint (Leveson, 2012). For example, the 
condition of the points was the responsibility of Network Rail, whereas the 
condition of the train involved in the accident was the responsibility of a 
different maintenance organisation (Alstom Transport West Coast Traincare 
Ltd).  
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System component relationships 
Each model requires the analyst to take a holistic view of the system, i.e. 
examining the interaction between the various elements of the system, albeit 
in different ways. The ATSB model and AcciMap analysis charts, rather than 
describing the system components and their relationships, show the outputs 
of these relationships and how they reduced system safety. By documenting 
the control structure, the CAST process shows the relationships between the 
various system components. The subsequent stages of the analysis then 
examine how the dysfunctional interactions between a given component and 
the rest of the system contributed to its unsafe actions and/or decisions (see 
Figure 31 and Figure 32). 
System behaviour 
The ATSB model and AcciMap analysis charts describe (via the caption 
boxes) key input and output conditions of system components. The 
transformation processes, which convert the inputs to outputs, are indicated 
by arrows, although details of the processes are not provided. In keeping with 
its control theoretic underpinnings, STAMP describes system inputs as the 
information available to a given component and the control instructions it 
receives. Component outputs, e.g. unsafe control actions, are described as 
well as the reasons why they happened, i.e. why the associated 
transformation processes failed. 
Neither the ATSB model nor AcciMap require the analyst to state the safety-
related goals of the system. However, they are implicitly addressed, as the 
principal goal of the system is clearly the avoidance of the main 
occurrence/critical event. STAMP, however, explicitly defines the system- 
and component-level safety-related goals during the various stages of the 
analysis.  
The adequacy and impact of the controls and feedback within the system is 
addressed by the ATSB model via the analysis of the risk controls created by 
the organisation. The same is true of the AcciMap method, although this 
information is presented in the decisions and/or consequences caption boxes 
across the diagram. However, the influence of missing/inadequate feedback 
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on management activities and decisions is not included in either analysis 
chart. Examining the control and feedback in a system is a core requirement 
of the STAMP analysis process. As such, this is clearly documented in the 
system control structure and the detailed analysis of each component.  
The ATSB model prompts the investigation of how the system’s behaviour 
changed over time. This is achieved by examining and charting the proximal 
events and conditions that occurred locally to the accident site, as well as the 
organisational and regulatory factors that were created further back in the 
system’s history. This approach is also taken by the AcciMap method. The 
requirement of CAST to determine the proximal and historic events leading to 
an accident ensures that the changes in system behaviour are analysed.  
The context in which actions and decisions were taken by the various 
frontline system components are explicitly incorporated into the ATSB model 
via the description of the local conditions. Although the context in which 
organisational and regulatory issues were created is not present in the 
analysis chart, the ATSB suggests that this contextual information can be a 
useful addition to an analysis (ATSB, 2008 p.44). By describing preconditions 
and the direct/indirect consequences created throughout the system, 
AcciMap depicts the context in which decisions and activities took place at 
the various system levels. The local context in which system component 
behaviour took place is explicitly addressed by CAST via the detailed 
analysis of the control structure (see Figure 31 and Figure 32). 
Given that accident investigation involves determining why a particular set of 
events and conditions contributed to an accident, the ability of the models to 
represent equifinality and multifinality is a moot point. A summary of the 
systems approach characteristics comparison is provided in Table 12. 
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Systems 
approach 
characteristic 
ATSB model AcciMap STAMP 
System 
structure 
Requires analysis of the whole system. Describes system as 
combination of events, actions and conditions. Little 
information about system structure or boundary provided. 
Requires analysis of the whole 
system. System structure and 
boundary defined by hierarchy 
of components responsible for 
controlling safety constraints. 
System structure graphically 
described. 
System 
component 
relationships 
Takes a holistic view of the system. Describes the safety-
related outputs of relationships throughout the system and 
their affect on other relationships. 
Takes a holistic view of the 
system. Describes component 
relationships throughout the 
system and their impact on 
safety. 
System 
behaviour 
Incorporates all aspects of 
system behaviour, although 
some are only partially 
described (e.g. feedback 
availability and context of 
behaviour at the 
organisational level). Short- 
and long-term system history 
is examined. 
Incorporates all aspects of 
system behaviour, although 
some are only partially 
described (e.g. systems goals 
and feedback availability at 
the organisational level). 
Short- and long-term system 
history is examined. 
Incorporates all aspects of 
system behaviour, which are 
described in the analysis output. 
Short- and long-term system 
history is examined. 
Table 12 - Systems characteristics approach comparison 
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 Model usage characteristics 5.6.2.2  
Data requirements 
Due to their holistic approach, all of the models require various types of data 
to be collected from all of the relevant parts of the STS and its environment. 
In practice, accident investigators will obtain this evidence in a variety of 
formats, such as photographic, documentary and witness testimony. A range 
of preliminary analysis activities is required to convert this data into a format 
suitable for the subsequent analyses (ATSB, 2008 p 49). This involves the 
use of techniques to interpret and organise data, e.g. employing 
photogrammetry to measure the distribution of a wreckage trail from an 
accident site photograph. The ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP analyses 
are, therefore, summaries of the findings produced by these more specific 
analytical processes. Consequently, the type of information that the models 
can analyse is not restricted by the original format of the data. More data is, 
however, explicitly required by STAMP, e.g. details on the system structure 
and components. 
Validity 
Capturing all of the complexity in a large STS is seemingly beyond the 
capability of an individual analysis model and the resource constraints of 
accident investigation. Therefore, proving the internal validity of the three 
analysis techniques is not possible. In fact, the ATSB model does not attempt 
to describe all of the complexities involved in accident causation. Rather it 
favours providing a general framework that helps guide data collection and 
analysis during an investigation (ATSB, 2008 p.36). Conversely, AcciMap 
purposefully sets out to analyse the dynamic behaviour that exists within a 
system and how it contributes to accidents. Likewise, STAMP deliberately 
addresses how complexity within a system influences accident events. 
Regardless of these different approaches, each model was devised 
specifically for the purposes of accident analysis, is based on a recognised 
theory of accident causation and has been used across multiple domains, 
which suggests an acceptable degree of face and external validity exists. 
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Reliability 
The qualitative nature of the models negatively impacts on their reliability. 
None of the techniques provide a detailed taxonomy of contributory factors, 
which further reduces their reliability and the chance to perform accident 
trend analysis. However, this also means the analyst has more freedom in 
how they classify such factors. It is understood that the ATSB use a 
taxonomy in their accident database, however, details about its content are 
not publically available (see ATSB, 2008 p.9). The reliability of the ATSB 
model and STAMP is, however, improved by the detailed descriptions of 
safety factors and accident causes and the model usage guidance provided 
by the ATSB (2008) and Leveson (2012). Therefore, both models are 
considered to have moderate inter-rater reliability. The AcciMap guidance 
material (e.g. Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) provides little support in 
comparison and, therefore, was considered to have low inter-rater reliability.  
Usability 
Assessing how easy the analysis tools are to understand and apply clearly 
involves the subjective opinion of the user, an issue which is discussed in 
Section  5.7. However, a number of observations regarding the availability 
and clarity of the guidance material which supports the techniques can be 
made. 
The ATSB (2008) provide a substantial amount of information regarding the 
theoretical aspects of their model and how it can guide the collection and 
analysis of data in an investigation. Structured approaches for identifying 
potential safety factors and testing their validity are also given. The usage 
guidance provided for STAMP (Leveson, 2012) is also considerable and 
describes systems theory, how it is applied by STAMP and how to use 
STAMP to analyse accidents. Therefore, the analyst is provided with a body 
of information that can facilitate a more effective and efficient analysis. 
However, the ATSB model and STAMP guidance contains a substantial 
amount of jargon, such as ‘safety factor’ and ‘safety constraint’, and the 
analyst is required to read a considerable amount of information to gain a full 
understanding of how to apply the models. The guidance available for 
AcciMap also provides a detailed description about the conceptual aspects 
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and purpose of the method, i.e. the analysis of a system’s dynamic behaviour 
and the variable performance of its components. However, little guidance is 
provided about how to apply the method and, although there is arguably less 
jargon associated with the technique, it seems likely that the analyst would 
have to carefully study the available information to fully understand how to 
apply AcciMap. Whether the analyst is taught how to use any of these 
models via self-learning or a training course, conveying such a large amount 
of information will clearly require more time and funding compared with 
simpler analysis techniques. The holistic approach taken by the models also 
means significant resources will be required for data collection.  
Graphical representation of the accident 
The graphical output of the ATSB model, based on the AcciMap format, 
provides a description of the accident scenario on a single diagram (see 
Figure 28). The use of colour coding helps to distinguish between the various 
different types of safety factors presented on the chart. The influence that a 
given safety factor has had on others is clearly indicated by arrows linking the 
caption boxes. Furthermore, by including the sequence of occurrence events 
leading up to the accident, the reader is provided with a sense of how the 
accident developed over time. In combination, these features provide a 
relatively simple means of understanding and communicating the findings of 
an analysis, albeit that knowledge of the ATSB model and its terminology is 
required to interpret the diagram. Similarly, AcciMap describes the accident 
scenario on one diagram (see Figure 29), provides information about the 
proximal sequence of events (via information contained in Level 5 of the 
analysis chart) and the relative influence of the identified actions, decisions 
and consequences etc. Given that there is comparatively little jargon 
associated with the method, the AcciMap chart is also relatively simple to 
understand. However, the lack of colour-coding utilised by Rasmussen (1997) 
and Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) (see Figure 17) arguably increases the 
difficulty in reading an AcciMap analysis chart (additional colour-coding was 
implemented by the researchers to ease the visual communication of the 
AcciMap findings). STAMP presents the findings of an analysis over several 
documents, some of which are mainly text based (e.g. Figure 31), and does 
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not lend itself to a simple graphical representation of an accident (Leveson, 
2012 p.91). Therefore, graphical communication of the accident analysis 
findings is not performed as efficiently as the ATSB model or AcciMap. A 
summary of the model usage characteristics comparison is provided in Table 
13. 
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Model usage 
characteristic ATSB model AcciMap STAMP 
Data 
requirements Data required from all system levels. Compatible with all forms of data. 
Validity 
Provides a general framework devised 
for accident analysis. Underpinned by 
a recognised accident causation 
theory. Used in multiple domains. 
Face and external validity provided. 
Specifically designed to analyse the 
dynamic behaviour of a system. 
Underpinned by a recognised 
accident causation theory. Used in 
multiple domains. Face and external 
validity provided. 
Specifically designed to analyse the 
complexity in a system. 
Underpinned by a recognised 
accident causation theory. Used in 
multiple domains. Face and 
external validity provided. 
Reliability 
Qualitative technique with no detailed 
(publically available) taxonomy of 
contributory factors. Safety factor 
definitions and analysis process 
guidance provided. Moderate reliability 
achieved. 
Qualitative technique with no detailed 
taxonomy of contributory factors. Little 
analysis process guidance provided. 
Low reliability achieved. 
Qualitative technique with no 
detailed taxonomy of contributory 
factors. Structured analysis process 
guidance and classification of 
accident causes provided. 
Moderate reliability achieved. 
Usability 
Substantial guidance provided about 
the model, its application and safety 
factor identification and testing. 
Resource intensive to learn and use. 
Substantial guidance provided about 
system behaviour and the purpose of 
Accimap. Little application guidance 
provided. Resource intensive to learn 
and use. 
Substantial guidance provided 
about systems theory, its use in 
STAMP and the application of the 
model. Resource intensive to learn 
and use. 
Graphical 
representation 
of the accident 
All (colour coded) safety factors, their 
relationships and proximal timeline 
included in one diagram. Effective 
visual communication of accident. 
All actions, decisions and 
consequences etc., their relationships 
and proximal timeline included in one 
diagram. Effective visual 
communication albeit lack of colour-
coding reduces effectiveness. 
Findings presented over several 
documents. Model does not lend 
itself to simple graphical 
representation. Ineffective visual 
communication of accident. 
Table 13- Model usage characteristic comparison
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5.7   Discussion 
5.7.1   Comparing the analysis models 
 Systems approach characteristics 5.7.1.1  
The ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP all employ the systems approach, i.e. 
they require the analysis of a system’s structure, the relationship of its 
components and its behaviour. However, there is a considerable difference 
between how the models achieve this.  
A number of the systems theory concepts are only implicitly and/or partially 
contained within the ATSB model. This is particularly true with respect to the 
description of the system structure and its boundary, the impact of 
missing/inadequate feedback and contextual factors on the actions and 
decisions made at the organisational level (see Section  5.6.2.1). Indeed, the 
ATSB (2008 p. 47) suggest that the model does not fully explain the complex, 
dynamic nature of accident development. Therefore, strict adherence to the 
format of the ATSB model may result in an incomplete application of the 
systems approach. However, although such usage may prevent investigators 
from exploring all of a system’s complexity, the model does not preclude this 
in anyway either (Ghirxi, 2010). If investigators understand and apply the 
systems theory concepts during an investigation then the ATSB model can 
fulfil its intended role as a framework for analysis activities and act as a 
gateway to SAA (see Section  5.3.1).  
Similarly to the ATSB model, AcciMap implicitly or partially describes the 
system structure, its boundary and the impact of missing/inadequate 
feedback. It does, however, provide a clearer representation of the context in 
which managerial decisions and activities took place. Nevertheless, a 
prescriptive application of the method may also result in an incomplete 
systemic accident analysis. Some of the system theory concepts implicitly 
covered by the ATSB model and AcciMap would naturally be addressed by 
investigators, such as identifying the components involved in an accident. For 
example, an ‘individual action’ cannot be examined until the person who 
performed that action is known. However, without explicit instructions to do 
so, some information may remain uncollected and/or undocumented, e.g. 
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missing/inadequate feedback. In the case of AcciMap, this problem can be 
overcome by using the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap techniques that also form 
part of the risk management process suggested by Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002 p.403). The ActorMap identifies the organisational bodies and 
individual actors involved in risk management whereas the InfoFlowMap 
graphically represents the communication between these decision makers. 
Whilst originally intended for use in risk management, these techniques could 
easily be utilised to provide information about the system components 
involved in an accident and any missing/inadequate communication. 
However, the use of additional techniques has usage implications, which are 
discussed in Section  5.7.1.2.  
STAMP more clearly embodies the core components of systems theory (see 
Table 12). This is unsurprising, given that it was specifically designed to 
employ a systems approach to accident analysis. Furthermore, the structured 
process for applying STAMP deliberately guides the analyst to consider 
these core components. By doing so, STAMP arguably provides a more 
effective means of applying the systems approach. Therefore, when 
considering how much of the systems approach could be applied during a 
live investigation, the difference between the models seems to be a small 
one. Instead, the more noticeable difference between the ATSB model, 
AcciMap and STAMP comes from how they guide investigators to apply the 
components of systems theory. The systems approach characteristic 
comparison of the models is visually represented in Figure 33. 
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STAMPExplicit description of: • System structure• Component relationships
• System behaviour
ATSB model & AcciMapImplicit/partial description of: • System structure• Component relationships
• System behaviour
 
Figure 33 - Systems approach characteristic comparison of the ATSB model, 
AcciMap and STAMP 
 Model usage characteristics 5.7.1.2  
As mentioned in Section  5.6.2.2, the ability of an individual to employ the 
systems approach depends on the usage characteristics of their chosen 
method. When comparing the models in relation to these characteristics, it 
appears that the data requirements, validity and reliability of the ATSB model 
and STAMP are not significantly different (see Table 13). Therefore, it is 
arguable that these aspects of the techniques will not necessarily hinder the 
application of systems thinking relative to one another. Whilst similar in its 
data requirements and validity, the arguably lower reliability of AcciMap 
suggests that its application of the systems approach may be more 
problematic. However, without formally testing the models (e.g. utilising the 
approach of Branford (2007) (see Section 3.4.2.7)), this evaluation is a 
subjective one.  
The usability of an analysis tool is affected not only by its features but also by 
the characteristics of its users (Thomas and Bevan, 1996). Therefore, 
although aspects relating to the usability of the models seem to be similar, as 
mentioned in Section 5.6.2.2, any judgement about a technique’s usability 
involves a degree of subjectivity. This is evidenced by the conflicting opinions 
regarding the usability of AcciMap and STAMP contained within the research 
literature (see Section  3.4.2). The most significant usability issue 
encountered by the first and second researcher of this study related to the 
classification of evidence. In the case of the ATSB model analysis, some of 
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the safety factors did not neatly fit into one of the levels of the model. 
Similarly with the STAMP analysis, it was sometimes hard to distinguish 
between the reasons why unsafe decisions and control actions were made 
and the context they were made in. Furthermore, the lack of specificity in the 
investigation report, regarding which elements of the Network Rail 
management contributed to the accident, made it hard to determine which 
AcciMap system level to attribute various decision/actions and consequences 
to. The application time of STAMP in this study was approximately double 
that of the ATSB model and AcciMap. This was attributed to the greater 
number of steps required to complete the CAST process and the associated 
need for more information about the system structure and its components. It 
is considered by the researchers that, had the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap 
methods been employed to complement the AcciMap and produce a more 
thorough analysis, the application time would have been similar to that of 
STAMP. 
The clearest difference between the models, in terms of their usage 
characteristics, lies in their graphical outputs. The ATSB model and AcciMap 
analysis charts provide a relatively succinct summary of all of the safety 
factors which contributed to an accident. This similarity is not surprising, 
given that the ATSB model charting format is based on the AcciMap. 
However, the different features of the underlying models do produce notable 
variations in the graphical outputs of the techniques. For example, the 
researchers believe that the ATSB model chart more clearly delineates the 
various events, activities and conditions that occurred at a local level. 
Conversely, incorporation of the RMF format enables AcciMap to provide a 
more detailed description of the accident across the different organisational 
levels of the system. In the ATSB’s experience, the use of their charting 
format has helped investigators maintain awareness of their progress during 
an investigation and assists the explanation of complex occurrences to 
industry personnel (ATSB, 2008 p.45). It seems likely that AcciMap would 
provide the same benefits, particularly if colour-coding was used to improve 
the effectiveness of its visual communication (as per Figure 29). In the 
researchers’ opinion, STAMP would also enable an awareness of an 
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investigation’s progress to be maintained. However, given that STAMP does 
not lend itself to a simple graphical representation of an accident, its 
usefulness in communicating an investigation’s findings to a non-expert 
audience may be limited (Leveson, 2012 p.91). This problem may also exist if 
AcciMap were to be complemented by the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap 
techniques. The differing usage characteristics of the models are described 
in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34 - Usage characteristic comparison of the ATSB model, AcciMap 
and STAMP 
5.7.2   The extent of the research-practice gap 
The discussion, so far, has focused on the similarities and differences 
between the ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP. What implications do these 
factors have on the application of the SCM and the systems approach?  The 
modifications made to the SCM by the ATSB when developing their model 
(see Section  5.3.1) supplemented the concepts embodied by the SCM, rather 
than eliminate them. Therefore, as the various components of systems theory 
can be applied with the ATSB model, this suggests that the underlying SCM 
can also achieve this and act as a gateway to SAA. Consequently, it seems 
that the SCM does provide a viable means of applying the systems approach. 
This statement, however, comes with an important caveat. As described in 
Section  5.2.2, the SCM is not a detailed accident analysis model, nor was it 
intended to be (Reason et al., 2006 p.21). Therefore, it should be applied via 
a method to ensure that the systems approach is correctly utilised. However, 
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this places an onus on the developers of SCM-based analysis methods to 
ensure that their techniques promote, rather than restrict, this application. 
This requirement is obviously true of any systemic analysis method. However, 
methods which explicitly incorporate the key concepts of systems theory, 
such as STAMP, go some way to resolving this problem. Therefore, it could 
be argued that such SAA techniques represent an evolution, rather than a 
revolution, in the application of the systems approach. In other words, the 
extent of the SAA RPG may not be significant for practitioners using SCM-
based methods, assuming, of course, that they correctly apply the method. 
Consequently, the need to bridge the RPG may not be as great as some 
proponents of SAA suggest (e.g. Dekker, 2006; Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 
2012). However, the SCM is not used exclusively throughout industry and 
other sequential methods remain popular (e.g. FTA), as indicated by Figure 
18. Therefore, the SAA RPG could still be extensive in some instances. This 
issue is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
5.8   Analysis and study limitations 
An important question in this type of study is whether any of the analysis 
techniques highlighted systemic issues that were not addressed in the 
investigation report. The findings presented in Section  5.6.1 indicate that 
insufficient information was provided in the report to complete the AcciMap 
and STAMP analyses. In the case of AcciMap this manifested as an inability 
to analyse the influence of the governmental level of the system, whereas it 
was not possible to examine the long-term changes to the system over time 
with STAMP. In contrast, the ATSB model analysis was relatively complete.  
However, the next stage of analysis would naturally be to examine why the 
organisational and regulatory issues existed. 
These limitations raise the important issue of when to stop evidence 
collection in an investigation. To fulfil the data requirements of AcciMap, 
STAMP and (to a lesser degree) the ATSB model, the RAIB would have 
needed to expand the boundary of the system they were investigating and 
look further back into the system’s history. The collection of this extra 
information may not have occurred for a number of reasons, e.g.: the 
resource constraints of the investigation; the analysis processes used by the 
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RAIB did not need the information; the required evidence was not available. 
Even if one of the three models used in the study had been adopted by the 
RAIB, it is possible that resource constraints and/or evidence availability 
would have prevented a complete analysis. Therefore, suggesting that a 
more extensive SAA would have yielded more in-depth results, whilst true, 
does not necessarily account for the practicalities of accident investigation. 
Furthermore, the RAIB (2011) report was written for a general audience and 
therefore, it is unclear what information was left out of the report for the sake 
of readability, personal or commercial sensitivity etc.    
Due to the resource constraints of this study, only three analysis models 
were utilised. Therefore, comments about how the SCM and its related 
methods compare in general to the SAA techniques are not necessarily 
representative of all of the available methods. However, it is felt that the 
comparison of the methods is indicative of the current state of accident 
analysis in research and practice. The resource limitations of the study also 
prevented the researchers from independently performing an analysis of the 
derailment with each model. This would have been the ideal approach to take 
as it would have removed any influence that one researcher’s findings would 
have had on the other researcher’s understanding of the accident, prior to 
discussing the analyses.  Furthermore, it would also have provided a deeper 
insight into the inter-rater reliability of the techniques. However, the 
researchers consider that the analysis process employed in the study (see 
Section  5.5.1) was sufficiently robust and provides accurate findings. 
5.9   Conclusion 
Debate exists within the research literature over whether the popular and 
widely adopted SCM provides an outdated view of accident causation or 
remains a viable means of applying the systems approach to accident 
analysis. This issue was examined by applying an SCM-based analysis 
model (the ATSB model) and two SAA methods (AcciMap and STAMP) to 
the Grayrigg train derailment. A comparison of the analysis outputs and 
usage of the techniques showed that each model did apply the systems 
approach, albeit in different ways. The ATSB model and AcciMap did not 
explicitly address all of the key systems theory concepts but graphically 
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presented their findings in a more succinct manner. Conversely, STAMP 
more clearly embodied the concepts of systems theory but did not provide a 
simple graphical representation of the accident. The findings of this study 
suggest that the SCM remains a viable model for understanding accidents 
and that SAA methods offer an evolutionary progression, rather than 
complete transformation, in accident analysis. Furthermore, the SAA RPG 
gap and the need to close it may not be as significant as some SAA 
proponents claim. 
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Chapter 6 – Study 4: Evaluating a systemic accident 
analysis method 
6.1   Chapter overview 
This chapter follows on from the findings of Study 2, which indicate that SAA 
methods must meet the needs of practitioners if they are to be adopted and 
used. A practitioner evaluation of the STAMP method is presented in this 
chapter. Six trainee accident investigators were recruited to perform a 
STAMP analysis on data they collected during an accident investigation 
simulation and assess the effectiveness and usability of the method. The 
findings of the study are presented and subsequently discussed with regards 
to how the usage characteristics of STAMP may affects its use by 
practitioners. 
6.2   Introduction 
The findings of Study 2 indicate that SAA methods must meet the needs of 
practitioners if the SAA RPG is to be bridged (see Section  4.4). Such 
requirements include: the usability of an analysis method, its validity and the 
usefulness of its output format (see Section  4.4.3.1). However, the use of 
SAA methods to analyse accidents has predominantly existed within 
research and very little is known about their application by practitioners. 
Therefore, in order to understand if the systemic techniques meet the needs 
of practitioners, it must be established how these methods cope with the 
demands of live investigations. Recruiting practitioners to apply and evaluate 
the SAA methods would be a useful start towards achieving this goal. Indeed, 
involving users in the development of a method/product/system can play an 
important part in gaining user acceptance (Damodaran, 1996; Olson and Ives, 
1981). This is evidenced by a number of analysis methods which, when 
developed by researchers in collaboration with practitioners, have become 
successful in (and beyond) their intended industries. 
Two well-known examples of where such collaboration has proved effective 
are HFACS and Tripod Delta. There are a number of notable features about 
the development process of these techniques: they were purposefully 
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developed for use within a certain industry (military aviation and oil and gas 
in the case of HFACS and Tripod Delta respectively), researchers based the 
methods on contemporary accident causation theory whilst practitioners 
supplied guidance on end-user requirements, the methods employed a 
taxonomic approach to standardise error classification and facilitate the 
examination of aggregated accident data and each technique was 
extensively validated in field-tests conducted with the sponsor organisations 
prior to their adoption. This high level of practitioner involvement combined 
with the theoretical input of researchers appears to have been a key factor in 
the success of implementing the methods. If a similar development process 
was adopted for the SAA techniques it is arguable that some of the existing 
issues hindering their usage may be overcome (see Section  4.4). For 
example, field-testing the methods could help establish the industry track 
record which is currently lacking and generate end-user feedback that may 
help to improve the tools’ functionality, usage guidance and training material. 
Developing industry-specific taxonomies for classifying contributing systemic 
factors may also help to improve the reliability of the SAA methods and their 
suitability for multiple accident case analysis (Salmon et al., 2012a). 
6.2.1   The use of scenario-based training 
From a research perspective, it would be favourable to collect data on 
practitioner usage of the SAA methods within a live investigation. However, 
there may be reluctance to trial new analysis techniques in an investigation. 
Furthermore, this goal may be practicably difficult to achieve for a number of 
reasons, such as: the unpredictable schedule of accident investigations; the 
expense of extended field-based research; gaining access to sensitive 
information. 
The use of scenario-based training (SBT), in the form of high fidelity 
simulations, can offer a solution to these problems. The use of simulations 
offers a degree of control over various aspects of accident investigation, e.g.: 
a predictable schedule can be achieved; the severity of the accident can be 
matched to the training resources; accident site boundaries can be easily 
established. It also offers practitioners an environment in which they can trial 
new methods without any negative consequences on safety within their 
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industry. Therefore, the use of high fidelity simulations can provide a suitable 
environment for data collection which balances the realism of an investigation 
with the theoretical and practical needs of researchers. SBT is well 
established as a technique to improve the performance of individuals/teams 
in safety-critical industries, such as healthcare (Crawford et al., 2010), energy 
(Saurin and Carim Júnior, 2011) and defence (Kropewnicki et al., 2010). 
However, relatively little information regarding the use of SBT for accident 
analysis exists within the research literature. One notable example is the 
research conducted by Woodcock et al. (2005). 
Accident stories, based on actual events, were created by Woodcock et al. 
(2005) to, amongst other issues, compare the effect of using two different 
analysis techniques versus a freestyle investigation approach. Participants 
(accident investigators) were initially provided with a brief synopsis of the 
accident and then proceeded to ask questions. Data was provided verbally 
by the experimenter until the participants were satisfied with their 
understanding of the accident, who then reported their conclusions. This 
laboratory-based simulation method allowed the participants to generate and 
test hypotheses in a flexible format and was considered by them to closely 
resemble the processes used during real investigations. Therefore, the use of 
simulated accidents seems to provide an appropriate means in which to 
perform research studies, such as method evaluations. However, some 
participants (experienced investigators) highlighted that a lack of site visits 
limited the realism of the exercise. Therefore, the preferred format for an 
accident simulation should involve field-based elements. 
6.2.2   Study aim and objectives 
The aim of this study is to provide an insight into the application of an SAA 
method by practitioners. In order to achieve this aim, the study has two main 
objectives: 
• Obtain a practitioner evaluation of an SAA method, based on their 
experience of using it in a (high-fidelity, partly field-based) simulated 
investigation 
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• Understand how the usage characteristics of the method affect its use in 
a live investigation scenario 
By conducting this study, it is hoped that a greater understanding of the 
extent of the SAA RPG can be achieved. 
6.3   Methods 
6.3.1   Mixed methods approach 
Whilst the research undertaken for this thesis adopted a mixed-methods 
approach overall (see Section  1.3.2), the use of multiple methods was a key 
feature of this study. The objectives of the study could have been achieved 
with a single method, e.g. a method evaluation questionnaire. However, a 
concurrent mixed methods approach was taken for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it was judged that the different objectives could be achieved by more 
than one method and using them in combination would compensate for their 
relative weaknesses and improve the validity of the overall findings. Secondly, 
the nature of the study was, to a degree, exploratory in nature (an evaluation 
of an SAA method within a simulated accident investigation has yet to be 
published). Therefore, it was believed that the breadth and depth of data that 
could be collected via a mixed methods approach would facilitate a 
comprehensive evaluation. Finally, the time available to conduct the study 
was limited to two days in the week following the investigation exercise. 
Therefore, it was necessary to use the methods concurrently (as long as 
multiple methods are administered in the same time frame and 
conceptualised as part of the same study they are considered concurrent) 
(Bronstein and Kovacs, 2013 p.358). 
Furthermore, previous studies involving accident investigation simulations 
have used a mixed methods approach (e.g. Gordon et al., 2005; Woodcock 
et al., 2005). In particular, Gordon et al. (2005), in an evaluation of their 
Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT), measured the inter-rater reliability 
of the HFIT users and gathered their feedback on the method’s ease of use 
and validity via user evaluation forms, written feedback and informal 
discussions. This approach revealed both strengths and weaknesses of HFIT 
and the need for further development of the method. Therefore, given the 
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similarities between the objectives of this study and that of Gordon et al. 
(2005), the use of mixed methods was deemed to be suitable. 
6.3.2   SAA method selection 
The STAMP method was chosen for evaluation for a number of reasons. As 
described in Section  3.4.2 it is the most frequently cited SAA technique. It 
was previously used in Study 3 and would, therefore, allow a comparison 
between its use in the research and practice contexts. Finally, detailed 
guidance about the application of the technique is available (see Leveson, 
2012), thereby facilitating the training of participants in the use of STAMP.  
6.3.3   Sampling strategy 
A combination of the stratified purposive and convenience sampling 
strategies, as defined by Miles and Huberman (1994), was employed in this 
study. The objectives of the study necessitated the recruitment of a particular 
group of individuals, i.e. practitioners employed (on a full- or part-time basis) 
as accident/incident investigators. However, due to their unpredictable 
working patterns, the recruitment of experienced investigators was 
considered unfeasible. Therefore, participants were recruited from a group of 
individuals that were training to be full-time aviation accident investigators or 
aviation safety professionals (e.g. safety managers) with a part-time 
responsibility for accident investigation. 
The participants were enrolled on a six week training course run by the 
Cranfield Safety and Accident Investigation Centre at Cranfield University, 
which consisted of an initial three week module entitled ‘Fundamentals of 
Accident Investigation’ and a  supplementary three week ‘Applied Aircraft 
Accident Investigation’ module. Individuals from various modes of transport 
were present during the first module, whereas only aviation practitioners 
were present during the second module. The investigation simulation 
exercise used within the study occurred over the second and third weeks of 
the ‘Fundamentals of Accident Investigation’ module. However, the study 
was conducted in the first week of the ‘Applied Aircraft Accident Investigation’ 
module, as the workload of the course delegates in the final week of the first 
module restricted their availability. Therefore, only aviation practitioners were 
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available for recruitment and hence why a degree of convenience sampling 
was utilised. 
6.3.4   Participants 
Six participants (mean age: 43.8 years) were recruited for the study and were 
either employed as (and receiving additional training), or training to be, 
aircraft accident investigators. A summary of the participants’ backgrounds 
and analysis experience is provided in Table 14. 
During the first course module the delegates received training in a variety of 
sequential, epidemiological and systemic accident analysis methods from the 
researcher (Underwood). This information included the conceptual 
background of STAMP, its use via the CAST process (see Leveson, 2012 
p.349) and an example of its application via a rail accident case study 
analysis. Therefore, although none of the participants were aware of STAMP 
before attending the training course, they had a basic knowledge of the 
method and its application process. This offered a degree of control over the 
experimental bias associated with the previous experiences of the 
participants. 
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Participant Age Country Industry Role 
% of time 
spent 
analysing 
accidents/ 
incidents 
Experience 
in 
analysing 
accidents/ 
incidents 
(years) 
Number of 
accidents 
(incidents) 
analysed 
Type of accidents and/or 
incidents analysed 
1 35 Canada Military aviation 
Accident 
investigator 25 1 2 (0) 
Aircraft fell off jack, nose 
wheel failure on landing 
2 45 Australia Military aviation 
Accident 
investigator 50 
0 as 
investigator 
(spent 2 
years as 
flight/voice 
data 
analyst) 
1 (6) 
Ejection from fixed-wing 
aircraft, smoke and fumes 
in a helicopter 
3 46 Australia Military aviation 
Aviation 
maintenance 
support 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Various maintenance related issues 
4 53 UK Military aviation 
Accident 
investigator 60 >20 >20 (>100) 
Rotary wing aviation 
(military and commercial) 
5 40 Nigeria Military aviation 
Wing 
commander Unknown 3 3 (4) 
Flight into terrain, airborne 
near misses, hard landing, 
hydraulics failure 
6 44 Japan Civil aviation 
Accident 
investigator 60 2 2 (0) Flight into terrain 
Table 14 - Participant information
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6.3.5   Investigation simulation 
The investigation exercise centred on a rail-based accident scenario which 
involved a train colliding with two track maintenance engineers, fatally 
injuring one of them. The exercise took place over 2.5 days; the first day 
consisted of field-based evidence gathering, the second day was dedicated 
to the analysis phase of the investigation and the remaining time was 
allocated to the presentation of the teams’ findings. 
The 34 course delegates were divided into four teams with each team having 
a nominated Investigator In Charge (IIC), i.e. a team leader. Each group 
received a pre-exercise brief detailing the learning objectives and site-safety 
instructions. The delegates were also provided with contextual information to 
increase the realism of the exercise, i.e. each team was formed of newly 
qualified ‘National Investigation Agency’ (NIA) investigators who were at the 
top of the call-out duty roster. However, no details were provided as to the 
mode of transport, location or stakeholders involved in the accident. Again, 
this was to maximise the realism of the exercise. 
During various stages of the first day, each IIC was telephoned by the NIA 
duty coordinator, provided with initial details of the collision and told to deploy 
their team to the accident site. The deployments were staggered to ensure 
that each team had sole access to the site for a given period of time. Each 
IIC was responsible for allocating roles to their team members and assigning 
tasks based on the needs of the investigation. Typical duties involved 
documenting evidence, mapping the accident site and interviewing witnesses. 
Each team was provided with a location to hold meetings/conduct interviews 
(a spare carriage on a train not involved in the accident) and a supply of 
evidence collection/documentation, personal protection and communications 
equipment. 
The teams were given 1.75 hours for site examination and a further 1.75 
hours to conduct several planned witness interviews, e.g. with the surviving 
maintenance engineer. Several unplanned witness interviews also took place 
during the site examination as various ‘witnesses’, e.g. a passing member of 
the public, were introduced into the scenario. During the subsequent analysis 
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phase, the teams were able to request additional evidence as they 
discovered/explored lines of enquiry. If available, this extra information was 
provided verbally or in the form of documentation, e.g. maintenance manuals. 
Two teams opted to use the ATSB model to guide their analysis, whereas the 
other teams used STAMP.  
The different investigation approaches taken by the teams resulted in each 
group possessing slightly different factual information about the accident. 
This, in turn, resulted in each team presenting different factual and analysis 
findings. Therefore, no complete description of the accident was available, 
however, a general synopsis is provided in Section  6.3.6. 
6.3.6   Accident synopsis 
The simulated accident ‘occurred’ on the 25th January 2013 on a bridge 
located south of the Pitsford and Brampton station in Northamptonshire (see 
Figure 35).  
 
Figure 35 - Simulated accident site 
The section of track on which the accident occurred had been subject to a 
temporary 50 miles per hour (mph) speed restriction. The restriction was in 
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place due to reported ‘rough running’ over the bridge caused by uneven track 
geometry which, in turn, was caused by dislodged ballast. The restriction was 
established between the Boughton signal box to the south of the accident site 
and the Pitsford and Brampton station (see Figure 36).  
Pitsford and 
Brampton station
Point of 
collision
Location of 
stopped train
Boughton 
signal box
N
Location 
of flagman
20 mph 
signs
Bridge
 
Figure 36 - Map of accident site 
A track maintenance crew, consisting of two maintenance engineers and a 
lookout (flagman), were called to perform an inspection of the affected 
section of track at 00:30 on the 25th January 2013. The maintenance crew 
arrived at the site at approximately 06:00 and began their shift by walking to 
the Boughton signal box. The leader of the maintenance crew, the Controller 
of Site Safety (COSS), met with the Boughton signalman to complete the 
required documentation to authorise the track inspection. As per company 
policy, a 20 mph emergency speed restriction was to be established in the 
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area where the track work was to be conducted. After leaving the Boughton 
signal box, the maintenance crew then installed the 20 mph signage and a 
warning light system 220 metres to the north (see Figure 36). However, this 
signage and light system was not adequately secured in place and ultimately 
toppled over before the train involved in the collision passed the Boughton 
signal box. 
The maintenance crew took up their positions for the inspection and the 
COSS and his assistant engineer observed a scheduled train pass over the 
affected track at approximately 06:35. Subsequent to the inspection, the two 
engineers then agreed to carry out some unscheduled (and unauthorised) 
maintenance work to the track and replace the missing ballast. This decision 
was taken based on the understanding that the next train was not due to 
arrive until 07:40. Therefore, sufficient time was available to complete the 
necessary repairs and avoid the need for a second site visit. The two 
engineers then proceeded to a nearby engineering depot, returned to the 
bridge with the required equipment loaded on to a track-mounted trolley (see 
Figure 35) and began their maintenance tasks. Their journey from the depot 
was slowed due to a defect with the trolley, which restricted its movement. In 
addition, the trolley brakes were inoperable and the engineers resorted to 
chocking its wheels with ballast to secure it in place.  
At approximately 06:50 an unscheduled train passed the Boughton signal 
box travelling northbound. The train slowed to 50 mph, as required, however, 
the train drivers were unaware of the 20 mph emergency restriction in place 
due to the fallen signage and warning lights. The flagman saw the 
approaching train but was unsuccessful in his attempts to warn the 
maintenance engineers. The train drivers observed the engineers on the 
bridge and applied the train’s emergency brakes. The COSS and his 
assistant heard the train and, fearing that its collision with the trolley could 
result in a derailment, attempted to remove the trolley from the track. They 
were, however, unable to remove the trolley in time and were struck by the 
train. The COSS was fatally injured in the collision and his assistant 
sustained head and leg injuries. The assistant engineer was attended to 
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initially by the second train driver before he was evacuated to hospital by the 
emergency services. 
6.3.7   Data collection 
 Analysis workshop 6.3.7.1  
The use of a workshop was judged to be the most appropriate environment 
for the participants to conduct a STAMP analysis. This decision was taken to 
maximise the level of control over the study conditions (e.g. each individual 
would be furnished with the same amount of time to complete the analysis 
and have access to support from the researcher) and minimise the required 
time for data collection. 
The duration of the workshop was two hours and began with a 15 minute 
briefing, covering a number of topics. Firstly, the participants were informed 
of the format and the overarching aim of the workshop, i.e. performing a 
STAMP analysis of the data collected during the simulated investigation and 
providing feedback on their experiences of using the method. To minimise 
participant expectation bias, the group was not informed about how the study 
data was to be analysed. Secondly, the group was provided with rules that 
applied to their participation in the workshop: (1) discussions with other 
participants about evidence were permitted for individuals that had been 
team members during the investigation exercise. This rule was established to 
ensure that the participants did not introduce new evidence into their 
analyses, thereby possibly affecting their experience of using STAMP and 
increasing the workshop duration by creating debates about the nature of the 
evidence; (2) queries about the application of STAMP should be directed to 
the researcher, rather than the other group members. This instruction was 
given in order to reduce the influence that the participants would have on 
each other’s analyses and to facilitate their own analysis, i.e. by gaining 
assistance from an experienced user of STAMP. Guidance on STAMP usage 
was provided by the researcher throughout the workshop. Although this 
influenced the participants’ usage of the method it was deemed necessary to 
facilitate data generation. Finally, the participants were provided with a re-cap 
of STAMP and the CAST process, in order to prime them to conduct the 
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analysis. Upon completion of the briefing, the remaining time was dedicated 
to the STAMP analysis. All but one of the participants were able to complete 
their analysis within the permitted time. 
Each participant was provided with a range of material to help them complete 
their analysis, i.e. a summary of the CAST process and worksheets, based 
on the various stages of CAST, on which the participants could record their 
analysis (see Appendix 6.1). The terminology used in these documents was 
taken from Leveson (2012); the expectation being that issues regarding the 
ambiguity of the terms would be raised by participants and, therefore, 
highlight usability problems. The first step of the analysis process, i.e. identify 
the system(s) involved in the accident, was completed for the participants to 
facilitate the rest of the analysis. Each member of the group was also 
provided with an example of a STAMP control structure hierarchy based on 
the diagram presented by Leveson (2012 p.82). The participants were 
instructed to exclude the fourth step of the CAST process, i.e. defining the 
proximal event timeline. This instruction was given to facilitate the analysis, 
given that the four teams had all created detailed timelines during the 
investigation exercise. 
An audio recording of the workshop was taken to identify any 
issues/questions raised by the participants and the support given by the 
researcher, in order to understand how these factors may have influenced 
the participants’ analyses. 
 STAMP evaluation questionnaire 6.3.7.2  
Upon the completion of the workshop, each participant completed an 
evaluation questionnaire (see Appendix 6.2). The questionnaire was 
designed to understand how the participants viewed different issues 
surrounding the validity and usability of STAMP by asking them to state their 
level of agreement with a number of statements. These statements were 
based on: the method evaluation topics used in the previous study (see 
Section  5.5.2), e.g. how effectively STAMP represents system component 
relationships; the questionnaire topics investigated by Gordon et al. (2005); 
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existing questionnaires employed in usability studies (e.g. Brinkman et al., 
2009; Schnall et al., 2012; Viitanen et al., 2011).  
Due to the number of evaluation topics, it was considered that a 
questionnaire would provide the most efficient means of collecting the 
resultant large quantity of data. In addition, it would generate quantitative 
data that could be used to make a statistical comparison of the participants’ 
usage experience. With this comparison in mind, it was decided to utilise a 
seven-point simple rating scale format to ascertain the level of participants’ 
agreement with the various statements. The scale values and their 
associated levels of agreement can be seen in Table 15 below:  
Scale value Level of agreement 
0 Strongly disagree 
1 Disagree 
2 Slightly disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Slightly agree 
5 Agree 
6 Strongly agree 
Table 15 - STAMP evaluation questionnaire rating scale 
Such a scale was chosen as it offered a neutral mid-point to the participants 
and provided an appropriate balance between data resolution and ease of 
questionnaire completion (DeVellis, 2012). The questionnaire was reviewed 
by a senior human factors researcher and minor amendments to the 
formatting were made before the start of the study. 
 Focus group 6.3.7.3  
Subsequent to the completion of the evaluation questionnaire, four of the 
participants took part in a focus group. The objective of the session was to 
understand the participants’ overall impression of STAMP. A number of 
questions were developed to gather this information: 
• What are the benefits of using STAMP? 
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• What are the disadvantages of using STAMP? 
• How would you improve STAMP? 
• Would you use STAMP in future investigations?  
Whilst these questions could have been incorporated into the STAMP 
evaluation questionnaire, it was deemed preferable to collect the participant 
responses via a focus group. This decision was made so that points of 
interest could be explored further, via the use of additional questions, and 
thus increase the breadth and depth of the data collected. The duration of the 
focus group was limited to 20 minutes due to the availability of the 
participants.  
6.3.8   Data analysis 
 Initial analysis 6.3.8.1  
The different data sources (see Section  6.3.7) were initially analysed 
separately. The analysis outputs created by the participants were converted 
into electronic documents and imported into NVivo 9. The documents were 
subsequently compared using an inductive analysis approach and any 
similarities/differences were coded in NVivo 9. This comparison was made to 
assess the different approaches of the participants, rather than make a 
judgement on the accuracy of the analyses or the reliability of STAMP (which 
was not possible given that the whole group was not using the same set of 
data). The study was not designed to formally test the validity and reliability 
of the method for a number of reasons: (1) the participants were first-time 
users of STAMP and, therefore, would not be expected to produce accurate 
analysis results; (2) the sample was formed of individuals from different 
investigation exercise teams whom had access to differing amounts of 
evidence; (3) a complete description of the accident was not available to 
compare the workshop analysis outputs against. 
Data from the STAMP evaluation questionnaire was analysed with SPSS 20 
in order to provide some descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values) regarding the participants’ level of 
agreement with the various questions. The audio recordings of the analysis 
workshop and focus group were transcribed, imported into NVivo 9 and 
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analysed inductively. All of the questions raised by the participants during the 
workshop and the answers provided by the researcher were coded, with 
similar questions/responses being grouped under parent-codes. Topics of 
interest related to the focus group questions were also coded and grouped as 
appropriate. 
 Data integration 6.3.8.2  
The findings from the first stage of analysis were subsequently integrated for 
a second analysis phase in order to identify instances of data corroboration 
(the ‘same results’ are derived from both qualitative and quantitative 
methods), elaboration (the qualitative data analysis exemplifies how the 
quantitative findings apply in particular cases), complementarity (the 
qualitative and quantitative results differ but together they generate insights) 
and contradiction (where qualitative data and quantitative findings conflict), 
as defined by Brannen (2005 p.176). This analysis was performed 
deductively, using an evaluation framework as a coding template (see 
Section  6.3.8.3). An inductive approach was also taken to highlight any 
additional factors identified during the analysis. 
 Evaluation framework 6.3.8.3  
The evaluation framework used in the integrative analysis phase (see 
Section  6.3.8.2) was based on the framework utilised in Study 3 (see 
Section  5.5.2). As the study was focused on understanding how the usage of 
STAMP by practitioners would impact on its suitability for use in live 
investigations, only the usage characteristics of the method were examined. 
Furthermore, the information presented in Figure 19 indicates that usability, 
validity and a useful output format are key practitioner requirements of a 
method, thereby justifying their inclusion in the evaluation framework. The 
evaluation framework is graphically represented in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37 – Study 4 evaluation framework 
6.4   Findings 
A summary of the individual sets of data, collected via the methods described 
in Section  6.3.7, is provided in this section. The integration of the data is 
discussed under the various headings of the evaluation framework in 
Section  6.5. 
6.4.1   STAMP analysis outputs 
This section provides a summary of the analysis outputs produced by the 
participants during the workshop. 
 Identification of system hazards 6.4.1.1  
All of the participants identified that at least one of the system hazards 
involved in the accident related to trains operating during periods of 
maintenance, which included people and/or equipment being present on the 
track (see Figure 38). 
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Figure 38 - System hazards identified during analysis (numbers in brackets = 
number of participants listing a given hazard) 
Participants 1, 2 and 4 identified this as the only type of hazard, whereas 
Participant 6 listed a further two hazards and Participants 3 and 5 cited an 
additional three hazards. The hazards identified by each individual are 
detailed in Table 22 (see Appendix 6.3). 
 Identification of system safety constraints 6.4.1.2  
The participants listed a total of 31 system safety constraints, which were 
related to three main topics: (1) speed restriction signage and warning 
systems; (2) personnel requirements, e.g. the use of a flagman and the need 
for the flagman to warn the maintenance engineers of an approaching train; 
(3) procedures, e.g. maintenance work permit forms (see Figure 39). A 
summary of system safety constraints identified by each participant is 
contained in Table 23 (see Appendix 6.3). 
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Figure 39 - System safety constraints identified during analysis (numbers in 
brackets = number of system safety constraints related to a given topic) 
As per the identification of the system hazards, variation existed amongst 
participants with regards to the number of system safety constraints they 
identified. Participants 1 and 2 both listed the greatest number (seven 
constraints) and Participant 6 documented the least (one constraint). Of the 
total number of constraints identified, 86 % were recorded by Participants 1, 
2, 3 and 4 (see Table 23 in Appendix 6.3). 
 Control structure hierarchy documentation 6.4.1.3  
Only five of the participants documented the control structure hierarchy; 
Participant 6 did not attempt to define the control structure as they were 
struggling to complete the rest of the analysis. Examples of the control 
structure diagrams produced by the participants can be seen in Figure 40 
and Figure 41. 
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Figure 40 - Participant 2 control structure diagram (AWS = Automatic 
Warning System, CRIC = Cranfield Railway Infrastructure Company, CTOC = 
Cranfield Train Operating Company) 
 Chapter 6 174 
 
Figure 41 - Participant 4 control structure diagram (ORR = Office of Rail 
Regulation) 
All of the participants who created diagrams of the system control structure 
utilised the format described by (Leveson, 2012 p.82), with four individuals 
describing control/feedback problems with dotted lines. 
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 Physical system analysis 6.4.1.4  
Four of the participants provided an explicit description of the physical 
system components they judged to be involved in the accident (see Table 16), 
with procedural documents and the signage and warning systems being the 
two most cited components.  
Physical system component 
description 
Participant number 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Explicit 
descriptions 
Driver notification 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Procedural 
documents 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
Signage and warning 
systems 1 2 0 1 0 1 5 
Train 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Inferred 
descriptions 
Personnel duties 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Procedural 
documents 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Signage and warning 
systems 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 
Total 3 4 3 2 4 1  
Table 16 - Physical system component description7 
Participants 3 and 5 did not provide any explicit descriptions of the physical 
system. However, three types of component could be inferred from the list of 
physical controls and violated safety constraints which they provided, albeit 
that one component (i.e. personnel duties) appeared to be more suitably 
defined as the safety-related responsibility of a higher-level system 
component. 
When asked to provide a description of the controls available to the various 
physical system components, the majority of the controls listed referred to 
items of physical equipment (see Figure 42). Two participants also cited the 
flagman as a physical control, albeit that the flagman represents a higher-
level system component (see Table 24 in Appendix 6.3). However, when 
describing how the physical system components failed or how the controls 
were inadequate, participants listed as many personnel-related issues as 
                                            
7 Yellow colour of cells used to highlight a non-zero value 
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physical equipment problems (see Figure 43). Again, these personnel-related 
issues seemed linked to the analysis of higher-level system components (see 
Table 25 in Appendix 6.3). 
 
Physical 
equipment (21)
Personnel (2)
Other (3)
Physical 
equipment (14)  
Figure 42 - Physical system controls (numbers in brackets = number of 
controls listed) 
Personnel (14)
Physical 
equipment (14)
Other (3)
 
Figure 43 - Physical system failures and inadequate controls (numbers in 
brackets = number of failures/inadequate controls listed) 
 Chapter 6 177 
 Higher system level analysis 6.4.1.5  
Similarly to the physical system analysis, five participants provided explicit 
descriptions of higher system level components (see Table 17). Inferred 
system component descriptions were also identified from the safety-related 
responsibilities described by two participants. The majority (76 %) of the 
components documented by the group referred to frontline staff individuals 
and teams. Only Participant 5 listed system components from higher levels of 
the control structure, i.e. the company management. However, these 
components were not analysed by the participant. 
 Higher system level component description 
Participant 
number Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Explicit 
component 
descriptions 
Frontline 
staff 
Assistant engineer 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
COSS 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Engineers and 
technicians 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Flagman 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Maintenance team 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Signalman 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Train driver 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Company 
management 
Supervisors 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Train company 
management 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Policies and 
procedures 
Governmental 
policy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Company 
regulation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Procedure 
documentation 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Inferred 
component 
descriptions 
Frontline 
staff 
COSS 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Flagman 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Maintenance team 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Signalman 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Train driver 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 2 4 3 5 5 2  
Table 17 - Higher system level component description7 
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 System coordination and communication 6.4.1.6  
Due to the workshop time constraints, only four participants completed the 
analysis of coordination and communication issues within the system, albeit 
that one of these individuals (Participant 5) documented their findings in the 
‘system changes over time’ analysis worksheet section (see Figure 58 in 
Appendix 6.1). Whilst the majority of issues that were identified centred on 
the themes of inadequate coordination and communication across various 
system levels, a number of additional issues were highlighted (see Table 18). 
These other factors appear to refer to unsafe actions, decisions and 
conditions, rather than coordination and communication issues.   
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Coordination and communication issues 
Participant 
number 
1 3 4 5 
Inadequate 
coordination of 
work 
Ambiguous instructions 0 0 1 0 
Authority gradient in maintenance 
team 0 1 0 0 
Inadequate coordination at 
organisational level 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate coordination at personal 
level 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate maintenance log and 
job-order procedures 0 0 0 1 
Ineffective issue and promulgation 
of work permit 0 1 0 0 
Lack of coordination between train 
operating and track maintenance 
companies 
0 0 0 1 
Lack of procedures to inspect the 
track 0 0 0 1 
Unclear paperwork 0 0 1 0 
Unclear responsibilities 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate 
communication 
Inadequate communication at 
organisational level 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate communication at 
personal level 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate communication 
between train stations 0 0 0 1 
Inadequate maintenance team 
communication 1 0 0 0 
Inadequate overall communication 0 0 1 0 
Inadequate visual communication 
between driver and speed signage 1 0 0 0 
Other 
COSS changed maintenance plan 1 1 0 0 
COSS instructions to flagman were 
not carried out 1 0 0 0 
Decision to work in poor 
environmental conditions 0 1 0 0 
Maintenance assistant only 
expected an inspection 1 0 0 0 
Maintenance staff fatigue 0 1 0 0 
Signalman did not close track 0 1 0 0 
Total 5 6 8 4 
Table 18 - System coordination and communication issues7 
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 System changes over time 6.4.1.7  
As a result of the workshop time constraints, only three of the participants 
completed the final stage of the analysis. The majority of the identified issues 
reflect a normalisation of the risk associated with performing ad hoc 
maintenance work (see Table 19). However, Participant 3 also commented 
that no significant changes in the system over time were noted. 
System changes over time Participant number 
1 3 4 
Acceptance of ambiguous track blockage 
procedure 0 1 0 
‘Can do’ attitude of workers 1 0 0 
Inflexible system unable to cope with short-
term changes in work plans 0 0 1 
Long term friendships clouded professional 
judgement of individual responsibilities 0 0 1 
Routine violations occurred 0 1 1 
Total 1 2 3 
Table 19 - System changes over time7 
6.4.2   Workshop audio recording  
The questions and comments raised by participants during the workshop 
related to three general issues. Firstly, some individuals had difficulty in 
understanding the concepts of STAMP. For example, two participants 
required clarification about the meaning of the control and feedback arrows 
used in the control structure diagram, whereas other individuals had difficulty 
understanding aspects of the STAMP terminology: 
“On this thing [control structure diagram] the lines are representing 
communication?” (Participant 1) 
“What do you mean by dysfunctional interactions?” (Participant 3) 
“System component description; is that a person?” (Participant 2) 
Secondly, the participants struggled to apply STAMP, e.g. every participant 
had trouble defining the system hazards. Other issues encountered by the 
group included: (1) difficulty in drawing the system control structure; (2) 
classifying the dysfunctional interactions of system components; (3) 
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analysing the physical equipment; (4) a general uncertainty of how to 
proceed with the analysis, e.g.: 
“I think that’s what I have a lot of difficulty with, i.e. putting all of this in a 
picture. It took me three attempts to even draw it [the control structure].” 
(Participant 1) 
“The ballast in the wheel of the trolley [used to chock the wheel]; that classes 
as a dysfunctional interaction?” (Participant 3) 
“I’m not sure what I should be doing. What should I write?” (Participant 6) 
Finally, four of the individuals had difficulty recalling information they 
collected during the evidence gathering phase of the simulation and had to 
discuss the investigation with the other participants. 
In addition, two participants commented on the effectiveness of STAMP in 
presenting the findings of the analysis and describing the analysis process 
itself: 
“…there’s nowhere it specifically highlights what the analysis is, how you 
went about getting it and what you did with it.” (Participant 3) 
“I tried to draw the control structure, as per the instructions, and then put 
dotted lines where it kind of falls down but then in the end what is this picture 
saying to somebody?  You have to understand STAMP to understand this 
picture and what’s going on.” (Participant 2) 
6.4.3   STAMP evaluation questionnaire 
The first question of the evaluation questionnaire revealed that four of the 
participants had used the ATSB model to originally analyse their team’s 
evidence during the simulation. The teams of the remaining two participants 
had used STAMP, however, these individuals had not been directly involved 
in the analysis and, as a result, had not used the method. Therefore, it was 
considered that their limited experience of STAMP would not prevent a fair 
comparison with the other participants’ analyses and evaluations. All of the 
participants confirmed in the second and third questions that they neither 
knew of, nor had used, STAMP before attending the accident investigation 
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training course. The answers to the remaining questions are presented in 
Table 20. 
Question Mean SD Min Max 
4 STAMP is a suitable method for analysing accidents 4.0 1.41 2 6 
5 STAMP effectively describes the event timeline of an accident 2.5 1.76 1 6 
6a STAMP effectively analyses the contribution to an accident from technical components 4.2 1.17 3 6 
6b STAMP effectively analyses the contribution to an accident from human factors issues 5.0 0.63 4 6 
6c STAMP effectively analyses the contribution to an accident from organisational issues 5.0 1.10 3 6 
6d STAMP effectively analyses the contribution to an accident from environmental issues 3.3 1.03 2 5 
7 STAMP provides a comprehensive description of an accident 3.5 1.05 2 5 
8 STAMP effectively represents the relationships between systems components 5.0 1.26 3 6 
9 STAMP correctly identifies the causes of an accident 3.7 1.37 2 5 
10 STAMP could be applied to any type of accident in my industry 3.3 1.03 2 5 
11 STAMP is an easy method to understand 2.3 1.51 1 5 
12 The terms and concepts used in STAMP are clear and unambiguous 3.2 1.17 2 5 
13 It is easy to identify the system safety requirements 3.7 1.37 2 6 
14 It is easy to define the system control structure 3.7 1.03 2 5 
15 It is easy to identify unsafe decisions and inadequate control actions 3.8 1.17 2 5 
16a It is easy to describe dysfunctional interactions 4.7 1.21 3 6 
16b It is easy to describe the context of decisions/actions taken by different system components 4.0 0.89 3 5 
17 STAMP is an easy method to use 2.5 1.05 1 4 
18 STAMP is easy to use in a team-based analysis 3.7 1.03 2 5 
19 STAMP promotes team collaboration during analysis 4.3 1.03 3 6 
20 A STAMP diagram is a useful communication tool 3.8 1.47 2 6 
21 A STAMP analysis can be completed in an acceptable timescale 4.3 0.82 3 5 
22 It would be easy for me to become skilled at using STAMP 3.5 1.38 1 5 
23 I received sufficient training in the use of STAMP to effectively use the method 2.7 1.97 1 6 
Table 20 - STAMP evaluation questionnaire results (SD, Min and Max 
columns present ±1 standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
respectively) 
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Examining the participants’ questionnaire responses in Table 20 (using the 
level of agreement values established in Table 15) reveals a number of 
noteworthy issues.  As a group, the participants slightly agreed that STAMP 
is a suitable method for analysing accidents, albeit that there was a wide 
range of opinion, and that it correctly identifies the causes of an accident. 
Specifically, the participants agreed that STAMP effectively analyses the 
contribution to an accident from human factors and organisational issues and 
that it effectively represents system component relationships. Furthermore, 
they also agreed that it was easy to describe the dysfunctional interactions of 
system components. However, the group slightly disagreed that the accident 
event timeline was effectively described by the method (five of the 
participants either slightly disagreed or disagreed with the statement) (see 
Figure 59 in Appendix 6.4).  
Collectively, the participants disagreed that STAMP was easy to understand 
and slightly disagreed that it was easy to use. In each case, only one 
participant agreed with the statement. However, four of the participants either 
slightly disagreed or disagreed that they had received enough training to 
effectively use the method. There was also a wide range of opinion amongst 
the group as to whether the participants could easily become skilled at using 
STAMP (see Figure 59 in Appendix 6.4). 
6.4.4   Focus group 
 Benefits of STAMP 6.4.4.1  
When asked, three participants provided examples of the benefits of using 
STAMP. These advantages related to the method’s ability to provide insights 
into the contribution to an accident from the higher levels of a system, 
graphically describe a complex accident and visually communicate the 
findings of an analysis to senior management in an effective manner, e.g.: 
“I think the pros would be that, if you had a very complex accident, I think you 
would be able to represent it graphically with the STAMP method.” 
(Participant 1) 
“It’s great for looking at the overarching stuff [and] it was useful for [defining 
the] lines of responsibility trees and communication trees.” (Participant 4) 
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 Disadvantages of STAMP 6.4.4.2  
Conversely, the group also mentioned disadvantages associated with the 
analytical and graphical representation capabilities of STAMP. Although 
Participants 1 and 4 felt that STAMP was suitable for higher system level 
analysis, they also stated that it did not provide an effective analysis of issues, 
e.g. human factors, at the lower system levels. Participant 4 also mentioned 
that the lack of an accident trending capability, due to the absence of a 
taxonomy, represented an analysis limitation. Furthermore, three of the 
participants remarked that the CAST process seemed too prescriptive, e.g.:  
“I felt as if the analysis was driving the evidence.” (Participant 2) 
“You had the evidence and you had to slot into the analysis at the right 
levels, rather than you’ve got your timeline, you’ve got your evidence and say 
‘what happened here?’” (Participant 4) 
The issues raised by the group, in relation to STAMP’s graphical 
representation of an accident, related to how effectively it communicates the 
findings of an analysis. In particular, all four members of the focus group 
commented that the inability of the method to chart the timeline of an 
accident posed an important limitation, e.g.: 
“That’s the big issue with STAMP: it’s not a logical representation. It’s not 
time-lined.” (Participant 1) 
“STAMP definitely needs a timeline somewhere in there to give you 
presentational stuff.” (Participant 4) 
The STAMP control structure diagram was also described as visually 
confusing by two participants. Participant 3 stated that it added no real value 
to an analysis and Participant 2 commented that the graphical output of the 
ATSB model was easier to understand. In addition, Participants 3 and 4 
commented that drawing the system control structure was most difficult stage 
of the analysis process. 
Other drawbacks of STAMP were associated with its usability. For example, 
Participant 1 stated that the method was not user friendly, whereas 
Participants 2 and 4 mentioned that it was hard to understand, due to the 
complicated analysis process. However, these participants also mentioned 
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that their ease of using and understanding STAMP was influenced by the 
level of training that they had received, e.g.: 
“I’d have to do it three or four times, i.e. use it more and then go ‘yeah, I’ve 
got the concept, it is good for this [type of accident/system]’ but, having just 
done it once, I don’t think I can really say it is good or it is easy to use.” 
(Participant 2) 
“I did find it complicated at first and that’s because it’s brand new and we 
didn’t understand it that well.” (Participant 4) 
 Improvements to STAMP 6.4.4.3  
The only improvement mentioned by the whole group referred to the 
inclusion of a timeline within the graphical output of the analysis, i.e. the 
system control structure diagram, despite being reminded that the creation of 
a timeline is a defined stage of the CAST process, e.g.: 
“An event-based timeline is the starting point [to improve the method].” 
(Participant 3) 
“[I would] put a timeline at the start.” (Participant 2) 
The participants subsequently discussed possible alterations to the STAMP 
control structure format which would enable the integration of a timeline, such 
as drawing an event timeline and then use the standard control structure 
format to link relevant system components to the various events (i.e. have 
instantiations of the control structure arranged along a timeline).  
 Use of STAMP in future investigations 6.4.4.4  
Participant 2 indicated that they may use the control structure diagram in 
future investigations, as a means of understanding the communication 
between system components. Conversely, Participants 3 and 4 explicitly 
stated that would not be inclined to use STAMP in the future. A number of 
reasons were cited for this decision: (1) a preference for using a multi-
method hybrid approach; (2) being mandated to use a different method; (3) 
the resource requirements of STAMP are too high; (4) a reluctance to trial a 
new method in a live investigation; (5) reverting to methods used before. 
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Furthermore, the group commented on the need to select a method that 
meets the needs of the analysis, rather than dogmatically applying one 
technique: 
“I don’t think there’s any one key method that you can really lock down 
because it’s the evidence that’s driving the analysis.” (Participant 3) 
“There’s no one model that’s perfect.” (Participant 1) 
6.4.5   Summary of findings 
When considered separately, the different sources of data highlight a number 
of issues. The analysis outputs (see Section  6.4.1) showed that considerable 
variation existed between the participants in terms of the quantity and nature 
of the system components and factors that were identified as contributing to 
the accident. This is evidenced by, for example, the range of system safety 
constraints identified by the participants (see Section  6.4.1.2) and the fact 
that only four participants described any system coordination and 
communication issues (see Section  6.4.1.6). The workshop audio recording 
identified that the participants had difficulty in understanding and applying 
STAMP, as well as recalling information about the evidence they had 
collected. The STAMP evaluation questionnaire revealed that, as a group, 
the participants slightly agreed that the method is suitable for analysing 
accidents and that it correctly identifies the causes of an accident. However, 
the participants slightly disagreed that STAMP effectively describes the 
accident event timeline or that it was easy to use. Furthermore they 
disagreed that STAMP was easy to understand, albeit that four participants 
felt that they had not been sufficiently trained in the use of the method. 
Finally, the focus group discussion identified a mixture of opinions regarding 
the benefits and drawbacks of STAMP. Although it was commented that the 
method provides insights into the higher levels of a system, the participants 
also stated that it was not effective at analysing issues at the lower system 
levels, e.g. human factors problems. Furthermore, whilst three participants 
felt that the graphical output of STAMP aided the communication of analysis 
findings, the whole group noted that the method did not visually represent the 
event timeline effectively. Three participants also mentioned problems with 
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the usability of STAMP, although they acknowledged that their opinion was 
influenced by the level of training that they had received.  
When the findings are integrated, however, what can be said about the 
participants’ experience of using STAMP and the subsequent implications for 
its adoption by practitioners?  These issues are discussed in Section  6.5. 
6.5   Discussion 
6.5.1   Model usage characteristics 
 Data requirements 6.5.1.1  
The evaluation of STAMP in Section  5.6.2.2 suggested that the type of 
information which can be analysed by the method is not restricted by the 
original format of the data. Some of the participants remarked, during the 
focus group, that STAMP was not effective at analysing information pertinent 
to lower system level components. Whilst this indicates variability in how 
STAMP analyses and incorporates data, the comments were contradicted by 
the evaluation questionnaire data, which showed that each participant at 
least slightly agreed that such information was effectively analysed. However, 
the participants did encounter some difficulties when trying to analyse and 
incorporate the evidence they had collected during the investigation exercise. 
For example, a degree of confusion existed over how some of the information 
should be processed. This was evidenced by the questions and comments 
raised during the workshop and the association of actions and decisions of 
personnel to the failures of the physical system components (see 
Section  6.4.2 and Figure 43). The difficulties of classifying data and 
incorporating it into the analysis were similar to those experienced when 
applying STAMP to the Grayrigg derailment in Study 3 (see Section  5.7.1.2) 
and those encountered by other researchers (Johnson and Holloway, 2003 
p.8; Salmon et al., 2012a p.1168). This suggests that more detailed usage 
guidance regarding the treatment of evidence may be required to facilitate 
the analysis. However, these difficulties may also be indicative of the 
participants’ lack of experience in using STAMP. Regardless, the problems 
encountered by the participants seem to result from usability issues 
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associated with the method, rather than a fundamental restriction on the type 
of data it can analyse. 
As described in Section  5.5.2.2, the information that a method requires to 
produce a thorough analysis can impact on the evidence collection process 
in an investigation. However, none of the teams based their evidence 
collection on the needs of any analysis model, i.e. the selection of analysis 
method was made after the evidence collection phase of the investigation 
exercise. Therefore it is not possible to evaluate whether STAMP aided the 
collection of data. However, it does offer a possible explanation as to why 
some of the participants felt that the CAST process was overly prescriptive 
(see Section  6.4.4.2). In other words, the perception that the participants 
were ‘force fitting’ some of the data into the STAMP analysis may have been 
lessened if the requirements of the method had guided their data collection. 
The output of an analysis will always be limited by the amount and quality of 
the evidence gathered by investigators. The evidence collected by the teams 
did not relate to many organisational issues and, therefore, the participants 
were not able to perform a thorough analysis of the higher system levels. 
Therefore, the participant observations and questionnaire responses which 
suggest that STAMP is effective at analysing organisational issues seem to 
be based on the perceptions of the participants, rather than on their 
experience of using the method. Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
whether, in practice, STAMP facilitates the analysis of higher system level 
information collected during an investigation. 
 Validity 6.5.1.2  
As explained in Section  6.3.8.1, the validity of STAMP was not formally 
tested. However, the questionnaire and focus group data suggest that the 
participants’ consider the method to have a degree of face validity. For 
example, the questionnaire responses of the participants reveal that, as a 
group, they slightly agreed that STAMP is a suitable method for accident 
analysis and that it correctly identifies the causes of an accident. Furthermore, 
the participants’ agreed that STAMP is effective at analysing 
organisational/higher system level issues. However, it is unclear whether the 
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group agreed that STAMP could effectively analyse lower system level 
factors, as their questionnaire responses conflict with various comments 
made during the focus group. Also, five of the participants at least slightly 
disagreed that STAMP effectively describes the accident event timeline (see 
Table 20). This opinion was subsequently elaborated on by the members of 
the focus group, who suggested that the lack of a timeline within the control 
structure diagram was a drawback of the method (see Section  6.4.4.2). 
Whilst STAMP appears to offer the practitioners a valid technique for analysis, 
this statement could be made with more confidence if: the participants gained 
more experience of using the method to thoroughly analyse each level of a 
system; improvements to the method were made, e.g. incorporating the 
event timeline into the control structure diagram. Therefore, although this 
apparent degree of face validity may start the process of building trust in the 
method, it seems that further work to develop and evaluate the method may 
be needed in order for it to gain acceptance by practitioners. This is 
supported by the findings of Study 2 (see Section  4.4.3.4) and the work of 
Johansson and Lindgren (2008), which suggest that practitioners require a 
method to have received empirical validation before they will adopt it. 
 Reliability 6.5.1.3  
As per the validity of STAMP, the method’s reliability was not formally tested 
for a number of reasons (see Section  6.3.8.1). Nonetheless, the analysis 
outputs show that there was considerable variation between the participants’ 
analyses (see Section  6.4.1). Given that STAMP was considered to have 
moderate reliability during its application in Study 3 (see Section  5.6.2.2), 
would this level of variability be expected?  As the participants were using 
their own sets of data, it is not possible to answer this question with a high 
degree of certainty. However, there was a considerable amount of similarity 
between the data used by each participant, and, therefore, it seems 
appropriate to discuss this variability.  
As the participants were first-time users of STAMP, it is not surprising that 
this variation occurred. This variability existed despite the training the 
participants had been given prior to the workshop and the CAST process 
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description they received before commencing their analyses. Therefore, this 
variation indicates that the training provided on STAMP and the CAST 
process was insufficient. Indeed, some of the participants highlighted that 
they had not received adequate training to effectively use the method in their 
questionnaire responses and focus group comments. The possibility of 
insufficient training was also evidenced by the difficulties the participants 
encountered during the analysis workshop (see Section  6.4.2). These 
findings are consistent with a method evaluation study performed by Baysari 
et al. (2011), who state that the inter-rater reliability problems they observed 
were, in part, due to a lack of participant training.  
Analysis reliability can also be influenced by the backgrounds and previous 
experience of the participants, as described in Section  4.4.4.2 and by other 
researchers (e.g. Johnson, 2003). The data collected during the focus group 
suggests that at least two of the participants have an established analysis 
approach (see Section  6.4.4.4). Therefore, it is possible that this prior 
experience may have affected their use of STAMP and contributed to the 
variation across the analysis outputs. 
The participants were not directly asked about their views on the reliability of 
STAMP and only one individual volunteered an opinion about the method’s 
reliability. During the focus group, Participant 4 mentioned the accident trend 
analysis limitations imposed by STAMP’s lack of a taxonomy; a feature of the 
method which also reduces its reliability (as described in Section  5.6.2.2). 
Whilst levels of experience and/or analyst bias seem to have affected the 
variability of the workshop analysis outputs, this connection was not made by 
them. This suggests that the reliability of a method was not a principal 
concern of the participants. This coincides with the views of the Study 2 
participants, i.e. only 4% of the sample stated that reliability was a preferred 
feature of their ideal analysis method (see Figure 19). Alternatively, it 
suggests that the participants were not as aware of the variation as they 
might have been had they been working together as a team. 
Regardless of the reason, maximising the reliability of an analysis is an 
important issue for investigators for a number of reasons: during an 
investigation it will facilitate the analysis process; it provides more consistent 
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findings, thus easing accident trend analysis; it will ultimately improve the 
validity of safety recommendations and, therefore, the credibility of the 
investigation team. Given that detailed usage guidance material is available 
for the method, it is conceivable that the analysis variability may lessen if the 
participants became more experienced in using STAMP. Furthermore, the 
analysis review process that often takes place amongst the major accident 
investigation teams, as described in Section  4.4.4.2, would also improve the 
reliability of the analysis findings. However, as also indicated in 
Section  4.4.4.2, the qualitative nature of STAMP could increase the difficulty 
in reaching a consensus regarding the analysis. Furthermore, as some of the 
participants felt that CAST was overly prescriptive, there might be a tendency 
for some individuals to adapt, or even ignore, the application process and 
thereby lower the reliability of STAMP.  
 Usability 6.5.1.4  
The various sources of data collected during the study clearly reveal that the 
participants found it hard to understand STAMP. Not only did some of the 
participants comment on the difficulties they experienced in understanding 
the method during the workshop but, as a group, their questionnaire 
responses show that they disagreed that the method was easy to understand. 
Furthermore, the comments raised by some of the participants during the 
focus group indicate that understanding the method was problematic (see 
Section  6.4.4.2). As described in Sections  6.4.4.2 and  6.5.1.3, such 
difficulties may be indicative of insufficient training and/or analyst bias. 
However, these findings do suggest that learning about STAMP and its 
application is not a quick process and that the participants would require 
multiple attempts at using the method before achieving a sufficient level of 
understanding. This highlights the resource implications of learning and using 
more complicated methods, such as the SAA techniques; a point which is 
raised by various authors, such as Johansson and Lindgren (2008) and 
Salmon et al. (2012a). 
In addition to the difficulties the participants experienced in understanding 
STAMP, the questions and comments raised during the workshop revealed 
that the group found that the method was not easy to use (see Section  6.4.2). 
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Remarks made by the participants during the workshop and in the focus 
group suggest that these usage difficulties are, in part, related to an 
inadequate understanding of the method. The evaluation questionnaire also 
revealed that the participants slightly disagreed that STAMP was easy to use. 
However, other questionnaire responses did not reflect the usage problems 
encountered during the workshop. The responses for Q13-16b suggest that 
the group at least slightly agreed that it was easy to perform various aspects 
of the CAST process (see Table 20). This contradiction in the data cannot be 
explained by inter-participant variation in responses, i.e. individual 
participants contradicted themselves rather than consistently holding an 
opinion about the ease of using STAMP. Furthermore, no other reason for 
this conflict could be deduced from the data. Therefore, it is not certain from 
the findings of this study how the usability of STAMP would affect its use 
during an investigation. 
Despite this issue, the majority of the data gathered during this study does 
indicate that improvements to STAMP’s usability are required, if the method 
is to be learnt more easily and with fewer resources.   
 Graphical representation of the accident 6.5.1.5  
As with aspects of STAMP’s usability, contradictions were found across the 
sources of data with regards to the creation and usefulness of the graphical 
output of the method. Comments made during the focus group suggested 
that the control structure diagram effectively represents the complexity of an 
accident and that it would successfully communicate analysis findings to 
senior management individuals. The effectiveness of STAMP as a 
communication device was also reflected in the group’s questionnaire 
responses, i.e. their slight agreement that the STAMP diagram is a useful 
communications tool. However, remarks made by some of the participants, 
during the workshop and focus group, suggest that the control structure did 
not facilitate the analysis process, e.g. identify gaps in the analysis, nor was it 
easy to understand. Furthermore, there was a clear need identified, during 
the focus group, for STAMP to graphically incorporate an event timeline. 
Again, it was not possible to explain this contradiction with the available data. 
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Interestingly, the majority of the participant responses concerning the 
graphical representation of the accident referred to the control structure 
diagram. This suggests that the participants considered this diagram as the 
focal point of the analysis documentation. This is arguably unsurprising, as 
many accident analysis methods utilise a diagram to summarise the findings 
of an investigation. However, STAMP does not lend itself to a simple 
graphical representation of an accident, as its outputs are spread over 
several documents, some of which are mainly text-based (Leveson, 2012 
p.91) (see Section  5.6.2.2). Therefore, it does seem that there could be a 
mismatch between STAMP’s outputs and the graphical needs that 
practitioners have of their analysis methods. 
6.5.2   Implications for the adoption of STAMP 
When examining the integrated study data, it appears that the usability of 
STAMP and its graphical output were the key concerns of the participants. In 
particular, the ease of understanding and usage of the method (and the 
subsequent need for extra training) and the lack of an event timeline in the 
control structure diagram were highlighted as problems. Based on the 
findings of Study 2 (see Figure 19), these issues highlight that two of the 
main requirements of an analysis model are not being met, i.e. acceptable 
usability and the usefulness of the method’s output format. Therefore, unless 
these issues are addressed it is possible that STAMP will struggle to gain 
widespread acceptance within the practitioner community. 
6.6   Study limitations 
A number limitations were placed on this study which relate to the use of a 
simulated investigation scenario and the selection of participants. The use of 
a simulated accident cannot exactly recreate the experience of conducting a 
live investigation. Therefore, the participants’ experience of using STAMP 
may have been affected by using it within this simulated context. However, 
the fidelity of the simulation was considered to be sufficiently high as to 
provide the participants with a representative experience of accident 
investigation. The small sample size limits the generalisation of the findings. 
However, only 10 individuals were eligible to participate in the study and 
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would still have formed a small sample even if 100% recruitment had been 
achieved. The participants, all of whom were aviation professionals, had a 
limited knowledge of the rail industry. At the time of the study, Cranfield 
University only conducted aviation-specialist courses in the weeks 
subsequent to the ‘Fundamentals of Accident Investigation’ module, i.e. when 
data collection was feasible. Therefore, it was not possible to recruit trainee 
rail accident investigators. Consequently, the ability of the participants to 
effectively analyse the accident may have been compromised, thus impacting 
on their experience of using STAMP. However, previous experience of 
accident investigator training at Cranfield University suggests that this is not 
the case. Braithwaite (2004) comments that a trainee investigation team 
comprised of aviation and marine specialists performed comparably to other 
teams, which included rail experts, during a rail accident investigation 
exercise. This highlights that the key principles of investigation remain the 
same and that a lack of subject matter expertise (at least during training) is 
not necessarily problematic. Furthermore, the lack of industry knowledge 
amongst the participants provided a degree of control over the reliability of 
their analysis outputs and their experiences of using STAMP.  
When considering the level of accident analysis experience of each 
participant, it is possible that Participant 4 could be considered an ‘outlier’ 
(see Table 14). In other words, their level of analysis experience may have 
significantly differentiated their usage of STAMP from the other participants. 
However, as show in the findings of this study (and their unreported 
comments captured during the analysis phase of the study) their STAMP 
analysis outputs and usage evaluation are comparable to that of the other 
participants (see Section  6.4 and Appendices 6.3 and 6.4). This is arguably a 
result of their similarly limited experience of using STAMP and justifies their 
inclusion in the study. 
Due to the resource limitations of the study, it was only possible to conduct 
the evaluation of one of the SAA methods, i.e. STAMP. Whilst it would have 
been preferable for the participants to also conduct analyses with FRAM and 
AcciMap, this limitation represents an opportunity for future research. 
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Finally, the participants were given freedom to select their own analysis 
method during the simulated investigation. No team pre-selected a method 
and used it to guide their evidence collection. Therefore, the participants 
experience of using STAMP may well have been different, had they used it to 
inform their data gathering. However, given that the participants were 
analysing primary data during the workshop, the findings of the study are 
considered to provide a useful insight into the use of STAMP within an 
investigation. 
6.7   Conclusion 
Little is currently known about the use of SAA methods by practitioners and 
ensuring that their needs are met is an important factor in whether an 
analysis method will be adopted or not, as indicated in Chapter 4 (see 
Section  4.7.1). This study aimed to provide an insight into the usage of 
STAMP, by obtaining a practitioner evaluation of the method based on their 
experience of using it in a simulated investigation, and an understanding of 
how the usage characteristics of the method may affect its application in a 
live investigation scenario. The findings of the study suggest that STAMP 
does not currently meet the usability or analysis output requirements of 
practitioners and, therefore, that the method may struggle to gain acceptance 
within industry. 
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Chapter 7 – Discussion 
7.1   Chapter overview 
This chapter starts with a brief summary of the research findings presented in 
the thesis. The overarching topics of whether the SAA RPG needs to be 
bridged, how this can be achieved and, if indeed, it is possible to bridge it are 
then discussed. Finally the strengths and weaknesses of the research, as a 
whole, are presented. 
7.2   Introduction 
This thesis has presented the findings of four studies which have examined 
various facets of the SAA RPG using a mixed-methods approach. The aims 
of this research were to identify factors which contribute to the SAA RPG and 
gain a better understanding of the extent of the RPG. A summary of the 
findings from each of the studies presented in the thesis is provided in 
Section  7.3. 
Based on these findings, what can be said about the SAA RPG?  As referred 
to in Chapters 4-6, further examination of some important topics is required. 
Firstly, given that there seems to be a similarity between the SCM-based 
techniques utilised by practitioners and the SAA methods, does the RPG 
need to be bridged?  If the gap should be bridged, which contributory factors 
should be addressed and how?  Furthermore, can the gap be bridged?  
These questions are considered in Sections 7.4-7.6. 
7.3   Summary of research findings 
7.3.1   Study 1: Evaluating the systemic accident analysis models, methods 
and literature 
The starting point for the thesis involved evaluating the ‘innovation’ of SAA to 
better understand what factors could affect its diffusion into practice. 
Consequently, the first study was designed to examine how the systems 
approach is presented within the SAA literature and identify the features of 
the systemic techniques which potentially hinder their adoption and usage by 
practitioners. To achieve this, the SAA literature was analysed to determine 
how key systems theory concepts had been interpreted by SAA researchers. 
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Examples of SAA methods were identified within the literature and the 
development processes, systemic and usage characteristics of the three 
most popular techniques (STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap) were evaluated. 
It was discovered that the research literature has not presented a consistent 
or clear approach to applying systems theory within accident analysis; the 
implication being that this arguably ineffective communication of SAA may 
hinder its acceptance by practitioners. Model validation, analyst bias, limited 
usage guidance, resource constraints and the implications of not assigning 
blame for an accident were identified as issues which may influence the use 
of SAA methods within industry.  
7.3.2   Study 2: Factors contributing to the SAA research-practice gap 
Following on from the findings of Study 1, the need was established to further 
examine the factors which could contribute to the SAA RPG. In particular, the 
intention was to better understand the practitioner-related influences which 
may affect the gap. Therefore, to supplement and expand upon the 
information gathered from the document analysis of Study 1, an interview 
study was performed. The three aims of the study involved: (1) 
understanding how the awareness of, and need for, SAA within the 
practitioner community could inhibit its adoption and usage; (2) 
understanding how the factors influencing current analysis approaches may 
hinder the adoption and usage of SAA; (3) probing deeper into the issues 
stemming from research which may contribute to the SAA RPG. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 42 safety experts, who were also 
asked to complete an analysis model awareness table. 
Various factors, including those found in Study 1, were identified which can 
affect the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA methods. As such, it was 
considered that an adequate representation of the SAA RPG has been 
provided. The key issues seemed to relate mainly to the communication of 
SAA and the requirement for analysis methods to meet needs of practitioners. 
Whilst one factor may be sufficient to prevent a practitioner from conducting 
SAA, it seems more likely that they all, to a greater or lesser extent, combine 
to inhibit the application of the systems approach. 
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7.3.3   Study 3: Systemic accident analysis vs. the Swiss Cheese Model 
The focus of the research then moved towards examining the extent of the 
SAA RPG. The SCM is the most popular accident causation model and is 
widely used throughout various industries. However, a debate exists in the 
research literature over whether the SCM remains a viable tool for accident 
analysis. Critics of the model suggest that it provides a sequential, 
oversimplified view of accidents (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2012). 
Conversely, proponents suggest that it embodies the concepts of systems 
theory, as per the contemporary systemic analysis techniques (e.g. Reason 
et al., 2006; Salmon et al., 2012a). The aim of this study was to consider 
whether the SCM can provide a systems thinking approach and remain a 
viable option for accident analysis. To achieve this, the Grayrigg train 
derailment was analysed with an SCM-based model (the ATSB model) and 
two SAA methods (AcciMap and STAMP). The analysis outputs and usage of 
the techniques were compared. 
The findings of the study showed that each model applied the systems 
thinking approach. However, the ATSB model and AcciMap graphically 
presented their findings in a more succinct manner, whereas STAMP more 
clearly embodied the concepts of systems theory. The study suggests that 
the SCM remains a viable model for accident analysis and that SAA 
techniques represent an evolution, rather than a revolution, in the application 
of the systems thinking approach. Therefore, in the cases where practitioners 
correctly apply the SCM, the extent of the SAA RPG may not be that 
significant. 
7.3.4   Study 4: Evaluating a systemic accident analysis method 
The findings of Study 2 indicated that SAA methods must meet the needs of 
practitioners, if the SAA RPG is to be bridged. This was one of the two main 
issues observed in the key themes of the study (the other being 
communication of SAA, see Section  4.4.1). Little information is currently 
available about the application of SAA methods by practitioners and whether 
their needs are met. This final study was devised to provide an insight into 
this issue and consisted of two objectives: (1) obtain a practitioner evaluation 
of an SAA method; (2) understand how the usage characteristics of the 
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method affect its use in a live investigation scenario. Six participants took 
part in a workshop to analyse data collected during a (high-fidelity, partly 
field-based) simulated investigation exercise using STAMP. The analysis 
outputs were assessed, along with the issues raised by the participants 
during the workshop and their questionnaire and focus group responses 
pertaining to their experiences of using the method. 
When combining the mixed methods data generated during the study, a 
number of observations regarding the participants’ experiences of using 
STAMP could be made. The difficulties in analysing accident data 
experienced by the participants seemed to result from usability issues, rather 
than a fundamental restriction on the type of data that STAMP can analyse. 
Some participants felt that the method was too prescriptive, although this 
may have resulted from not using STAMP to guide their data collection. 
Regardless, the participants seemed to consider that STAMP has face 
validity. Although not formally tested, low inter-rater reliability was observed. 
This was likely due to the lack of training provided to the participants and the 
biases they introduced, e.g. the effects of their previous analysis experience. 
Overall, the participants reported that STAMP was hard to understand, 
although mixed views were provided regarding its ease of use. Variation in 
the participants’ opinions was also noted regarding the usefulness of 
STAMP’s graphical output. However, there was a clear demand to 
incorporate a timeline into the method’s graphical representation of an 
accident. Improving the usability and graphical output of STAMP were 
highlighted as key developments that may improve the method’s acceptance 
by practitioners.  
7.4   Does the SAA research-practice gap need to be bridged? 
Following on from the discussion presented in Chapter 5 (see Section  5.7.2), 
this section examines whether the SAA RPG needs to be closed or not.  
To recap, the proposed benefits of SAA presented in Sections  2.3 and  2.4.3, 
i.e. gaining an improved understanding of accidents which may lead to more 
effective recommendations, suggest that it should be. Indeed, research that 
has compared SAA methods with non-systemic analysis techniques indicates 
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that such benefits are attainable and, therefore, that SAA should be 
promoted throughout safety-critical industries (see Section  2.4.3). The 
findings of Study 3 suggest that the SAA RPG may, in certain circumstances 
(i.e. for people utilising SCM-based methods), not be as extensive as some 
researchers suggest (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2012). Furthermore, 
due to the on-going academic debate as to whether or not the SCM provides 
a means of conducting SAA, the existence of an SAA RPG seems to depend 
on which view of accident causation is taken by an individual. Therefore, the 
need to bridge the gap could be questioned. However, whilst the SCM is 
undoubtedly the most popular accident analysis technique, there are many 
other non-SAA methods in use throughout industry. Does use of these 
methods increase the extent of the SAA RPG to the point where its existence 
becomes problematic, i.e. will the understanding of accidents be 
compromised?  Due to resource constraints, evaluating every non-SAA 
technique is beyond the scope of this research and, therefore, it is not 
possible to give a definitive answer to this question. However, the work of 
(Hollnagel, 2008) provides some useful insights. 
Expanding upon the NAT work of Perrow (1984), Hollnagel (2008) provides a 
means of characterising systems which considers their coupling and 
tractability (manageability). The coupling of a system can vary between being 
loose and tight and refers to how subsystems and/or components are 
functionally connected or dependent upon each other. As described in 
Section  2.2.3, various issues contribute to a tightly coupled system, such as: 
processes which occur rapidly and cannot be stopped, failed components 
that cannot be isolated or there being only one way to maintain safe 
operations (Perrow, 1984 p.5). A system’s manageability can vary from high 
(tractable) to low (intractable). A system can be defined as tractable when: 
the principles of the system’s functioning are known; descriptions of the 
system are simple and with few details; the system does not change while it 
is being described, i.e. changes in system activities are slow enough that the 
whole system can be described completely and in detail (Hollnagel, 2008).  
Hollnagel (2008) characterised a number of systems by using the dimensions 
of coupling and manageability and adapting the system characteristics matrix 
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created by Perrow (1984) (see Figure 44). A number of analysis tools were 
subsequently evaluated and mapped on to the coupling-tractability matrix 
(see Figure 45); the suggestion being that different generations of analysis 
technique are best suited to certain types of system. 
 
Figure 44 - System characteristics. Adapted from Hollnagel (2008). 
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Figure 45 - Analysis technique suitability. Adapted from Hollnagel (2008). 
As indicated by Figure 45, Hollnagel (2008) suggests that the STAMP and 
FRAM systemic methods are best suited for analysing accidents in tightly 
coupled systems with low tractability8. Although not addressed by Hollnagel 
(2008), it is considered that other SAA methods, such as AcciMap, would 
also be located in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 45. Given the ever-rising 
complexity of STS, it seems that the use of SAA methods will become 
increasingly important in the future. The implication is, therefore, that the 
traditional sequential techniques, e.g. FTA and Five Whys, will become 
increasingly inadequate at describing the nature of complex accidents and 
the size of the SAA RPG will increase. Furthermore, despite the ambiguity 
                                            
8 No class of analysis technique has been assigned to the lower right-hand quadrant of 
Figure 45 as, according to Hollnagel (2008), no models or methods are applicable for loosely 
coupled systems with low tractability. Hollnagel (2008) suggests that this is because no 
major accidents have occurred in systems of this nature and, therefore, there was no drive to 
develop any relevant analysis tools. It is also important to note that the locations of the 
boundaries between the model generation categories in Figure 45 are notional and will not 
be this distinct in reality. 
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surrounding the definition of a systemic method (see Section  5.2), it seems 
that SAA tools are theoretically capable of providing useful insights into 
complex STS accidents which are not generated by many traditional analysis 
methods. Therefore, efforts to bridge the SAA RPG should be made. 
However, sequential techniques may remain effective in certain 
circumstances, e.g. the analysis of less complex systems or of sub-
systems/components (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Salmon et al., 2011). As 
described in Section  4.5.1.4, this notion is supported by the views of some 
safety experts, who commented on the importance of matching the analysis 
method with the characteristics of the system. Furthermore, emerging fields 
of research can neglect the commonalities they have with more traditional 
fields and developers of new models often criticise or even disqualify older 
ones, as noted in Section  5.2. However, in reality, different techniques can 
actually complement each other, due to their own strengths and weaknesses 
(Jacobsson et al., 2009; Katsakiori et al., 2009; Sklet, 2004). This issue has 
been examined in studies which combined systemic and non-systemic 
techniques (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012; Salmon et 
al., 2013) and suggest that a more insightful analysis is achieved compared 
to that when using a single model. 
Therefore, SAA methods may only represent one option in an investigator’s 
‘analysis toolkit’ and bridging the SAA RPG does not necessitate the 
abandonment of every non-systemic technique. Rather, SAA methods could 
be integrated with the current analysis practices of accident investigators in 
order to provide them with a means of understanding the more complex 
major accidents. In this respect, it seems that the SAA RPG should be 
bridged to maximise the effectiveness of accident investigators.  
7.5   Bridging the SAA research-practice gap 
Given that bridging the SAA RPG seems justified, what should be done to 
achieve this?  As indicated by the findings of Study 2, two key solutions focus 
on meeting the analysis method needs of practitioners and the effective 
communication of SAA.  
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7.5.1   Adapting SAA methods 
An initial step towards implementing the first solution was made in Study 4, 
i.e. performing an evaluation of STAMP and ascertaining that the method’s 
usability and graphical output were highlighted as insufficient. However, 
further effort is required if it is to be determined if, and how, the systemic 
methods need to be adapted to meet the demands of live investigations and 
accident trend analysis. This work has begun and discussions between the 
two communities are taking place, e.g. the annual STAMP and FRAM 
workshops organised respectively by Nancy Leveson and Erik Hollnagel. 
However, practitioner feedback has yet to be widely publicised. Therefore, 
further efforts should be made to establish whether the SAA methods can be 
effectively applied in industry. As suggested in Section  6.2, this work would 
ideally involve recruiting accident investigators to use, evaluate and help 
refine the systemic techniques; a process that was also involved in 
successfully establishing other analysis methods, such as HFACS and Tripod 
Delta. This would create researcher-practitioner engagement, make research 
more practitioner-focused and, ultimately, increase the amount of research 
applied by practitioners; three main strategies for bridging RPGs referred to 
in other domains, such as healthcare (e.g. Dobson and Beshai, 2013; 
Hofmann, 2013), manufacturing (e.g. Bacchetti and Saccani, 2012) and 
human factors (e.g. Chung and Shorrock, 2011) (see Table 3).  
7.5.2   Communication of SAA 
Achieving more effective communication of SAA research to practitioners can 
be accomplished via a number of routes. Table 10 suggests that, along with 
continued presentation of research at conferences, promoting SAA within the 
practitioner literature and professional institutes would increase the 
awareness of many practitioners. Steele and Pariès (2006) comment that 
successful communication of ‘less traditional’ perspectives on accident 
causality to practitioners target the layperson, convincingly summarise such 
ideas and make them seem like common sense. Information created for the 
practitioner-focused literature should, therefore, be produced to meet these 
criteria. This may be particularly relevant for practitioners who only have a 
part-time involvement in accident investigation. 
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Increasing the access to SAA research may also help to bridge the gap, as 
indicated by the findings of Study 2 (see Section  4.4.2.4) and Table 3. It 
seems that the majority of SAA information is presented via the scientific 
literature and at conferences, which can incur access costs. Publishing in 
open-access journals would remove the potentially unaffordable expense 
associated with journal subscriptions/purchasing articles whilst still providing 
peer-reviewed research. However, although the number of open-access 
journals is increasing, they still account for a relatively small amount (~12%) 
of the available journals (Solomon et al., 2013). Therefore, this solution is 
likely to be a long-term one. 
Increasing the amount of SAA information provided in accident analysis 
training offers another important option for raising the awareness and 
adoption of systemic methods. Indeed, improving the amount/quality of 
training provided to practitioners is the most frequently cited solution in the 
recent RPG literature (see Table 3). Preferably this training would be 
conducted strategically to maximise its impact. As a starting point, the 
training should be provided to accident investigation trainers. This would 
utilise an existing network of professional trainers that can act as an effective 
and efficient interface between the researcher and practitioner communities. 
Ideally, industry regulators and senior safety managers should also be 
trained in SAA. If regulators and organisations formally adopt SAA then the 
need/requirement for individuals to employ systemic techniques in accident 
analysis will increase. However, until an SAA track record can be established 
in industry, it is unlikely that regulators and organisations will commit to 
formally adopt and use the systemic analysis techniques. Therefore, 
achieving this commitment is likely to be a long-term aim of bridging the RPG.  
Communication is not a one-way process and, in addition to providing 
practitioners with more information about SAA, the information needs of 
researchers should also be considered. As indicated by Table 3, ensuring 
that research is focused on the needs of practitioners is an important means 
of bridging an RPG. If researchers are to accomplish this, there is a need to 
engage with practitioners in order to understand their analysis needs and the 
issues they encounter when investigating. As suggested by the recent RPG 
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literature (see Table 3), possible options for creating this engagement include 
collaborative research projects, providing researchers with opportunities to 
observe live investigations and recruiting practitioners into the academic 
environment. Other options could include performing more participatory-
based research, e.g. action research or design science (see Holmström et al., 
2009; Kenny et al., 2012; Moore et al., 2012; van Aken, 2005), and the 
formation of safety-related knowledge transfer workshops, seminars and 
conferences akin to those established in domains such as healthcare, human 
factors and rail (see Appendix 7.1 for examples). 
A considerable amount of research concerning the practices of accident 
investigators (and the challenges they face) has already taken place (e.g. 
Braithwaite, 2008; Lundberg et al., 2010; Okstad et al., 2012; Roed-Larsen 
and Stoop, 2012; Rollenhagen et al., 2010; Svenson et al., 1999). However, 
as SAA methods are yet to be widely adopted throughout industry, it seems 
there is a need for further research which specifically addresses the use of 
SAA in practice. Examples of successful research-practice collaborations, 
which have enabled the application of research within practice, exist within 
the domain of accident analysis (e.g. the development of the HFACS and 
Tripod Delta methods) and in other areas, such as human resource 
management (e.g. Hamlin et al., 1998), social work (e.g. Herie and Martin, 
2002), management science (e.g. Hodgkinson and Rousseau, 2009) and 
healthcare (e.g. Tai et al., 2010). This suggests that increasing the 
collaboration and, therefore, communication between SAA researchers and 
practitioners can offer a credible solution for bridging the gap. If collaboration 
is not a viable option, practitioners could still provide useful feedback to 
researchers by publishing articles about how they have applied research and 
the successes/challenges they encountered (Chung and Shorrock, 2011). 
Given that there are so many factors which can contribute to the SAA RPG, 
there may well be the need for a multifaceted solution, i.e. a combination of 
methods to bridge the gap. Indeed, as some contributory factors are likely to 
have varying impacts on individuals/organisations (e.g. training resource 
constraints), tailored solutions may be required. For example, organisations 
which allocate a larger percentage of their budget towards safety may be 
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more willing to engage in collaborative research. However, regardless of how 
the gap is to be bridged, practitioners must see the value and applicability of 
SAA if they are to adopt it (Herie and Martin, 2002).  
7.6   Can the SAA research-practice gap be bridged? 
7.6.1   The differing needs of practitioners and researchers  
Despite efforts in various fields of research over multiple decades, the 
bridging of RPGs can remain elusive (Holmström et al., 2009). The on-going 
struggle is exemplified by the considerable amount of research currently 
being produced (see Section  2.5.3). Holmström et al. (2009) suggest that 
theoretical and academic research interests do not seem to coincide with the 
needs of managerial practice and that the challenge of bridging an RPG is 
more fundamental than knowledge transfer, i.e. it is one of diverging interests. 
The proposed solutions described in Section  7.5 offer a means of bridging 
the SAA RPG. However, are the needs of accident analysis researchers and 
practitioners too different to completely close it?  The differences between 
the needs of the two communities and their impact on SAA method adoption 
and usage are considered in the rest of Section  7.6.1.  
 Efficiency-thoroughness trade-off 7.6.1.1  
In any form of analysis, a compromise must be made between the 
thoroughness of the analysis and the resources available to complete it. 
Practitioners can be placed under intense amounts of pressure (e.g. 
commercial and legal) to provide an explanation for an accident (Hayward 
and Lowe, 2004 p.378). There is also a need to conclude an analysis quickly 
so that feedback does not come too late to be of any use and resource 
expenditure, which can be significant, can be optimised (Hollnagel, 2009 
p.70). Therefore, practitioners are likely to require a method which provides a 
thorough enough analysis to generate useful safety lessons whilst also 
ensuring efficient resource usage. Given that practitioner feedback on SAA 
methods has not been widely publicised, it is not possible to determine 
whether they can satisfy this efficiency-thoroughness trade-off. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, the ATSB (2008 p. 47) claims that their model provides such a 
balance and, given the similarity to the ATSB model (see Section  5.6.2), it is 
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arguable that AcciMap may also meet this requirement. However, as 
mentioned in Section  4.5.1.3, the SAA methods may only be suited to major 
accident investigations where funding, time and personnel are sufficient to 
match the large resource demands of the techniques.  
Whilst researchers are also required to make an efficiency-thoroughness 
trade-off, the objective of their accident analysis is generally quite different. 
For example, accident case study analyses tend to focus on whether a given 
method can provide additional safety insights (e.g. Hickey, 2012; Stanton et 
al., 2012) or if it is suitable for use in a given domain (e.g. Kazaras et al., 
2012). Furthermore, there is significantly less external pressure on 
researchers to deliver a timely analysis. Therefore, there is a justifiable 
tendency to perform as thorough an analysis as possible. In addition, the cost 
of performing such research is small in comparison to an accident 
investigation so the need for efficiency is arguably less. Based on the 
findings of Studies 1 and 3 (see Sections  3.5.2.4  and  5.6.2.2), it is possible 
that, due to the procedural requirement for an extensive analysis which 
incorporates all of the systems thinking concepts, STAMP, FRAM and the 
AcciMap-ActorMap-InfoFlowMap combination may be more attractive options 
for researchers conducting SAA. This is not to say that practitioners would 
find that these techniques do not provide an appropriate balance of 
thoroughness and resource demands. However, in everyday practice the 
efficiency of a method often outweighs the drawback of reduced 
thoroughness (Hollnagel, 2009 p.132). 
Furthermore, simplifying these SAA methods so that it is easier to 
understand and apply them, may be problematic. Sacrificing thoroughness 
for efficiency may be worthwhile, if the aim is to increase the usage of 
systemic methods by practitioners. However, there is a counter argument for 
maintaining the depth of analysis that the methods require, i.e. reduced 
thoroughness may lead to an inadequate understanding about the causes of 
an accident. As Leveson (2013a) suggests, it may be worth the extra time to 
do a more thorough analysis if, in the future, fewer investigations are 
necessary and thus less time overall is spent in investigating accidents, even 
if time is the most important factor. 
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 Analysis output requirements 7.6.1.2  
Practitioners and researchers arguably have some dissimilar requirements of 
their analysis method outputs also. For example, practitioners will often need 
to classify the various findings of their analyses via a taxonomy, in order to 
conduct trend analysis. Although accident trend analysis is a well-established 
part of safety research (e.g. Lenné et al., 2012; Rashid et al., 2013; 
Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011), there is not such a pressing need for 
researchers to conduct accident case study analyses with a taxonomic 
method. Therefore, it is possible that researchers are afforded a wider choice 
of methods, including the SAA tools, which are yet to have industry-specific 
taxonomies developed for them. 
It is widely acknowledged within the scientific literature that blaming 
individuals for causing accidents results in insufficient learning about the 
nature of the events (e.g. Dekker et al., 2011; Junior et al., 2012; Leveson, 
2012), hence the popularity of SAA within the research community. Not all 
accident investigators are required to assign blame for an accident, however, 
it remains one of the key reasons for conducting accident analysis (Leveson, 
2004). It seems unlikely that, due to the potentially vast commercial and legal 
implications of major accidents, this situation will change in the foreseeable 
future. Therefore, as described in Sections  3.5.2.5 and  4.4.3.3, some 
practitioners may favour the use of non-systemic methods in order to 
facilitate the apportioning of blame.  
 Analysis method validation 7.6.1.3  
The track record of a method can also influence an individual’s choice of 
technique (see Sections  3.5.2.1  and  4.4.3.4). Most practitioners in safety-
oriented businesses tend to prefer well established methods and concepts 
and, therefore, may be reluctant to try new methods in a live investigation 
(Johansson and Lindgren, 2008). This is particularly relevant when 
investigators are conducting accident investigation on a consultancy basis 
and need to establish credibility with their client (see Section  4.4.3.4). 
Conversely, the research community, when conducting academic studies, 
may be incentivised to use relatively untested and/or developmental 
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techniques (such as the SAA methods) in order to advance the 
understanding of accidents. 
 Scope of analysis 7.6.1.4  
Within the domain of accident analysis, a number of SAA researchers (e.g. 
Dekker, 2011; Stanton et al., 2012; Zio and Ferrario, 2013) are continuing to 
explore the nature of systemic accidents by considering the behaviour of 
ever-larger ‘systems of systems’9. For example, the drift into failure concept 
promoted by Dekker (2011) (see Section  2.2.5) encourages individuals to 
look ‘up and out’ at various factors which operate at a global level, such as 
sociological and political conditions, and how they affect system safety. The 
investigation of major accidents in various industries (e.g. aviation and 
marine transport) often involves the analysis of ‘systems of systems’, as the 
event can affect multiple stakeholders, some of whom may be large STS. In 
the case of aviation these stakeholders include aircraft manufacturers and 
operators, engine manufacturers, maintenance organisations, airport 
operating companies, national and international regulators etc. So, in the 
case of analysis scope, are the interests of researchers actually diverging 
from those of practitioners? 
It seems, to a certain extent, that the answer to this question is ‘no’. However, 
whilst some practitioners already perform ‘systems of systems’ analysis, 
investigating and rectifying issues which stem from sociological and political 
conditions is likely to remain beyond the scope of accident investigation, at 
least in the short term. This is due to a variety of issues, such as resource 
constraints and the difficulty of implementing safety interventions at the 
political and societal levels. Therefore, if researchers continue to examine 
issues which are currently outside the scope of accident investigation, 
practice will continue to lag behind research and the SAA RPG will not be 
closed. 
Given that theory building and explanation remain an indispensable aspect of 
research, the development of accident causation theory will undoubtedly 
                                            
9 The boundary of a system is an abstract concept defined by the viewer of the system and 
Leveson (2013b)  argues that a ‘system of systems’ is simply a larger ‘system’. This is 
visually described in Figure 60 (see Appendix 7.2), in which System A and System B can be 
considered to be in a ‘system of systems’ or part of the larger AB system. 
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continue (Holmström et al., 2009). However, even if researchers stopped 
studying such issues, from a practical perspective, the time and effort 
required to ensure that every practitioner engaged in accident analysis was 
trained in and used the SAA methods seem prohibitive. 
The different factors that affect the method selection of researchers and 
practitioners are represented in Figure 46. 
 
Practitioners
• Thoroughness and 
efficiency
• Taxonomy required
• Apportion blame?
• Method track record
• Bounded analysis scope
Researchers
• Greater thoroughness, 
less efficiency
• Taxonomy not normally 
required
• No blame analysis
• Developmental methods
• Unlimited analysis scope
 
Figure 46 - Researcher and practitioner method selection influences 
7.6.2   Bridging vs. closing the SAA research-practice gap 
As shown by the discussion in Section  7.6.1, the differing needs of 
researchers and practitioners indicate that, at present, the SAA methods may 
be better suited for academic use. It is possible that the requirements of the 
two communities might become less disparate in the future, e.g. industry 
track records and taxonomies could be established for the SAA methods. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that, due to other factors (e.g. the need to 
apportion blame), the interests of practitioners and researchers will 
completely coincide and, therefore, that the SAA RPG will be closed. 
However, it is arguable that totally closing the gap is not necessary. 
Researchers in other domains, such as education (Chafouleas and Riley-
Tillman, 2005), occupational psychology (Anderson, 2007) and management 
science (Bansal et al., 2012), suggest that RPGs are to be expected and that 
the two communities should retain a critical distance from each other. 
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Reasons for this include: researchers could lose their objectivity and produce 
practically relevant but methodologically weak ‘popularist’ science if 
practitioner interests drove the whole research agenda; researchers can 
continue to examine and develop theory; practitioners are able to address 
problems and solutions without researcher interference; the gap allows 
practitioners to prototype, experiment and learn vicariously  (Anderson et al., 
2001; Bansal et al., 2012; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006). 
Therefore, as the SAA RPG is likely to persist, trying to close the gap risks 
researchers behaving as practitioners and vice versa (Bansal et al., 2012). 
Instead, the aim should be to extend bridges (such as those described in 
Section  7.5) across the common ground that both communities share. This 
would enable researchers and practitioners to benefit from each other’s 
strengths whilst retaining their necessarily separate identities, as described in 
Figure 47.  
Research Practice
Scope to 
bridge SAA 
RPG
 
Figure 47 - Scope to bridge the SAA RPG 
7.6.3   Is bridging the gap enough? 
Even if the practitioner community did adopt the systemic methods it may still 
be impossible to achieve the ultimate aim of SAA, i.e. the development of 
more effective safety recommendations. As described in Section  2.2, STS 
continuously change and develop, due to internal and external forces and 
demands. The methods that are available to investigate them change at a 
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much slower rate (and usually in a discrete rather than continuous manner) 
and frequently lag behind reality, often by as much as a decade or two 
(Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Leveson, 2012). In other words, analysis 
techniques are rarely able to represent or address the actual complexity of 
industrial systems (Hollnagel, 2008). Therefore, in addition to accident 
analysis practice lagging behind research, research also lags behind the 
reality in which practitioners operate. Therefore, regardless of which analysis 
methods researchers and practitioners use, their analysis processes may 
already be outdated, as illustrated in Figure 48. Consequently, the safety 
recommendations produced during an investigation may also be out-dated.  
Time
Socio-technical 
system complexity 
Researchers’ 
understanding of 
accident causation
Practitioner adoption 
of new research 
theories/methods
Earlier 
adopters
Later 
adopters
 
Figure 48 - Lag between reality, research and practice 
Furthermore, there are various practical issues which hinder the 
implementation of safety recommendations, such as: the cost-benefit of the 
recommendation; the diverse roles and perspectives of stakeholders involved 
in effecting the recommendation; organisational resistance to change (see 
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Cedergren, 2013; Lundberg et al., 2010; Lundberg et al., 2012). Given the 
comprehensive and holistic nature of SAA, implementing all of the 
recommendations of a systemic analysis is likely to require significant 
resources and changes in the way organisations operate. Therefore, their 
application may be less likely, even if they are potentially more effective at 
reducing the risk of complex STS operations. However, this is not to say that 
efforts to bridge the SAA RPG should be abandoned. Even if the SAA 
methods are already obsolete, they are still better at describing complex 
accidents than many non-systemic techniques and important safety lessons 
can be gained by implementing them. 
7.7   Methodological considerations 
The limitations of the individual studies have been discussed within each 
study chapter (see Chapters 3-6). The remainder of this section describes 
the strengths and weaknesses of the research as a whole. 
7.7.1   Mixed methods and the realism paradigm 
A mixed methods approach was utilised for this research, in order to examine 
different aspects of the SAA RPG, and provided various benefits. For 
example, comparing the findings of Study 1 and 2 permitted the triangulation 
of some of the RPG’s contributing factors. The use of multiple methods in 
Study 4 also enabled the triangulation of various aspects of STAMP usage. 
Furthermore, it is considered that the description of the SAA RPG presented 
in this thesis would not have been as broad had a single method been 
employed. The drawbacks of the mixed methods approach described in 
Section 1.3.2 were, however, experienced to varying degrees. For example, 
integrating the different types of data collected in Study 4 was challenging, 
particularly in the case when conflicts in the data were found. Furthermore, it 
was necessary to learn or improve existing knowledge of a number of 
methods during the course of the PhD, i.e. questionnaire design, focus group 
design and execution, thematic analysis etc. However, these issues were 
overcome and the benefits of the mixed methods approach were realised. 
Healy and Perry (2000) describe six criteria with which to judge the quality of 
realism research (see Table 21). These can be used to evaluate the 
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appropriateness of the paradigm for a given piece of research, as well as 
attesting to its quality (Williams, 2008). Examples of how the work contained 
in this thesis meets these requirements are also presented in Table 21, 
thereby demonstrating some of the strength of the research. 
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Quality criteria Criteria description Example of research 
Ontology 1 - 
ontological 
appropriateness 
Research problem deals with complex social science 
phenomena involving reflective people 
The SAA RPG is a complex, multi-factorial social 
phenomenon which involves many stakeholders with 
their own view of the gap 
Ontology 2 - 
contingent validity 
Open ‘fuzzy boundary’ systems involving generative 
mechanisms rather than direct cause-and-effect. 
Causal impacts are not fixed but are contingent upon 
their environment. 
The description of the SAA RPG suggests that the 
factors which can contribute to it will be experienced in 
different ways (or not at all) by individuals, due to the 
differing environments (e.g. financial, regulatory) in which 
they work 
Epistemology – 
multiple 
perceptions of 
participants and 
peer researchers 
Neither value-free nor value laden, rather value-
aware. Relies on multiple perceptions about a single 
reality, which involve triangulation of several data 
sources, and of several peer researchers’ 
interpretations of those triangulations. 
Triangulation of data sources provided by mixed methods 
approach. Peer researchers interpretations gained via 
journal/conference proceedings review process and 
personal communication from domain experts (Erik 
Hollnagel and Nancy Leveson). 
Methodology 1 – 
methodological 
trustworthiness 
The research can be audited 
Method selection and usage described in detail. 
Quotations from interviews and focus group used to 
present qualitative findings. Various sources of primary 
data and analysis findings archived, including: audio 
recordings and transcriptions; NVivo coding information; 
STAMP workshop analysis outputs and evaluation 
questionnaires. 
Methodology 2 – 
analytic 
generalisation 
Analytic generalisation (that is, theory building) rather 
than statistical generalisation (that is, theory-testing) 
Data collection and analysis focused on developing an 
understanding of the nature and extent of the SAA RPG, 
rather than testing hypotheses regarding it 
Methodology 3 – 
construct validity 
How well information about the constructs in the 
theory being built are measured in the research 
Prior knowledge from systems theory, accident analysis 
and SAA literature used to generate aims of research 
and triangulation of findings 
Table 21 - Quality criteria of realism research. Adapted from Healy and Perry (2000).
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7.7.2   Validity of findings 
SAA is a dynamic area of research and SAA-related publications have been 
generated throughout the period of this research (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Le 
Coze, 2013b; Leveson, 2012; Read et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is little 
to suggest that the level of researcher interest is waning. Therefore, whilst it 
is considered that this thesis presents a valid description of the SAA RPG, 
the rapidly expanding literature on the subject may impose a relatively short 
lifespan on this validity. This situation is exemplified by the findings of Study 
1 which, although providing an original contribution to the research literature 
at the time they were generated, became outdated by subsequent 
publications (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2012; Salmon et al., 2012a) and 
required the supplementary discussion provided in Section  3.5.3. 
7.7.3   Reliability of findings 
Given that the data collection and analysis was performed (almost) 
exclusively by one researcher, the influence of researcher biases will be 
more prominent. For example, conducting interviews effectively is a skill 
which requires practice and throughout the data collection phase of Study 2 
the interviewing competence of the researcher improved (Robson, 2002 
p.290). However, this particular issue was addressed by using a set of pre-
defined questions (see Appendix 4.2). Moreover, the systematic approaches 
used to conduct the four studies and the peer review processes that Studies 
1-3 were subjected to (whilst under review for publication) helped to improve 
the reliability of the research findings. 
7.7.4   Generalisation of findings 
The research approach provided a strong foundation for the study of the SAA 
RPG. However, due to the non-representative sample created in Study 2 and 
the small sample used in Study 4, the findings contained within the thesis 
should be treated as indicative of the issues associated with the gap, rather 
than conclusive. It may not be possible to overcome this issue. For example, 
creating a representative sample of safety experts may be impracticable, 
given that accident analysis is conducted in numerous industries and 
countries by a multitude of organisations and individuals. Recruiting a larger 
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sample for Study 4 may improve the generalisation of the study findings for 
the community of full-time accident investigators. However, due to the 
differences in the working environments of full- and part-time investigators 
and SAA researchers (e.g. different levels of training and investigation 
resources) any additional findings may not help to understand how the wider 
accident analysis community would view the usage of the SAA techniques. 
Furthermore, a lack of generalisation may not be problematic, given that 
efforts to bridge the gap may need to be tailored to a given situation (see 
Section  7.5.2). 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions and future work 
8.1   Conclusions 
The research contained in this thesis has set out to provide a better 
understanding of the SAA RPG by examining its contributory factors and the 
extent of the gap. In summary, an RPG does exist in the field of SAA and is 
multifaceted in nature. It seems that researchers, in their presentation of SAA 
and their design of systemic methods, have created an accident analysis 
innovation that is neither easily communicated to, nor used by, practitioners. 
Furthermore, various factors stemming from research and practice contribute 
to the SAA RPG, as well as a general gap within the field of accident analysis. 
This implies that bridging the gap also requires a multifaceted solution, e.g. 
improved communication of SAA and development of the systemic methods. 
The SAA techniques are able to provide insights into accidents which are not 
provided by many traditional analysis methods and efforts to bridge the gap 
should be made. However, in some cases, the RPG may not be as significant 
as indicated by some proponents of SAA. For example, users of the SCM 
and its related methods are required to employ various aspects of the 
systems approach. Furthermore, sequential techniques can still offer an 
effective solution for the analysis of smaller and/or simpler systems. When 
considered alongside the fact that practitioners and researchers generally 
have different requirements of their analysis tools, it seems best to view SAA 
methods as one part of an analysis toolkit. Therefore, bridging the gap may 
require integrating the SAA methods with the current analysis practices of 
accident investigators, rather than replacing every non-systemic technique. 
The natural differences between the needs and objectives of the research 
and practice communities also mean that the SAA RPG should be bridged 
rather than completely closed. However, even if the gap is bridged, the 
understanding of system safety provided by the SAA methods may already 
be outdated due to ever-increasing STS complexity. 
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8.2   Knowledge contribution 
At the time this research began there was no clear description of the SAA 
RPG, nor an understanding of the extent of the gap or how it could be 
bridged. The SAA literature and methods had yet to be examined in any 
great detail and no research had been recently published on the nature of 
RPGs in accident analysis or investigation.  
Therefore, it is considered the work presented in this thesis provides an 
original and important contribution to the field of accident analysis and the 
wider RPG literature. This is evidenced by the fact that three of the studies 
have been converted into peer-reviewed publications. 
8.3   Future work 
8.3.1   Progression from thesis 
A number of possibilities exist for furthering the research contained in the 
thesis. These ideas are described in the remainder of Section  8.3.1. 
 Progression from Studies 1 and 2   8.3.1.1  
Now that the factors which contribute to the SAA RPG have been identified a 
natural step would be to examine their relative importance. A more 
quantitative approach, e.g. an online survey, aimed at recruiting a larger 
number of participants may be most suitable. The issues of obtaining a 
representative sample (see Section  7.7.4) would still remain and it may be 
that a smaller section of the accident analysis community should be targeted, 
i.e. creating the sample from a given profession, location and/or industry etc. 
If it is possible to understand the relative impact of the RPG contributory 
factors then a more strategic approach to bridging the gap could be achieved. 
 Progression from Study 3 8.3.1.2  
A key limitation of Study 3, imposed by resource constraints, was the limited 
number of analysis methods and accident case studies used to examine the 
extent of the SAA RPG. An opportunity exists, therefore, to conduct further 
analyses with the same and/or different SAA and non-systemic techniques 
and case studies covering a range of industries and accident types, in order 
to increase the knowledge base of SAA method usage. 
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 Progression from Study 4 8.3.1.3  
Whilst the findings of Study 4 provided a useful insight into the use of STAMP 
by practitioners, there are clear avenues for developing this work. For 
example, the study could be repeated over multiple training courses to 
generate a larger set of evaluation data. Other SAA methods could be 
evaluated and comparisons made with STAMP. Alterations to STAMP, based 
on the findings of Study 4, could be made and evaluated. Also, collaborative 
participatory-based research could be conducted with accident investigators 
to understand how the SAA methods should be developed in order to meet 
their needs. 
8.3.2   Research for the wider SAA research-practice gap context 
In addition to the research which could directly follow the studies presented in 
Chapters 3-6, a number of research topics could be examined, as detailed in 
the rest of Section  8.3.2. 
 SAA taxonomies 8.3.2.1  
Causal taxonomies for the SAA methods could be developed in collaboration 
with accident investigators, organisations and regulators to provide a trend 
analysis capability. In order to maximise their efficacy, such taxonomies 
would need to be industry-specific and compatible with the outputs generated 
by the systemic techniques. The outcomes of this research would be most 
effective if opportunities existed within organisations/regulators to establish 
new safety databases. An alternative research topic could involve examining 
current taxonomies and the accident/incident databases used within industry 
to understand their level of compatibility with SAA outputs. This could inform 
the redesign of the current databases and/or the SAA methods. 
 Usage guidance 8.3.2.2  
Given that SAA methods provide a generic approach to analysis, an in-depth 
knowledge of the domain in question is required. Therefore, additional 
guidance material could be created to provide instructions and/or prompts for 
conducing SAA in a given industry. This guidance could be extended to cover 
the analysis of different types of accident. For example, pre-defined STAMP 
control structure templates or lists of potentially relevant FRAM functions 
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could be devised. This would help to improve the thoroughness, efficiency 
and reliability of any analysis. However, it would be necessary to design the 
guidance in such a way as to prevent it from being overly prescriptive, i.e. 
investigators should still be given flexibility to analyse all of the issues they 
consider relevant. 
 Examine system complexity threshold 8.3.2.3  
As suggested in Section  7.4, the use of SAA methods may not always be 
necessary, i.e. non-systemic techniques may still be suitable for the analysis 
of simpler and/or smaller systems. However, at present there is little 
guidance for determining when a system is complex enough to require the 
use of SAA. Furthermore, the information that is available (e.g. Hollnagel 
(2008) and Hollnagel and Speziali (2008)) is limited. Therefore, analysing 
these simpler/smaller types of systems, e.g. the domain of general aviation, 
with SAA methods and comparing the outputs with those generated by non-
systemic techniques would help inform the decision making of investigators 
with regards to the use of the various methods in their ‘analysis toolkit’. 
8.3.3   Summary 
When considering the various ideas for future SAA research described 
throughout Section  8.3, it is difficult to prioritise them or suggest an order in 
which they should be addressed. However, the underlying theme is that 
future work should be done in collaboration with practitioners, whether it is 
with the potential end-users of the SAA methods or individuals and/or 
organisations affected by their use. This infers that, rather than producing all-
encompassing solutions to bridge the SAA gap, researchers will need to work 
with individual organisations to achieve tailored solutions for integrating 
systemic methods into their analysis practices, as suggested in Section  7.5.2. 
The suggestions for future work are visually described in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49 - Future work 
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practice 
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Abstract 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant concept within accident 
analysis research. Viewing accidents as a result of uncontrolled system 
interactions, it forms the theoretical basis of various systemic accident 
analysis (SAA) models and methods. Despite the proposed benefits of SAA, 
such as an improved description of accident causation, evidence within the 
scientific literature suggests that these techniques are not being used in 
practice and that a research–practice gap exists. The aim of this study was to 
explore the issues stemming from research and practice which could hinder 
the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA. To achieve this, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 42 safety experts from ten countries and a 
variety of industries, including rail, aviation and maritime. This study suggests 
that the research–practice gap should be closed and efforts to bridge the gap 
should focus on ensuring that systemic methods meet the needs of 
practitioners and improving the communication of SAA research. 
1. Introduction 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant paradigm in accident 
analysis and human factors research (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et 
al., 2012). It views socio-technical system accidents as the result of 
unexpected, uncontrolled relationships between a system’s constituent parts. 
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This requires the study of systems as whole entities, rather than considering 
their parts in isolation. Many complex system accidents, e.g. space shuttle 
Columbia and Comair flight 5191, have not simply resulted from catastrophic 
equipment failure or an unsafe human action, as required according to 
traditional cause-effect accident models; instead accidents emerge as 
complex phenomena within the normal operational variability of a system (de 
Carvalho, 2011). Therefore, describing accidents in a sequential (cause-
effect) fashion is arguably inadequate, as it is unable to sufficiently explain 
the non-linear complexity of modern-day socio-technical system accidents 
(Hollnagel, 2004; Lindberg et al., 2010). It can also lead to equipment or 
humans at the ‘sharp end’ of a system being incorrectly blamed for an 
accident. This represents a missed opportunity to learn important lessons 
about system safety and, therefore, develop more effective safety 
recommendations. Use of the systems approach, via systemic accident 
analysis (SAA), supposedly avoids these limitations and it has been used as 
the conceptual foundation for various SAA methods and models, e.g. 
Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes model (STAMP) 
(Leveson, 2004), the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
(Hollnagel, 2004) and Accimap (Rasmussen, 1997). 
1.1. Systemic accident analysis in research 
A number of studies have compared SAA methods with established non-
systemic analysis techniques, such as Fault Tree Analysis (e.g. Belmonte et 
al., 2011) and the Sequentially Timed Events Plotting method (e.g. Herrera 
and Woltjer, 2010). These studies and others like them (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011) 
suggest that, whilst the non-systemic methods are suitable for describing 
what happened in an accident, the SAA techniques provide a deeper 
understanding of how dynamic, complex system behaviour contributed to the 
event. 
Furthermore, Leveson (2011, p. 349) comments that most accident reports 
are written from the perspective of cause-effect models and that the analysis 
frequently stops prematurely. Some studies exemplify this by stating that 
additional insights were achieved using SAA methods, when compared with 
the findings of official investigation reports (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2010; Johnson 
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and de Almeida, 2008). The improved understanding of accident causation 
provided by SAA should, therefore, allow the development of more effective 
safety recommendations.  
1.2 Systemic accident analysis in practice  
Despite the proposed advantages of SAA, there is evidence within the 
scientific literature to suggest that methods and tools employing a systemic 
perspective are not being adopted in practice. For example, some 
researchers (e.g. Carhart and Yearworth, 2010; Leveson, 2011) comment 
that the most widely used accident analysis tools are based on sequential, 
reductionist models of systems and causality. Other researchers also 
suggest that SAA techniques are yet to gain acceptance outside of the 
research community (e.g. Okstad et al., 2012; Salmon et al., 2012a). These 
observations are supported by the sequential understanding of accident 
causation presented within various elements of the practitioner-focused 
safety literature (e.g. Energy Institute, 2008; Health and Safety Executive, 
2004; Rail Safety Standards Board, 2011). 
1.3. The gap between research and practice 
The different analysis approaches taken by the researcher and practitioner 
communities suggest that a research–practice gap exists in the domain of 
SAA. Various aspects of the research–practice gap in accident analysis have 
been previously studied, both from a general perspective and within the 
context of SAA. Generic factors which can influence a practitioner’s approach 
to accident analysis have been identified, such as investigator bias and 
resource constraints (e.g. Johnson, 2003; Lundberg et al., 2010). These 
influences can arguably lead practitioners away from the theoretical ideal of 
accident investigation and therefore contribute to a research–practice gap 
(Lundberg et al., 2010). Other studies (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Underwood 
and Waterson, 2012) have examined how the characteristics of several 
systemic analysis models impact on the ability of an individual to successfully 
perform SAA, such as the lack of method reliability caused by their qualitative 
nature. 
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Despite the presence of such a research–practice gap there is evidence to 
suggest that a desire to adopt SAA exists within sections of the practitioner 
community. For example, accident investigators within aviation have begun 
to recognise the need to look beyond sequential analysis methods (e.g. 
Martinez, 2011, p. 8). Further-more, Steele and Pariès (2006) suggest that 
many practitioners acknowledge the limitations of traditional models and are 
keen to apply new techniques. Given that a demand to apply SAA seems to 
exist in both the researcher and practitioner communities, the research–
practice gap needs to be examined in more depth. 
1.4. Study aims 
Whilst some of the research-based factors contributing to the SAA research–
practice gap have been identified in previous studies (e.g. Underwood and 
Waterson, 2012), it is believed that practitioner-related influences, such as 
those described by Lundberg et al. (2010), require further examination within 
the context of SAA. Therefore, the following aims for the study were 
established: 
• Understand how the awareness of, and need for, SAA within the 
practitioner community could inhibit the adoption and use of SAA. 
• Understand how the factors influencing current analysis approaches may 
hinder the adoption and use of SAA. 
• Follow up and probe deeper into the issues stemming from research 
which may impede the diffusion of SAA into practice. 
2. Methods 
The use of semi-structured interviews was selected as the most appropriate 
method to achieve the aims of the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
lack of information regarding SAA within the practitioner literature prevented 
the use of document analysis alone. Secondly, previous studies focused on 
the SAA research–practice gap have used methods such as thematic 
analysis of the scientific literature (e.g. Underwood and Waterson, 2012) and 
user evaluations of SAA methods (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a). 
Consequentially, interview data was viewed as the most suitable form of 
information to supplement the existing findings. Finally, semi-structured 
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interviews provide the ability to examine topics of interest in varying degrees 
of depth; an approach which suited the exploratory nature of this study 
(Robson, 2002). 
2.1. Sampling strategy 
Due to the study resource constraints, it was not possible to create a 
statistically representative sample. Therefore a convenience sample, 
considered to be indicative of the accident investigation community, was 
created. The sample included participants employed as full-time accident 
investigators, health and safety professionals (e.g. company safety 
managers), human factors specialists and accident analysis researchers. 
However, these participant categories were not mutually exclusive, e.g. some 
practitioners had research experience. Therefore, participants were allocated 
to the category associated with their current role as it was felt that their role 
would have the most influence on their analysis approach, e.g. due to 
resource constraints. Also, gaining a detailed understanding of how a 
participant’s background influenced their analysis approach was beyond the 
study scope. 
Human factors experts were recruited as they are often employed on a 
consultancy basis to provide input into accident investigations or safety-
critical system design. The views of researchers were also sought to enable 
a comparison with the practitioners’ perspectives and further explore the 
research-based factors that may influence the SAA research–practice gap. 
Participants were required to have experience of investigating accidents 
and/or performing risk assessments within at least one safety-critical industry. 
No specific inclusion criteria were set regarding the level of their experience. 
Participant recruitment was halted when an appropriate level of thematic data 
saturation was judged to have been achieved. 
2.2. Participants 
Interviews were conducted with 42 participants (age range: 28–79 years; 
mean age: 46.4 years) based in ten countries. The nine full time accident 
investigators (AI), 17 health and safety professionals (HS), ten human factors 
specialists (HFE) and six researchers (R) had experience of working in at 
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least one of 25 industries. Of these industries, those that had been worked in 
by at least five participants included: rail, aviation, maritime, oil and gas, 
defence, healthcare, nuclear power and manufacturing. The interviews lasted 
between 28 and 128 min (mean interview length: 70 min). 
2.3. Interview question design 
The interview questions were designed to understand the following topics: (1) 
the participants’ knowledge of SAA and accident causation, (2) the analysis 
methods and processes they currently use and (3) the barriers they feel 
prevent information flowing between the research and practice communities. 
In order to provide a comprehensive deductive analysis framework, the 
interview questions were based on these topics, the questions employed by 
Lundberg et al. (2010) and the findings of previous studies (e.g. Underwood 
and Waterson, 2012) (see Appendix A for interview questions). 
In addition to the interview questions, participants were asked to complete an 
analysis model awareness table (see Appendix B) which was specifically 
designed to assess their level of awareness and usage of well-known 
systemic and non-systemic techniques. The STAMP, FRAM and Accimap 
methods were included as they have been identified as the most frequently 
cited systemic analysis tools (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). The Swiss 
Cheese model (Reason, 1997) and Fault Tree Analysis (Watson, 1961) were 
also included as they are examples of traditional techniques commonly 
mentioned in the scientific literature (e.g. Katsakiori et al., 2009; Qureshi, 
2007; Sklet, 2004). 
2.4. Data collection and analysis 
Five pilot interviews were conducted and analysed. The inter-view schedule 
was reviewed and amended, where necessary, after each interview. The 
main interview study was subsequently performed with a minor iteration of 
the interview schedule generated halfway through the process (wording of 
two questions was changed). Upon the conclusion of the data collection 
phase a theoretic (i.e. deductive) and inductive thematic analysis, as 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006), was performed on the interview 
transcriptions using NVivo 9. 
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2.5. Research–practice gap evaluation framework 
Research–practice gaps signify the impairment of transferring new 
information between the research and practice communities. The 
transference process itself, sometimes termed the ‘diffusion of innovation’, 
has been the focus of a number of studies which have produced a range of 
theories and models (e.g. Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Rogers, 2003). Rohrbach 
et al. (1993) summarised the stages involved in achieving long-term 
commitment to new ideas which arguably relate to transferring SAA from 
research into practice. Firstly, the awareness of an innovation, e.g. SAA, is 
created within the practitioner community. The second and third steps involve 
practitioners committing to adopt and subsequently implementing the new 
systemic techniques. These steps were used as a frame-work to evaluate 
whether issues discovered in the data could affect a given stage and 
therefore contribute to the formation of a gap. 
3. Findings 
3.1. Key themes 
The themes which were considered to be key issues, i.e. topics that were 
mentioned by at least 20% of the participants, are presented in Table 1. 
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Theme (relevant article section) 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
Human 
factors 
expert 
Researcher Total 
1. Requirement for accountability 
influences analysis approach (3.3.3) 56 41 30 67 45 
2. Model not practitioner focused 
(3.3.1) 33 24 80 50 43 
3. Empirical validation requirements 
(3.3.4) 11 35 60 50 38 
4. Analyst chooses a technique that 
suits the situation (3.4.1 and 3.6.1) 56 35 30 17 36 
5. Previous experience and training 
affects analysis (3.4.2) 67 18 30 50 36 
6. Model suits user's way of thinking 
(3.3.2) 22 24 30 67 31 
7. Research considered too conceptual 
(3.2.5) 56 12 30 17 26 
8. Analysis time requirements (3.4.1) 44 6 40 33 26 
9. Company policy affects analysis 
(3.5.1) 22 18 50 17 26 
10. Amount of training given (3.2.3) 33 24 30 0 24 
11. User's previous training and 
experience affects model preference 
(3.3.2) 
11 24 20 50 24 
12. Lack of communication between 
researcher and practitioner 
communities (3.2.5) 
56 18 10 0 21 
Table 1 – Key themes 
Whilst the number of participant comments indicates the importance of a 
given theme, the non-representative nature of the sample means that this 
cannot be meaningfully tested (see Section 5 for more information). 
Therefore, the key themes listed in Table 1 are described alongside others 
that were deemed to influence SAA awareness, adoption and usage and 
contribute to the research–practice gap. 
3.2. SAA awareness 
3.2.1. Current level of SAA awareness 
The scientific literature presented in Section 1 describes a general lack of 
systemic analysis model usage with industry. This situation does not 
necessarily stem from low levels of SAA aware-ness and comments from 
several senior practitioners indicate that awareness is growing within industry: 
“Lots and lots of people talk about this [systemic analysis approach] and it’s 
very current in a lot of the safety and high-hazard industry community.” 
(Health and safety professional) 
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Furthermore, notable remarks from two participants provide evidence that 
systemic models are currently employed in certain industry sectors. One 
individual commented that both Accimap and FRAM are used within their 
national transport accident investigation agency. A second participant with a 
background in human factors described the Accimap training provided by 
their organisation to accident investigators within the rail industry. 
However, the analysis model awareness table responses obtained from the 
participants suggest that the majority of practitioners remain unaware of the 
most frequently cited systemic analysis models, i.e. STAMP, FRAM and 
Accimap (see Fig. 1) (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). 
 
Figure 1 - Analysis model awareness 
This is in contrast to the responses of the researchers who were interviewed 
and indicates that knowledge and use of these models is greater within the 
scientific community. The research-based participants only accounted for 14% 
of the sample and therefore this comparison must be made tentatively. 
However, it is indicative of the lack of SAA model usage within industry 
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portrayed in the scientific literature and provides further evidence that a 
research–practice gap exists. 
In addition, a different understanding of SAA seems to exist between the two 
communities. When asked to provide a description of the ‘systems approach 
to accident analysis’, the two most common characteristics mentioned by 
participants referred to ‘component interactions’ and ‘analysing the whole 
system’, which are key elements of SAA. However, relatively fewer 
practitioners (AI = 22%, HS = 27%, HFE = 30%) referred to ‘component 
interactions’ compared with the researchers (67%). The ‘analysing the whole 
system’ feature was also referred to by relatively fewer practitioners (AI = 
22%, HS = 20%, HFE = 40%) compared with the researchers (50%). Five 
practitioners described SAA as a ‘systematic’ approach, rather than providing 
examples of ‘systemic’ analysis characteristics, which suggests a degree of 
confusion may exist regarding SAA terminology. Furthermore, five 
practitioners were unable to provide a definition. 
3.2.2. The demand for SAA information 
Whilst there is a clear theoretical argument for the use of SAA (see Section 
1), various factors exist which may negate the need or opportunity for a 
practitioner to seek out a systemic analysis tool. Some practitioners simply 
have no desire to change their current approach and therefore have no need 
for new information: 
“I can’t say that I’ve actively gone and looked at the new techniques that are 
out there as the ones I’ve always used have worked.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
Additionally, day-to-day workload demands were considered by some 
individuals to restrict their learning opportunities: 
“I don’t have nearly enough time to keep up with the [research] paperwork in 
this area; hardly any at all. That’s a problem that most practitioners have; 
they’re so busy doing investigations it’s very difficult to keep up with the 
theoretical side.” (Accident investigator) 
These comments highlight factors which inhibit the search for SAA-related 
information. However, should a practitioner decide to use a systemic analysis 
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technique, they are still faced with obstacles associated with accessing and 
utilising the relevant research. 
3.2.3. Extent of training impacts awareness 
An individual’s awareness of analysis methods is dictated, at least in part, by 
the level of training they receive. The extent of training received has clear 
implications with regards to the opportunity to increase awareness of SAA 
and comments from participants indicate that levels of training are role-
dependent. Full-time investigators, for example, sometimes receive extensive 
training via university-level courses: 
“After you join, the first two years is spent doing a diploma, through a 
university here, in accident investigation.” (Accident investigator) 
However, it may also be the case that other practitioners with varying 
degrees of involvement with accident investigation receive less training: 
“We had analytical investigation methods training which was a week-long 
course. The course started as a week but latterly I think it went down to one 
and a half days.” (Human factors expert) 
Several participants with experience in the rail and nuclear sectors remarked 
that individuals with lower levels of responsibility for accident investigation 
may not have received any relevant training. 
3.2.4. Accessibility of SAA information 
Individuals who are not provided with SAA training can find gaining access to 
the relevant information problematic, which may limit their awareness. The 
time and costs associated with the acquiring the necessary training, for 
example, may be excessive: 
“A lot of time, when you hear about courses, it costs a lot of money to go 
which dissuaded me from going.” (Health and safety professional) 
Furthermore, an accident investigator, a health and safety professional and a 
human factors expert all remarked that the cost of purchasing scientific 
journal articles and attending conferences may prohibit access to SAA 
information. 
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As well as cost, intellectual property rights can form another barrier to 
acquiring scientific research information: 
“The academic community is very competitive. There’s intellectual property 
rights problems in industry too but normally if there’s a buck in it, or a 
common benefit, you’ll collaborate and create an alliance. I find it very hard to 
get an alliance of academics.” (Health and safety professional) 
3.2.5. Communication of SAA information 
Each participant was asked to list the sources of information they utilise in 
order to keep their knowledge up-to-date. 40 participants provided answers, 
which are summarised in Table 2. 
Source of information 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
(n = 9) 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
(n = 16) 
Human 
factors 
expert 
(n=10) 
Practitioner 
total 
Researcher 
(n = 5) 
Colleagues and network contacts 56 44 60 51 60 
Conferences 33 50 40 43 20 
Internet searches 22 13 10 14 0 
Investigation reports 11 19 0 11 0 
Online forums and networks 11 19 0 11 0 
Practitioner literature and 
professional institutes 33 44 70 49 20 
Research literature 22 6 50 23 100 
Research projects 0 19 10 11 60 
Textbooks 22 6 10 11 0 
Training and experience 44 31 20 31 20 
Does not search for information 0 6 0 3 0 
Table 2 - Sources of information 
Table 2 indicates that the three most popular sources of new information for 
practitioners, in general, are speaking with colleagues and members of their 
extended networks, attending conferences and consulting industry literature 
and professional institutes. In comparison, Table 2 suggests that the majority 
of researchers tend to gain new knowledge via the scientific literature and by 
conducting research projects, as well as consulting colleagues. The data in 
Table 2 also suggests that most practitioners do not consult the scientific 
literature. 
Moreover, some of the practitioners specifically remarked on a general lack 
of communication between the research and practice communities: 
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“I’m not aware of any real liaison between the two [communities].” (Human 
factors expert) 
“We hardly ever meet people on the theoretical side; it’s once in a blue moon.” 
(Accident investigator) 
When practitioners do engage with the research community the information 
presented is considered by some practitioners to be too conceptual and 
provides little or no practical benefit: 
“I know some accident investigators that have been to international 
conferences where there were lots of academics putting forward papers on 
approaches to accident investigation. The practitioners in the audience said 
‘this is actually meaningless and we don’t use it.”’ (Accident investigator) 
Consequently practitioners can develop a sense of disregard for researchers 
which could further influence the apparent lack of SAA communication: 
“There is a mentality within practitioners where academics are seen as 
people sitting in an ivory tower and haven’t had any real expe-rience of 
accident investigation so [practitioners think] ‘how can they comment on 
investigations?’” (Accident investigator) 
3.3. SAA adoption 
3.3.1. Practicality of analysis method 
Even if sufficient awareness of research is obtained, barriers to its adoption 
may arise from a lack of consideration for practitioner requirements. The 
features of an analysis method desired most by participants referred to 
aspects of usability, such as the simplicity of using a method (see Fig. 2). 
  
262 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Preferred features of an analysis method 
The importance of designing a usable technique was reflected in the 
comments of several individuals: 
“I think if you make it simple, people will use it. If it’s complicated, they won’t 
and it becomes another job that’s too difficult to do and it gets put on the 
shelf.” (Health and safety professional) 
Other practicality-related issues which may inhibit the adoption of research 
were also referred to by participants. Several accident investigators, for 
example, commented on a possible lack of appreciation for the practicalities 
of their role in the design of analysis methods. The potentially excessive cost 
of implementing research was also highlighted by a human factors expert. 
3.3.2. Personal adoption criteria 
In addition to the practicalities of using an analysis technique, adoption may 
also be influenced by a number of factors based on an individual’s personal 
preference and experience. A person’s decision to adopt a method may be, 
for example, based on how well it suits their way of thinking: 
“When I think of the Swiss Cheese model, I can really think of those barriers 
being broken and trying to find out why they have been broken. For me it’s a 
very natural way of investigating. Some people really hate it but for me it 
works.” (Accident investigator) 
The preference for a given model can also be influenced by an individual’s 
previous experience and training: 
Usability of method
Validity of method
Useful output format
Software based method
Reliability of method
Dynamic modelling capability
Generic analysis approach
Existing worked examples
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“If I had trained with other people I would probably have a very different 
default model that I use. I think it’s mostly my [educational] upbringing that 
makes it very difficult to think of anything else.” (Researcher) 
Experience gained by analysis method usage was specifically highlighted by 
several participants who remarked that their decision to adopt a technique 
was based upon the outcome of an initial trial period. 
3.3.3. Accountability influences analysis approach 
The analysis approach taken by a practitioner can be influenced by their 
need to assign liability for an accident. Some individuals remarked that they 
prefer or are mandated to avoid seeking blame in favour of focusing on 
safety improvements, as per the systems approach. However, other 
practitioners who are more concerned with the commercial and legal 
implications of accidents may seek to apportion blame: 
“The way the analysis was set up was really to assist with legal proceedings. 
That was the main driver. . . [it was] not always to find out what the root 
cause was. It would be more to do with whether a prosecution was likely to 
be successful or not.” (Human factors expert) 
This is particularly evident when those who are conducting an investigation 
may be deemed culpable and are incentivised to apportion liability elsewhere:  
“Because it’s the manager that carries out the industry’s own investigation 
they’re not really going to look at themselves and they’re certainly not going 
to look at their own management chain because that puts them in a 
threatening position.” (Accident investigator) 
In addition to the influence on SAA adoption, the need to demonstrate liability 
can also influence the use of an analysis technique. One health and safety 
professional, for example, referred to the occasions where he was instructed 
by clients to use their analysis tools in particular ways in order to avoid ‘black 
spots’ on their safety records. 
3.3.4. Model validation 
The extent of an analysis model’s empirical validation was considered by 
many practitioners to be a key influence on their adoption decision. Several 
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participants commented on the need for extensive validation to demonstrate 
that a method has been ‘proven’ and can be ‘trusted’: 
“Has it been tried and tested? Does it add value? We have to ask these 
questions when we implement something.” (Health and safety professional) 
A number of individuals who provide consultancy services in accident 
investigation and risk analysis specifically commented on the importance of a 
method’s track record when attempting to establish the credibility of their 
work with clients. However, less consideration was given to the extent of a 
method’s conceptual validity: 
“Validity comes very much down the line. I think it’s very much about 
quickness and whether the technique is understood in the community, if I’m 
brutally honest.” (Health and safety professional) 
3.4. SAA usage 
3.4.1. Usage resource constraints 
The level of effort invested in an analysis will be based, at least in part, by the 
resources available to the investigation team: 
“There’s a 14 out of 15 chance that we’re not going to go to an investigation 
that we should do and that’s simply because of funding.” (Accident 
investigator) 
Consequently this can affect whether an individual employs more complex 
analysis techniques, such as those based on the systems approach: 
“[Name of method] is something that I’ve been trained in but I’d only use it if 
there had been a major incident, whereas the 5 Whys method (Ohno, 1988) 
is probably a starting point for a nice and simple easy one. I think the more 
complex the incident you’d pull in more of the techniques to give you the 
answer.”  (Health and safety professional) 
In addition to whether an analysis method is used, the time and financial 
constraints involved in accident investigation can also affect how it is used. 
Several participants, for example, remarked that the depth of analysis they 
can achieve with their preferred technique is limited by the time available to 
them. 
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3.4.2. Model reliability 
If a systemic analysis technique is adopted by a practitioner there are factors 
related to reliability which will affect its usage. A number of participants 
remarked on the influence that an individual’s background and experience 
has on their analysis approach and how this can produce variation in 
investigation findings. Open discussions and analysis reviews which result in 
a consensus on the investigation findings can help minimise the biasing 
effects of individuals’ backgrounds; a process which is common with full-time 
investigators: 
“The inspector will do a very structured presentation to a group of inspectors 
where we challenge what he’s done, what he’s said and what evidence he’s 
got that’s sufficient to make the conclusions that he’s drawing together.” 
(Accident investigator) 
However, several participants commented on how the qualitative nature of 
the systemic analysis tools could increase the difficulty of reaching such an 
agreement: 
“If you turned up with an Accimap and said ‘the system is safe because I’ve 
analysed it in an Accimap’ you’d just get laughed out of the room. They’d pick 
it to pieces because it’s far more subjective.” (Human factors expert) 
3.4.3. Data requirements of SAA 
Several factors relating to the data requirements of SAA were considered by 
participants to impact on their ability to use the systemic analysis methods. 
For example, the system-wide data needed to perform SAA is not always 
available: 
“If I were to go and work in industry now I think I would have to revert back to 
more simple accident analysis methods just because the data wouldn’t be 
there to support them [the SAA methods].” (Researcher) 
Some practitioners mentioned that the accident information databases they 
are required to use employ coding taxonomies which reflect the theoretical 
(cause-effect) underpinnings of sequential techniques. This may influence 
the type of data that is collected and one individual observed that, even if 
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they gather data relevant to SAA, they must transpose their findings into a 
non-systemic format.  
These issues appear to stem, in part, from the fact that researchers and 
practitioners have fundamentally different approaches to analysis and 
therefore different data requirements: 
“Sometimes I do feel there is an important division between how practitioners 
and some academics treat accident investigation. We’re always looking at 
specifics and therefore evidence will some-times take us down a very specific 
path and we don’t need to consider the wider aspects and vulnerabilities of 
the system.” (Accident investigator) 
3.5. Organisational influences on the research–practice gap 
3.5.1. Organisational policy 
Some individuals have the freedom to choose which analysis technique they 
adopt and use. However, in many cases, organisational policy dictates which 
methods are used: 
“We tend to find that when people come here [for investigation training] they 
want to know all about the models and how to use all of them but often they 
go back to an organisation that says ‘this is what we use’ so they don’t really 
get the opportunity.” (Researcher) 
Practitioners who provide investigation services on a consultancy basis also 
commented that requests from some clients to use in-house analysis 
techniques can produce similar barriers to analysis tool usage. 
Organisational policy can also impact on the resources available for 
practitioners to learn and use new analysis methods and therefore create the 
issues described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.4.1. 
A link between safety culture and organisational policy was referred to by 
several individuals who observed that their analysis approaches were, in part, 
dictated by the senior management and the safety culture they instilled. A 
number of participants also commented that safety-related changes they 
recommended to senior management teams, such as introducing new 
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accident investigation policies, sometimes needed to be presented in cost-
benefit, rather than safety improvement, terms: 
“When I turned up at [company name] there was no health and safety. They 
didn’t care about which safety regulation said they had to do risk 
assessments. What I had to do was sell them the cost-effectiveness [of 
safety]. When I put it into a dollar sign they understood it and then their 
attitude became ‘this is good for the company and it prevents reputational 
damage as well.’” (Health and safety professional) 
3.6. Industry influences on the research–practice gap 
3.6.1. Regulatory requirements 
The degree of regulation within a given industry can have a large influence 
on what type of analysis techniques are used in accident investigation and 
risk assessments: 
“Regulators [in the nuclear industry] dictate exactly what methods need to be 
used and they’re very slow to update their opinions on these things.” (Human 
factors expert) 
“There is a degree of flexibility. No one is telling me that I have to use the 
Swiss Cheese model and that is it. This is an International Maritime 
Organisation resolution, don’t forget, and is not mandatory.” (Accident 
investigator) 
The comments of many practitioners indicated that SAA-based regulation is 
not in place across industry in general. This may be due to a lack of SAA 
awareness at the regulatory level, rather than a decision to reject it: 
“The regulation probably doesn’t recognise [the systems approach] or 
encourage it at the minute. I don’t know about the military or anyone like that 
but certainly in the railway industry it doesn’t seem to.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
3.6.2. Industry characteristics 
In addition to the regulatory environment of an industry, the suitability of 
performing SAA within a given industry may depend on a range of domain 
characteristics, e.g. degree of operational complexity: 
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“If you look at highly dynamic, very complex systems then the systems 
approach is more appropriate. If you’re looking at things like the 
manufacturing industry, it’s probably less appropriate, and things like the 
Bowtie method or something a bit more linear is probably more suitable.” 
(Human factors expert) 
“If you are in a highly defined, highly automated environment requiring 
software reliability, for instance in medical systems, then it makes absolute 
sense to use the STAMP technique. It’s an issue of horses for courses.” 
(Health and safety professional) 
3.6.3. Resistance to change 
The effort and cost of implementing an innovation, such as SAA, within an 
organisation or throughout an industry by means of new regulations can 
create resistance to change. This inertia can increase with the level of 
regulation: 
“Once you get a nuclear power plant licensed you don’t ever want to change 
it because you’ve spent so much money. So, by its very nature, a very 
heavily regulated industry cannot be innovative.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
“I would say changing anything in healthcare at a national level is really, 
really difficult. It takes a long time and there’s a lot of consultation involved. If 
we were going to change the way we work, there’s huge numbers of people 
who have a stake in what we do.” (Human factors expert) 
4. Discussion 
The topics presented in Section 3 describe a wide range of issues that can 
affect if, and how, research is applied by practitioners. When considering all 
of these factors together they can be viewed as providing a wider context in 
which the research practice-gap is played out. Whilst not an exhaustive list, it 
is believed that the range of themes included in Section 3 is comprehensive 
enough to provide an adequate representation of the gap. The findings are 
graphically summarised in Fig. 3, which is based on the evaluation 
framework derived from the work of Rohrbach et al. (1993) (see Section 2.5). 
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Figure 3 – The SAA research-practice gap 
Discussion on the features of the gap and the implications for SAA is 
provided in the remainder of Section 4. 
  
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L 
FA
C
TO
R
S
O
R
G
A
N
IS
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
FA
C
TO
R
S
IN
D
U
S
TR
Y
 F
A
C
TO
R
S
A
w
ar
en
es
s
A
do
pt
io
n
U
sa
ge
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
ce
ss
ib
ili
ty
D
em
an
d 
fo
r S
A
A
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
P
ra
ct
ic
al
ity
 o
f 
an
al
ys
is
 m
od
el
R
es
ea
rc
h 
to
o 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
D
is
re
ga
rd
 fo
r 
re
se
ar
ch
er
s
S
ub
-o
pt
im
al
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
G
en
er
al
 la
ck
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
C
os
t o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
V
ar
yi
ng
 le
ve
ls
 
of
 tr
ai
ni
ng
In
te
lle
ct
ua
l 
pr
op
er
ty
 
rig
ht
s
N
o 
de
si
re
 
fo
r c
ha
ng
e
O
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 
to
 s
ee
k 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
af
fe
ct
s 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
M
od
el
 
su
its
 w
ay
 
of
 th
in
ki
ng
C
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
fo
r u
se
r 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
Tr
ac
k 
re
co
rd
 o
f 
m
od
el
 u
sa
ge
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
ve
rs
us
 s
af
et
y
N
ee
d 
to
 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
C
re
di
bi
lit
y 
of
 m
od
el
A
do
pt
io
n 
af
te
r 
tri
al
 u
sa
ge
M
od
el
 
va
lid
at
io
n
Tr
ai
ni
ng
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
an
al
ys
is
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
P
er
so
na
l 
ad
op
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
E
m
pi
ric
al
 
ve
rs
us
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 
va
lid
at
io
n
M
od
el
 
re
lia
bi
lit
y
P
re
vi
ou
s 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
of
 a
na
ly
st
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l 
po
lic
y
Tr
us
t i
n 
m
od
el
D
at
a 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
M
od
el
 
se
le
ct
io
n U
sa
ge
 
re
so
ur
ce
 
co
ns
tra
in
ts
Le
ve
l o
f 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
m
od
el
 
se
le
ct
io
n
M
od
el
 
us
ag
e
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
S
A
A
D
at
ab
as
e 
de
si
gn
 
an
d 
us
e
P
ra
ct
iti
on
er
 
an
al
ys
is
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
S
A
A
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
R
es
ou
rc
e 
co
ns
tra
in
ts
E
xi
st
in
g 
in
-h
ou
se
 
m
od
el
In
du
st
ry
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
R
es
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 
ch
an
ge
S
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
270 
 
4.1. Issues associated with the research–practice gap 
The majority of issues raised by participants may contribute, at least in part, 
to a general gap between accident analysis research and practice. Therefore, 
these factors could hinder the success of any new analysis method, 
regardless of its theoretical under-pinning. What then are the characteristic 
features of the SAA research–practice gap? This question is explored further 
within the context of SAA awareness, adoption and usage in the rest of 
Section 4.1. 
4.1.1. SAA awareness 
The opportunity to learn about new analysis techniques, e.g. via training (see 
Section 3.2.3), access to and the communication of the relevant information 
(see Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5) will affect a practitioner’s awareness of any 
technique. However, it is worth commenting on how these issues relate to 
SAA. It is acknowledged within the literature that SAA requires extensive 
theoretical and domain knowledge, training and for-mal education (e.g. 
Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et al., 
2012a; Sklet, 2004). 
It is therefore conceivable that practitioners will only be made aware of 
systemic analysis tools in the more in-depth training courses. In addition, it is 
the belief of the authors that the majority of SAA information is presented via 
the scientific literature and at conferences. SAA has been presented at 
conferences (e.g. Kazaras and Kirytopoulos, 2011; Underwood and 
Waterson, 2012), however, as conferences appear to be the third most 
popular source of information for practitioners (see Table 2), it is arguable 
that SAA is not being promoted in the most effective way. 
The cost of training, scientific literature and conference proceedings can limit 
SAA awareness. However, information regarding SAA is freely available on 
the internet from sources such as Google Scholar, Nancy Leveson’s MIT 
website (http://sunnyday.mit.edu/) and Erik Hollnagel’s FRAM related website 
(http://www.functionalresonance.com/). This suggests that it is the issues 
surrounding SAA communication (see Section 3.2.5) that may be a more 
significant influence on awareness. Given that practitioners can lose interest 
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in research that is too conceptual it is possible that the considerable amount 
of accident causation theory present in the systems approach literature may 
dissuade them from learning more about SAA. 
4.1.2. SAA adoption  
As with the awareness of SAA, there are several factors related to the 
adoption of an analysis technique which are influenced by features of the 
systems approach. 
The importance of an analysis method’s usability was reflected in the 
comments of practitioners (see Section 3.3.1). Whilst there is varying opinion 
within the literature with regard to the usability of the systemic analysis 
techniques their use has been viewed in some cases as time-consuming (e.g. 
Ferjencik, 2011; Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et al., 2011). This 
issue can become increasingly problematic for individuals whose main 
responsibilities do not include the investigation of accidents, as they may 
have less time to conduct analyses. SAA may not be suited to and, therefore, 
adopted by them. 
The notion that more effective safety recommendations can be devised by 
the avoidance of blaming a suitable culprit is well established in the SAA 
literature (e.g. Leveson, 2004) and was echoed in the comments of several 
participants (see Section 3.3.3). How-ever, searching for human error makes 
it easier to find out who is responsible for an accident and various 
practitioners emphasised that demonstrating accountability, particularly from 
a legal or commercial perspective, is still an objective of accident 
investigation (Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2011). Therefore, practitioners may 
be incentivised to use non-systemic analysis techniques to ease the 
identification of culpable personnel (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). 
Most practitioners in safety-oriented businesses tend to prefer well 
established methods; a point which was raised by the participants 
(Johansson and Lindgren, 2008). Although STAMP, FRAM and Accimap 
have been applied across a variety of safety-critical domains this has mainly 
taken place within an academic context, e.g. accident analysis case studies 
(e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a). The comments of participants, therefore, suggest 
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that SAA methods will require considerable empirical validation within an 
industrial set-ting if they are to gain acceptance from practitioners (see 
Section 3.3.4). 
4.1.3. SAA usage 
If a practitioner takes the decision to adopt a systemic analysis method they 
are faced with several issues which can hinder the application of SAA. 
SAA is not a simple endeavour and requires significant analyst effort and 
access to various subject matter experts (Salmon et al., 2012b). SAA may, 
therefore, only be suited to major accident investigations where funding, time 
and personnel are sufficient to obtain the amount of information required for 
SAA. Indeed, both Leveson (2004) and Salmon et al. (2012b) suggest that 
the data requirements of STAMP and Accimap are only typically met via the 
comprehensive reports produced after a large scale accident. 
Furthermore, individuals may not be able to gain access to the data required 
for SAA. For example, such information may exist outside of the organisation 
‘affected’ by the accident (e.g. commercially sensitive documentation from an 
equipment supplier) or an individual may be in the ‘wrong’ position within an 
organisation to address the whole scope of an accident (e.g. unable to 
interview senior managers) (Dien et al., 2012). In addition to the varying 
levels of information access, the type of data that is collected can also 
influence the application of SAA. Accident data is reported, collected and 
compiled in databases over time in line with national regulations and 
established codification systems (Mullai, 2004; Mullai and Paulsson, 2011). 
However, in some cases these databases and coding schemes are not 
based around the systems approach (e.g. they just focus on local events at 
the ‘sharp end’ of a system) and the information required to populate them is, 
there-fore, unlikely to enable thorough SAA (Roelen et al., 2011; Salmon et 
al., 2012b). 
4.1.4. Organisational and industry issues 
A significant influence on a practitioner’s selection of a model is the safety 
culture of their organisation. The comments of a number of participants (see 
Section 3.5.1) reflect the findings of Lundberg et al. (2012), who suggest that 
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four aspects of safety culture can influence the decision to implement safety-
related changes: institutionalised low safety standards, prioritisation of safety, 
the decision making criteria to adopt changes and the level of resources 
allocated to implement them. These factors clearly apply to the 
implementation of any new analysis method. However it is arguable that, in 
some cases, obtaining organisational (or regulatory) commitment to making a 
fundamental shift to employ SAA may be harder than implementing a 
modification of an existing sequential technique. 
The comments from practitioners (see Section 3.6.2) indicate that, depending 
on the industry in question, the use of SAA may not always be appropriate. 
This notion is supported by Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) who suggest that 
systemic models are best suited to accidents within highly complex, 
intractable systems, e.g. nuclear power plants. Therefore, whilst the generic 
nature of the systemic models means that they can be applied in any domain, 
the notion that ‘one size does not fit all’ means that the resulting ‘competition’ 
from other analysis techniques represents a further barrier to SAA adoption 
(Mullai and Paulsson, 2011; Salmon et al., 2012a). 
However, although new models often criticise or even disqualify older ones, 
in reality these different techniques can complement each other due to their 
own strengths and weaknesses (Jacobsson et al., 2009). This issue has 
been examined in studies which combined systemic and non-systemic 
techniques (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012) and 
suggest that a more insightful analysis is achieved compared to that when 
using a single model. This indicates that aspects of SAA may be successfully 
utilised in many industries, regardless of their complexity. 
4.2. Does the SAA research–practice gap need to be closed? 
So far, this article has described and discussed a number of features that 
may prevent the use of SAA techniques by practitioners. An important 
question that naturally follows this discourse is ‘does the SAA research–
practice gap need to be closed?’ 
The proposed benefits of SAA presented in Section 1, i.e. gaining an 
improved understanding of accidents which may lead to more effective 
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recommendations, suggest that it should be. Research that has compared 
SAA methods with non-systemic analysis techniques indicates that these 
benefits can be achieved and, therefore, that SAA should be promoted 
throughout safety critical domains (see Section 1.1). Whilst sequential 
techniques may remain effective in certain circumstances, e.g. the analysis of 
less complex systems or of sub-systems/components, the ever-rising 
complexity of socio-technical systems suggests that the use of SAA will 
become increasingly important in the future (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; 
Salmon et al., 2011). 
However, the difference between SAA and the current practices of some 
accident investigators seems to be a subtle one. The Swiss Cheese model 
(SCM), which has been widely adopted in various industries (e.g. healthcare 
and aviation) is described as a sequential technique by some researchers 
(e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2011). However, it does provide a holistic 
multi-level analysis approach, as per SAA, and later versions of the model 
(see Reason, 1997) also take account of the fact that ‘active failures’ are not 
required for an accident to occur. Additionally, a number of organisations 
have purposely neutralised the language used in their SCM-based models to 
avoid attributing blame, such as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and 
EUROCONTROL. Even within the research community, confusion exists 
over whether the SCM is a systemic technique, as exemplified by 
researchers who cite it (and methods based on it) as such (e.g. Salmon et al., 
2012a; Stanton et al., 2012). Therefore, acknowledging the existence of a 
SAA research–practice gap seems to depend on which view of accident 
causation is taken by an individual. 
Despite this ambiguity, what seems clear is that SAA methods are 
theoretically capable of providing useful insights into complex socio-technical 
system accidents which are not generated by many traditional analysis 
techniques. Therefore, efforts to increase practitioner awareness, adoption 
and usage of SAA should be made. 
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4.3. Bridging the SAA research–practice gap 
Whilst one of the factors presented in Section 3 may be sufficient to prevent 
a practitioner from conducting SAA, it is more likely that they all, to a greater 
or lesser extent, combine to inhibit the application of the systems approach. 
So, if the SAA research–practice gap is to be closed, which of issues 
presented in Section 3 should be tackled? An initial step in answering this 
question can be made by considering the key themes contained in Table 1. 
The majority of these themes focus on two aspects: ensuring that the SAA 
methods meet the needs of the practitioners (themes 2–4, 8); communicating 
SAA research in a more effective manner (themes 5, 7, 9–12). 
In order to meet the analysis needs of practitioners, it must be established if, 
and how, the systemic methods need to be adapted to meet the demands of 
live investigations and accident trend analysis. This process has begun and 
discussions between the two communities are taking place, e.g. the annual 
STAMP and FRAM workshops organised respectively by Nancy Leveson and 
Erik Hollnagel. However, to the authors’ knowledge, practitioner feedback 
has yet to be widely publicised. Therefore, further efforts should be made to 
establish whether the SAA methods can be effectively applied in industry. 
Ideally, this work would involve recruiting accident investigators to use, 
evaluate and help refine the systemic techniques; a process that was also 
involved in successfully establishing other analysis methods, such as HFACS 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000) and Tripod Delta (Hudson et al., 1994). As 
indicated by the data presented in Fig. 2, the evaluations should initially focus 
on the methods’ usability, validity and the usefulness of their outputs. This 
process would bring the added advantage of providing a degree of empirical 
validation and help create the ‘track record’ desired by various elements of 
the practitioner community. Given that there may be reluctance to trial a new 
technique in live investigations, the use of high-fidelity simulated 
investigations would provide a suitable alternative. Research should also be 
conducted into developing industry-specific taxonomies for classifying 
contributing systemic factors to improve the reliability of the SAA methods 
and their suitability for multiple accident case analysis (Salmon et al., 2012a).  
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Achieving more effective communication of SAA research to practitioners can 
be accomplished via a number of routes. Table 2 suggests that, along with 
continued presentation of research at conferences, promoting SAA within the 
practitioner literature and professional institutes would increase the 
awareness of many practitioners. Steele and Pariès (2006) comment that 
successful communication of ‘less traditional’ perspectives on accident 
causality to practitioners target the layperson, convincingly summarise such 
ideas and make them seem like common sense. Information created for the 
practitioner-focused literature should be produced to meet these criteria. This 
may be particularly relevant for practitioners who only have a part-time 
involvement in accident investigation. Increasing the amount of SAA 
information provided in accident analysis training offers another important 
option for increasing awareness and adoption of systemic methods. Ideally 
this training would be conducted strategically to maximise its impact. As a 
starting point, the training should be provided to accident investigation 
trainers. This would utilise an existing net-work of professional trainers that 
can act as effective and efficient interface between the researcher and 
practitioner communities. Ideally, industry regulators and senior safety 
managers should also be trained in SAA. If the regulators and organisations 
formally adopt SAA then the need/requirement for individuals to employ 
systemic techniques in accident analysis will increase. However, until a SAA 
track record can be established in industry, it is unlikely that regulators and 
organisations will commit to formally adopt and use the systemic analysis 
techniques. Therefore, achieving this commitment is likely to be a long-term 
aim of bridging the research–practice gap. 
4.4. Can the SAA research–practice gap be closed? 
Whilst the proposed solutions described in Section 4.3 offer a means of 
bridging the research–practice gap, it may not be possible to completely 
close it. A number of researchers (e.g. Dekker, 2011; Stanton et al., 2012; 
Zio and Ferrario, 2013) are continuing to explore the nature of systemic 
accidents by considering the behaviour of ever-larger ‘systems of systems’. 
For example, the drift into failure concept proposed by Dekker (2011) 
promotes looking ‘up and out’ at various factors which operate at a global 
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level, such as sociological and political conditions, and how they affect 
system safety. Investigating and rectifying such issues is likely to remain 
beyond the scope of accident investigation, at least in the short term, due to 
a variety of issues such as resource constraints. There-fore, whilst is it is the 
role of the research community to further the understanding of systemic 
accidents, some of this knowledge may not be practicable to apply. However, 
efforts should still be made to bridge the research–practice gap so that SAA 
knowledge can be utilised when possible. 
5. Study limitations 
Given that this study utilised a non-representative convenience sample, as 
indicated in Section 3.1, a number of limitations were placed on the findings. 
For example, statistically testing the relative importance of themes identified 
by the participants or the differences observed across roles, industries and 
countries would not produce results that could be generalised. This means 
that the representation of the research–practice gap in Fig. 3 can only 
present the contributing factors, rather than their relative influence. However, 
the use of a convenience sample resulted from the resource constraints of 
the study rather than a lack of consideration of sample design. Given the 
number of people who are involved in accident analysis, achieving a 
representative sample from which results could be generalised would be a 
significant challenge. Despite the limitations imposed by the nature of the 
sample, the authors believe that the findings of this study offer some useful 
insights and direction for future work. 
6. Conclusions 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant concept within accident 
analysis research. Its application, via systemic accident analysis (SAA), 
supposedly provides an improved description of accident causation, avoids 
the incorrect apportioning of blame for an accident and helps inform more 
effective safety recommendations. However, despite the suggested benefits 
of SAA, evidence within the scientific literature indicates that systemic 
analysis models and methods are not being widely used in practice. This 
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implies that a research–practice gap exists which impacts on the awareness, 
adoption and usage of SAA. 
This study examined various issues stemming from both the research and 
practice communities which may hinder the application of SAA. Some of 
these factors are indicative of a general research–practice gap in accident 
analysis. However, others are more pertinent to SAA, such as its lack of track 
record within industry and the possible incentive to use non-systemic 
techniques to facilitate the attribution of liability. The benefits of SAA suggest 
that the research–practice gap should be closed. Efforts to bridge the gap 
should focus on ensuring that SAA methods meet the needs of practitioners 
and improving the communication of SAA research. 
Appendix A 
Interview questions 
Background information 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your current job title? 
3. What are the main duties of your current role? 
4. As a percentage, how much of your time is spent analysing accidents? 
5. How many years of experience do you have of analysing accidents? 
6. How many accidents have you analysed? 
7. What types of accidents have you analysed? 
8. Which industries did these accidents occur in? 
9. When would you be called into perform an analysis/risk assessment? 
10. In your opinion, what is the main reason why major accidents within the 
industry you work in? 
10.1 Why? 
The systems approach 
11. Have you heard of the systems approach? 
12. What is your understanding of the systems approach to accident analysis? 
12.1 How did you gain this understanding? 
13. Do you apply a systems approach to accident analysis? 
13.1 How do you apply it? 
14. What do you think the benefits of using the systems approach are? 
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15. What are the drawbacks of using the systems approach? 
The current approach 
16. When you perform an analysis, what steps do you go through? 
17. How much time is spent on analysing the data compared with its 
collection and report writing? 
18. What method(s) do you currently use to analyse accidents? 
19. What made you choose that specific method? 
20. What are the benefits of the method? 
21. What are the drawbacks of the method? 22. 
What other methods did you consider? 
23. Why is your current method better than the alternatives? 
24. When selecting a method what consideration do you give to: 
24.1 Validity and reliability? 
24.2 Usability? 
24.3 How it helps you generate recommendations? 
25. If I asked you to write a wish list of the features that your ideal analysis 
technique would possess, what would you write? 
Research–practice gap 
26. How do you keep up-to-date with new analysis theories and methods? 
27. What sort of input would you value from the researcher/practitioner 
community? 
28. What are the barriers which prevent the application of accident analysis 
research? 29. How do you think those barriers could be removed? 
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Appendix B  
Analysis 
tool 
I have 
never 
heard of 
it 
I have 
heard  of it 
but don’t I 
know how 
it works 
I understand 
how it works 
but I have 
never used 
it 
I have used 
it before but 
do not use it 
currently 
I 
currently 
use it 
STAMP      
FRAM      
Accimap      
Swiss 
Cheese 
     
MORT      
Fault 
Tree 
Analysis 
     
Domino 
model 
     
 
STAMP: Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
FRAM: Functional Resonance Accident Model 
MORT: Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
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Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese Model and accident analysis: A 
comparative systemic analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using 
the ATSB, AcciMap and STAMP models 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001457513002959 
Keywords: Systems thinking, Accident analysis, Swiss Cheese Model, ATSB, 
AcciMap, STAMP 
Abstract 
The Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) is the most popular accident causation 
model and is widely used throughout various industries. A debate exists in 
the research literature over whether the SCM remains a viable tool for 
accident analysis. Critics of the model suggest that it provides a sequential, 
oversimplified view of accidents. Conversely, proponents suggest that it 
embodies the concepts of systems theory, as per the contemporary systemic 
analysis techniques. The aim of this paper was to consider whether the SCM 
can provide a systems thinking approach and remain a viable option for 
accident analysis. To achieve this, the train derailment at Grayrigg was 
analysed with an SCM-based model (the ATSB accident investigation model) 
and two systemic accident analysis methods (AcciMap and STAMP). The 
analysis outputs and usage of the techniques were compared. The findings 
of the study showed that each model applied the systems thinking approach. 
However, the ATSB model and AcciMap graphically presented their finding 
sin a more succinct manner, whereas STAMP more clearly embodied the 
concepts of systems theory. The study suggests that, whilst the selection of 
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an analysis method is subject to trade-offs that practitioners and researchers 
must make, the SCM remains a viable model for accident analysis. 
1. Introduction 
The systems thinking approach to understanding socio-technical system 
accidents is arguably the dominant paradigm within accident analysis 
research (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012; Stanton et al., 2012). It views accidents 
as the result of unexpected, uncontrolled relationships between a system’s 
constituent parts with the requirement that systems are analysed as whole 
entities, rather than considering their parts in isolation (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). 
Traditional cause–effect accident models suggest that complex systems 
accidents are caused by events such as catastrophic equipment failure or an 
unsafe human action. However, as system complexity has increased over 
time, many accidents (e.g. space shuttle Columbia; Comair flight 5191) have 
not simply resulted from such trigger events. Instead these accidents emerge 
as complex phenomena within the normal operational variability of a system 
(de Carvalho, 2011). Describing accidents in a sequential (cause–effect) 
fashion is, therefore, arguably inadequate. It can also lead to equipment or 
humans at the ‘sharp end’ of a system being incorrectly blamed for an 
accident. This represents a missed opportunity to learn important lessons 
about system safety and how to prevent accident recurrence. 
The use of the systems thinking approach, via systemic accident analysis 
(SAA), attempts to avoid these limitations and it has been used as the 
conceptual foundation for various SAA methods and models, such as: 
AcciMap (Rasmussen, 1997); Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004); Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and 
Processes model (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004); systems dynamics simulation 
(e.g. Cooke, 2003);causal loop diagrams (e.g. Goh et al., 2010, 2012). A 
number of studies have compared SAA methods with established non-
systemic analysis techniques, such as the Sequentially Timed Events 
Plotting method (e.g. Herrera and Woltjer, 2010) and Fault Tree Analysis (e.g. 
Belmonte et al., 2011). These studies and others like them (e.g. Ferjencik, 
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2011) suggest that the SAA techniques do indeed provide a deeper 
understanding of how dynamic, complex system behaviour contributes to 
accidents. 
The academic debate on accident models is, however, a lengthy one with 
new models often criticising or even disqualifying older ones (Ghirxi, 2010; 
Jacobsson et al., 2009). A notable case in point can be found when 
considering the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) (Reason, 1990, 1997). 
1.1. SAA vs. the SCM 
Undoubtedly the most popular accident causation model, the SCM has been 
widely adopted in various industries (e.g. aviation and healthcare) (Salmon et 
al., 2012). Classified by some (e.g. Hollnagel, 2004) as an ‘epidemiological’ 
model, the SCM suggests that longstanding organisational deficiencies can 
create the necessary conditions for a frontline ‘active failure’ to trigger an 
accident. The presence of these conditions and events in the system 
represent the inadequacy/absence of defensive barriers (e.g. physical 
protection, training and procedures) designed to prevent accidents. The 
defences within a system and their associated inadequacies are graphically 
represented by layers of and holes in Swiss cheese (see Fig. 1). When the 
‘holes’ in a system’s defences align, an accident trajectory can pass through 
the defensive layers and result in a hazard causing harm to people, assets 
and the environment, as depicted in Fig. 1 (Reason, 2008, p.101). 
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Hazard
Accident
Layers of 
defences
Some holes due to 
latent conditions
Other holes due 
to active failures
 
Figure 1 – Swiss Cheese Model (adapted from Reason (2008)) 
The SCM has drawn criticism from a number of researchers (e.g. Dekker, 
2006, p.89; Hollnagel, 2012, p.14; Leveson, 2012, p.19) who describe it as a 
sequential technique which oversimplifies accident causation by not 
considering the complex interaction of system components. In addition, some 
authors (e.g. Dekker, 2006, p.89; Hickey, 2012, p.19) suggest that the 
sequential nature of accident causation is portrayed in the signature image of 
the SCM (see Fig. 1). The implication is that the SCM no longer provides an 
appropriate description of accident causation. 
Other criticisms of the SCM focus on its application. For example, some 
researchers comment on the model’s lack of specificity about a number of its 
features, e.g. how the holes in the layers of cheese line up and how this 
affects its ease of use (e.g. Le Coze, 2013; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). 
Furthermore, Shorrock et al. (2004) suggest that an overly prescriptive 
application of the SCM can lead to accidents being entirely (and incorrectly) 
attributed to senior management, i.e. overlooking the contribution of 
individuals at the frontline. 
1.2. Performing SAA with the SCM? 
The perceived drawbacks of the SCM (see Section 1.1) only represent one 
side of the academic debate, however. In contrast to the idea that the SCM is 
a sequential model, Reason et al. (2006, p.9) state that it describes accident 
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causation as the ‘unlikely and often unforeseeable conjunction of several 
contributing factors arising from different levels of the system’. In other words, 
events and/or conditions happen together to produce an accident. As per 
SAA, the SCM provides a holistic multi-level analysis approach and later 
versions of the model also take account of the fact that ‘active failures’ are 
not required for an accident to occur (see Reason, 1997,p.17). Furthermore, 
the connection made by the SCM between normative serialisation (i.e. 
cause–effect) and the temporal orderliness of events that occurred is entirely 
unintended (Reason et al., 2006,p.16). 
The SCM is underspecified but Reason et al. (2006, p.21) state that it was 
never intended to be a used as a detailed accident analysis model and that 
criticising it for a lack of specificity seems unjustified. Regardless, this issue 
has been resolved by the various methods which have been developed to 
operationalise its concepts such as HFACS (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003) 
and Tripod-Delta (Hudson et al., 1994). Additionally, a number of 
organisations (e.g. the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and 
EUROCONTROL) have purposely neutralised the language used in their 
SCM-based models to avoid attributing blame, an important aspect of SAA. 
Whist the development of accident models has been required to explain the 
increasing complexity of socio-technical systems, the introduction of a new 
model does not necessarily mean that existing ones become obsolete 
(Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008, p.37; Reason et al., 2006, p.21). Indeed, the 
SCM (and methods based on it) is still used by researchers to perform 
accident analysis (e.g. Szeremeta et al., 2013; Xue et al., 2013) with some 
suggesting that it offers a systemic view of accidents (e.g. Salmon et al., 
2012; Stanton et al., 2012). However, if the critiques of the SCM are justified 
then the continued use of this (arguably outdated) model means accident 
investigations may not achieve the necessary understanding of major 
accidents to prevent recurrence. Given that the SCM is in widespread use 
throughout various industries and SAA methods are yet to be widely adopted 
by practitioners (see Underwood and Waterson, 2013), the outcome of this 
debate has clear ramifications with regards to improving safety. Therefore, it 
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is important to understand whether or not the SCM can provide a systems 
thinking approach and remain a viable option for accident analysis. 
1.3. Study objectives 
The aim of this paper is to consider whether the SCM can provide a systems 
thinking approach to accident analysis. In order to achieve this aim, the paper 
has three main objectives: 
1. Analyse a major accident (the train derailment at Grayrigg) using three 
techniques: an SCM-based model developed and used by practitioners (the 
ATSB investigation analysis model) and two SAA methods predominantly 
used by the research community (AcciMap and STAMP). 
2. Compare the outputs and application processes of the models, via an 
evaluation framework, in order to examine their theoretical and usage 
characteristics. 
3. Reflect on the similarities and differences between the models and the 
implications for applying the systems thinking approach in theory and 
practice. 
The intention is to examine this issue within an applied context, rather than a 
purely conceptual one. By giving a practical example of how the SCM 
compares to SAA techniques, it is hoped that the paper will be able to 
demonstrate whether the SCM does apply the systems thinking approach or 
not. An overview of the three analysis tools, a description of the Grayrigg 
accident, details of the analysis processes and the model evaluation criteria 
used in the study are provided in Sections 2, 3, 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
2. The analysis methods 
2.1. ATSB investigation analysis model 
The ATSB investigation analysis model (referred to hereafter as the ‘ATSB 
model’) is a modified version of the SCM. As per the SCM, the ATSB model 
provides a general framework that can be used to guide data collection and 
analysis activities during an investigation (ATSB, 2008, p.36). However, 
various alterations to the original SCM were made by the ATSB to improve its 
usability and the identification of potential safety issues. Such changes 
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include an enhanced ability to combine technical issues into the overall 
analysis, the use of neutral language and emphasising the impact of 
preventative, as well as reactive, risk controls. To highlight the changes 
made, the ATSB (2008) presented a latter version of the SCM (see Fig. 2) 
and their adaptation of it (see Fig. 3). 
 
Figure 2 – Latter version of the SCM (adapted from ATSB (2008)) 
 
 
Figure 3 – ATSB adaptation of the SCM (adapted from ATSB (2008)) 
As indicated by Fig. 3, the ATSB model views organisations as goal seeking 
systems whose performance can become unsafe from the result of 
interacting events and conditions. In this situation, risk controls are required 
to prevent an accident from occurring or minimise the severity of its 
consequences (ATSB, 2008, p.36). These risk controls are akin to the layers 
of defences portrayed in Fig. 1.Whereas Fig. 3 highlights some of the 
changes that the ATSB made to the SCM, the official representation of the 
ATSB model which is used during investigations is presented in Fig. 4. 
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Figure 4 – The ATSB Investigation Analysis Model (adapted from ATSB 
(2008)) 
The model represents the operation of a system via five levels of ‘safety 
factors’, where a safety factor is an event or condition that increases safety 
risk (ATSB, 2008). The first three levels correspond to ‘safety indicators’, i.e. 
safety factors dealing with the individual or local aspects of an accident. The 
upper two levels address ‘safety issues’, i.e. safety factors associated with 
organisational or systemic issues. 
The ATSB model was selected for use in this study for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, although modified, it is based on the SCM and therefore, according to 
various SAA researchers (see Section 1.1), can be classed as a sequential 
model. Secondly, the model has been used in transport accident 
investigations by the ATSB since 2002 (ATSB, 2008). As such, the model 
has been empirically validated by a governmental investigation agency, 
which is highly regarded within the accident investigation community (ATSB, 
2008). Therefore, the ATSB model represents a ‘tried and tested’ analysis 
technique used by investigation experts. Furthermore, a publically available 
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description of the model and its use is provided by the ATSB (2008), thereby 
enhancing the reliability of its usage in this study. 
2.2. AcciMap 
The AcciMap, developed by Rasmussen (1997) and Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002) was designed to take a control theory-based systems 
thinking approach to accident analysis. Consequently, accidents are 
considered to result from the loss of control over potentially harmful physical 
processes. According to Rasmussen (1997), every organisational level in a 
system affects the control of these hazards and a vertically integrated view of 
system behaviour is required. The dynamic nature of socio-technical systems 
means that an accident is likely to be prepared over time by the normal 
efforts of many individuals throughout a system and that a normal variation in 
somebody’s behaviour can ‘release’ an accident (Rasmussen, 1997). The 
AcciMap was developed as a means of analysing the series of interacting 
events and decision-making processes which occurred throughout a socio-
technical system and resulted in a loss of control (Branford et al., 2009). To 
do so, it combines the classic cause-consequence chart and the Risk 
Management Framework (Rasmussen, 1997), which depicts the control of 
socio-technical systems over six organisational levels (see Fig. 5). 
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Figure 5 – AcciMap diagram format (adapted from Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002)) 
Although the AcciMap forms part of a broader risk management process, it 
has been used independently of this approach to analyse individual accidents 
(e.g. Salmon et al., 2012; Stanton et al., 2012) (Branford et al., 2009). The 
method was selected for use in this study for this reason and because: it is 
one of the most popular SAA methods; it has been used previously to 
analyse rail accidents (e.g. Branford et al., 2009; Salmon et al., 2013); 
guidance material is available which would improve the reliability of the 
analysis (see Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Underwood and Waterson, 
2012). 
2.3. STAMP 
The STAMP model, based on systems and control theory, focuses on safety 
as a control problem (as per the AcciMap approach). Emergent system 
properties (e.g. safety) are controlled by imposing constraints on the 
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behaviour and interaction of system components (Leveson, 2012). Three 
basic constructs are used by STAMP to determine why control was 
ineffective and resulted in an accident: safety constraints, hierarchical safety 
control structures and process models. 
Safety constraints can be passive, which maintain safety by their presence 
(e.g. a physical barrier), or active, which require some action to provide 
protection (i.e. detection, measurement, diagnosis or response to a hazard). 
Accidents occur only when system safety constraints are not enforced. 
Hierarchical safety control structures are used by STAMP to describe the 
composition of systems (see Fig. 6). 
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Figure 6 – General socio-technical system hierarchical safety control 
structure (adapted from Leveson (2011)) 
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Each hierarchical level of a system imposes constraints on and controls the 
behaviour of the level beneath it. Control (two-way communication) 
processes operate between system levels to enforce the safety constraints. 
Process models are incorporated into STAMP as any human or automated 
controller requires a model of the process they are responsible for controlling, 
if they are to control it effectively (Leveson, 2012).The STAMP model was 
selected for comparison with the ATSB model and AcciMap for several 
reasons. It is the most frequently cited SAA model and has been used 
previously to analyse rail accidents and incidents (e.g. Ouyang et al., 2010; 
Song et al., 2012) (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). In addition, detailed 
guidance on the application of STAMP is provided by Leveson (2012) and, 
therefore, would enhance the reliability of the analysis. 
3. The Grayrigg accident 
3.1. Case study selection 
The train derailment at Grayrigg was selected as the analysis case study for 
various reasons. Firstly, the event represented a major accident on the UK 
rail network; a complex system with many stakeholders, including 
infrastructure controllers, train and freight operating companies and 
maintenance contractor organisations. Therefore, it was appropriate to utilise 
systems thinking concepts to analyse the event. Furthermore, the rail 
industry in the UK is currently expanding and creating an increased usage 
demand on the network and continued pressure to reduce costs (Office of 
Rail Regulation, 2013). With these conditions, it is clear that safety research 
within this industry is an on-going requirement. This is evidenced by the 
current rail-based research within and outside of the UK (e.g. Dadashi et al., 
2013; Read et al., 2013; Salmon et al., 2013; Wilson, 2013). The accident 
garnered significant media coverage and resulted in Network Rail (the 
organisation that manages the rail infrastructure in the UK) receiving the 
largest fine imposed since the Office of Rail Regulation was established. As 
such, the derailment represents one of the highest profile accidents in UK rail 
history. Finally, the event resulted in a full investigation by the Rail Accident 
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Investigation Branch (RAIB), the independent railway accident investigation 
organisation for the UK. The RAIB investigated a wide range of factors 
across various parts of the rail network system, e.g. the activities of frontline 
staff, management teams and regulatory inspectors. Therefore, the scope of 
the investigation and the comprehensiveness of the final report (RAIB, 2011) 
provided a suitable data source for a systemic analysis. 
3.2. Description of the accident 
On 23 February 2007 an express passenger train derailed as it entered the 
points (known as Lambrigg 2B points) located near Grayrigg in Cumbria, UK 
(RAIB, 2011). Points are an assembly of two movable (switch) rails and two 
fixed (stock) rails which are used to divert vehicles from one track to another 
(see Fig. 7). For a detailed description of points components and operation 
see RAIB (2011, p.210–214). 
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Figure 7 – Layout of points showing switch and stock rails and stretcher bars 
(from RAIB (2011)) 
All nine vehicles of the train derailed, eight of which subsequently fell down 
an embankment with five turning onto their sides (see Fig. 8). The train was 
carrying four crew and at least 105 passengers at the time of the accident. 
One passenger was fatally injured; 28 passengers, the train driver and one 
other crew member received serious injuries and 58 passengers received 
minor injuries (RAIB, 2011). 
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Figure 8 – Aerial view of the derailed train (numbers represent train vehicle 
number) (from RAIB (2011)) 
The subsequent investigation determined that the train derailed as it passed 
over 2B points, which were in an unsafe state that allowed the left-hand 
switch rail to move towards the left-hand stock rail. The left-hand wheels of 
the leading vehicle were subsequently forced into the reducing width 
between the switch rails and derailed by climbing over the rails. All the other 
vehicles derailed as a consequence. The RAIB concluded that various 
operational and environmental aspects (e.g. the actions of the driver, the 
condition of the train, the weather) had no bearing on the accident (RAIB, 
2011, p.14). Therefore, the derailment was a maintenance related accident. 
The unsafe state of the points was caused by successive failures of all three 
permanent way stretcher bar (PWSB) assemblies and the lock stretcher bar 
assembly. Three factors were deemed to have combined to create this 
situation: (1) the failure of the joint connecting the third PWSB to the right-
hand switch rail which, together with (2) excessive residual switch opening 
(the gap between the rail heads of adjacent switch and stock rails on the 
closed side of points), caused the left-hand switch rail to be struck by passing 
train wheels. The resultant large cyclic forces caused rapid deterioration and 
the eventual failure of the remaining stretcher bars and their fasteners. (3) An 
inspection, scheduled for18 February 2007, which should have detected the 
degradation, was not performed. 
The omitted inspection was due to be undertaken by the local track section 
manager (TSM), who had volunteered to perform a routine visual check of 
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the track. The RAIB concluded that restricted track access (resulting from a 
change in access policies in 2005 and the reduced daylight hours in winter) 
and limited staff availability contributed to the decision of the TSM to combine 
his own supervisory inspection with a basic visual inspection. The TSM, 
however, forgot to complete the points inspection. This omission was not 
identified in the maintenance review meeting on the following day and the 
maintenance records were incorrectly updated to show that the inspection 
had been completed. These events, which reduced the likelihood of any 
corrective action being taken, were also considered by the RAIB to have 
contributed to the accident. 
A number of ‘underlying’ factors (which the RAIB associates with the overall 
management systems, organisational arrangements or the regulatory 
structure) were considered to have influenced the derailment. Examples 
include: (1) an incomplete understanding within Network Rail of points 
maintenance requirements, which resulted in an absence of clear, properly 
briefed standard for maintaining loose PWSB fasteners and residual switch 
opening; (2) the performance measurement of points was not based on a 
thorough understanding of risk and control measures; (3) underestimating the 
risks associated with the design of points with non-adjustable stretcher bars 
(as per the points involved in the derailment), which adversely affected 
inspection regimes, reporting of faults and maintenance activity. 
4. Methods 
4.1. Accident analysis process 
The ATSB model and STAMP analyses of the Grayrigg derailment was 
performed by the first researcher (Underwood), as per the processes 
described in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3. The AcciMap analysis of the accident 
was performed by the second researcher (Waterson) in accordance with the 
process described in Section 4.1.2. Both individuals (human factors 
researchers) have experience of applying accident analysis methods in 
various domains (e.g. rail, aerospace, healthcare) and used the RAIB (2011) 
investigation report as the data source for the analysis activities. The report 
was imported into NVivo 9 and the text contained within the document, 
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considered relevant to each analysis, was qualitatively coded (see Sections 
4.1.1–4.1.3 for further details). This coded information was subsequently 
used to create the various analysis diagrams to ensure a direct link between 
the text in the report and the analysis outputs. Upon completion of the 
analyses, the researchers exchanged and reviewed the outputs and any 
discrepancies or disagreements were resolved through discussion until 
consensus was reached, as per the approach taken by Salmon et al. (2012). 
As the researchers were familiar with all three methods and their application 
processes prior to commencing the study, it was judged that the cross-
checking process was sufficiently robust. Only pre-derailment events were 
analysed due to study resource limitations. 
4.1.1. ATSB model analysis process 
The guidance provided by the ATSB (2008) on the use of the ATSB model 
refers to its application within live investigations. Therefore, no specific 
guidance was available with regards to its use for the analysis of completed 
investigations. The analysis process consisted of applying the ATSB safety 
factor definitions, as a coding framework, to the information in the RAIB 
(2011) report (see ATSB, 2008, p.38–42). When a given piece of information 
was identified as a safety factor the text was coded with NVivo 9 and 
subsequently captioned, colour-coded and mapped on to the relevant section 
of an analysis chart, as per the format used by the ATSB (see ATSB, 2008, 
p.46). Relationships between the safety factors were represented by arrows 
to indicate the direction of influence, as per the ATSB (2008) approach. 
4.1.2. AcciMap analysis process 
AcciMap analyses have been conducted in various formats since the 
method’s creation. This prompted Branford et al. (2009) to develop a 
standardised application process for the method, aimed at improving the 
consistency of its usage. However, it was judged that this process was too far 
removed from the original format introduced by Rasmussen (1997), which 
has been used in more contemporary research (e.g. Stanton et al., 2012; 
Salmon et al., 2013).Therefore the guidance offered by Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002)was selected for use in this study. Information within the 
302 
 
investigation report was coded with NVivo if it described: (1) the topography 
of the accident scene; (2) a decision/action taken by an actor in the system; 
(3) a direct/indirect consequence; (4) a precondition requiring no further 
evaluation. This information was subsequently captioned, mapped on to the 
relevant sections of an AcciMap diagram and linked by arrows to represent 
the influence a given factor had on another, as per the format in Fig. 5. 
4.1.3. STAMP analysis process 
The process of applying STAMP to analyse an accident consists of nine 
stages and is defined by Leveson (2012, p.349) as the CAST (Causal 
Analysis based on STAMP) approach. The stages of CAST are summarised 
below: 
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the loss. 
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements associated 
with the hazard. 
3. Document the control structure in place to control the hazard and enforce 
the safety constraints. 
4. Determine the proximal events leading to the loss. 
5. Analyse the loss at the physical system level. 
6. Analyse the higher levels of the control structure. 
7. Examine the overall coordination and communication contributors to the 
loss. 
8. Determine the dynamics and changes to the system and its control 
structure over time. 
9. Generate recommendations. 
The first eight steps of the CAST process were completed in order, although 
this was not a necessity, as noted by Leveson (2012, p.350). The final stage, 
i.e. generating recommendations, was not performed as this was outside the 
scope of the study. The information required for each stage of CAST was 
used as a coding framework to facilitate the identification of relevant data 
within the RAIB (2011) report. For example, once a higher-system level 
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component had been identified, text was coded if it described the 
component’s: safety-related responsibilities; unsafe decisions and control 
actions; the reasons for the unsafe decisions/actions; relevant contextual 
information (as per stage 6 of the CAST process). 
4.2. Analysis model evaluation 
The analysis techniques were evaluated against two topics of interest: (1) 
coverage of systems theory concepts and (2) usage characteristics. When 
considering whether a model actually applies systems thinking, it is 
necessary to operationalise the key concepts of systems theory (Read et al., 
2013). Furthermore, using analysis techniques underpinned by systems 
theory does not necessarily mean that the systems thinking approach can be 
applied successfully, i.e. other characteristics of the methods which affect 
their usage must be considered. These systems theory concepts and usage 
characteristics are described in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and are graphically 
summarised in Fig. 9. 
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Figure 9 – Evaluation framework 
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This diagram represents the evaluation framework used to assess the 
outputs and usage of the models. 
The outputs and usage of the models were assessed by both analysts in 
relation to the components of the evaluation framework in order to facilitate a 
systematic comparison. As per the accident analysis, any disagreements in 
the evaluations were resolved through discussion until consensus was 
reached. 
4.2.1. The components of system thinking within accident analysis 
Systems thinking has been advocated in accident analysis research at least 
since the 1980s (e.g. Leplat, 1984). Defining the core components of the 
systems thinking approach, however, is difficult task as there appears to be 
no firm agreement amongst researchers (Waterson, 2009). Nevertheless, 
some broad interrelated themes can be identified within the literature. 
4.2.1.1. System structure 
Systems are generally based on a hierarchy of subsystems which are formed 
in order to perform specific functions (Skyttner, 2005). In order to understand 
a system, it is necessary to examine each relevant hierarchical level and its 
relationship with adjacent levels. Moving up the hierarchy provides a deeper 
understanding of a system’s goals, whereas examining lower levels reveals 
how a system functions to meet those objectives (Vicente, 1999). 
Furthermore, determining the boundary of a system, i.e. distinguishing 
between what is part of the system and what is part of the environment, is an 
important aspect of specifying its hierarchy (Jönsson, 2007, p.41). 
4.2.1.2. System component relationships 
The interaction of system components results in emergent behaviour, e.g. 
safety (Leveson, 2012). Therefore, socio-technical systems will display 
characteristics and operate in ways not expected or planned for by their 
designers (Wilson, 2013). Such behaviour cannot be explained by studying 
system components in isolation: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
A system must be studied holistically, i.e. all components, human and 
technical, need to be considered as well as the relationships between them 
(Read et al., 2013). 
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4.2.1.3. System behaviour 
Inputs are converted into outputs, via transformation processes, in order to 
achieve system goals, e.g. safe operations. System components must be 
controlled via feedback mechanisms when deviations in behaviour occur if 
system goals are to be reached and safety maintained (Skyttner, 2005). 
Dynamic system behaviour means that a goal can be achieved from a variety 
of initial starting conditions (equifinality). Alternatively, systems can produce a 
range of outputs from an initial starting point (multifinality). This dynamic 
behaviour also means that systems can adapt over time to changing 
conditions and may migrate towards a state of increased risk and drift into 
failure (Dekker, 2011; Leveson, 2011). Furthermore, system components do 
not operate in a vacuum and their performance must be placed within context, 
i.e. how local goals, resources and environmental conditions influenced their 
behaviour. 
4.2.2. Model usage characteristics 
Establishing whether a given analysis technique is theoretically underpinned 
by systems thinking concepts is only one factor that will determine if an 
individual can effectively perform SAA. A number of researchers have 
identified a range of other issues which can hinder the usage of analysis 
methods (e.g. Benner, 1985; Stanton et al., 2012; Underwood and Waterson, 
2013). 
4.2.2.1. Data requirements 
The output of any analysis is defined, in part, by the ability of a method to 
analyse and incorporate a given piece of evidence (e.g. photographic, 
documentary, witness testimony, etc.). Furthermore, the information that a 
method requires to produce a thorough analysis (e.g. data related to 
technical failures, human factors, organisational practices, etc.) can impact 
on the evidence collection process in an investigation. The importance of 
how a method processes information and its data requirements has been 
recognised in previous method evaluation studies (e.g. Herrera and Woltjer, 
2010; Stanton et al., 2012; Waterson and Jenkins, 2010). 
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4.2.2.2. Validity and reliability 
The closely related issues of validity and reliability are important factors in 
successfully applying any type of analysis method. Previous studies have 
acknowledged this significance by including validity and reliability (and topics 
related to them) as method evaluation criteria (e.g. Benner, 1985; Stanton et 
al., 2012; Wagenaar and van der Schrier, 1997). The need for valid and 
reliable methods was also identified as a requirement of practitioners, who 
are engaged in accident analysis, by Underwood and Waterson (2013). 
4.2.2.3. Usability 
The usability of an SAA technique will clearly affect whether an analysis is 
performed effectively and efficiently and, therefore, it must be easy to 
understand and apply. The availability and clarity of guidance material as well 
as the training and resources required to use SAA methods have all been 
cited as factors which can influence their usability (e.g. Branford et al., 2009; 
Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Stanton et al., 2012). 
4.2.2.4. Graphical representation of the accident 
The graphical output of a method also affects the ability of an individual (or 
team of investigators) to successfully perform an analysis. Graphically 
representing an accident has been considered to be useful by both 
researchers (e.g. Sklet, 2004; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) and 
practitioners (e.g. ATSB, 2008) for a number of reasons. For example, it can 
be easier to see the relationships between system components and identify 
gaps/weaknesses in the analysis. Charting an accident can also be useful for 
communicating the findings of complex investigations (ATSB, 2008). 
5. Findings 
5.1. Applying the analysis models to the Grayrigg accident 
5.1.1. ATSB model analysis output 
The analysis chart produced by the ATSB model analysis is presented in Fig. 
10. 
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Figure 10 – Chart of the safety factors associated with the Grayrigg accident 
(dashed lines indicate a possible but not probable factor/relationship) 
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The derailment of the wheels of the leading vehicle was the single 
occurrence event attributed to the accident. However, various technical 
issues were included in the analysis chart to represent the gradual 
deterioration and failure of the points which led to the derailment. These 
technical problems were also incorporated to more clearly describe the 
multiple interactions between them and the individual actions and local 
conditions associated with the accident. The chart shows that there were few, 
albeit important, individual actions/inactions that contributed to the accident, 
such as the missed inspection of the points by the TSM. Conversely, a larger 
number of local conditions and inadequate risk controls were identified as 
factors which negatively affected the work of the maintenance staff and 
condition of the points. However, as showman Fig. 10, some of the local 
conditions resulted from technical problems and individual actions. 
Few organisational influences were classified during the analysis. However, 
these factors were shown to have a wide ranging adverse influence on 
numerous risk controls. In particular, Network Rail’s approach to 
maintenance management was identified as a significant influence on the 
ineffectiveness of many risk controls. The analysis chart shows six levels of 
safety factors to account for the role that regulatory oversight played in the 
accident. Although this sixth ‘regulatory’ level goes beyond the official format 
of the ATSB model (see Fig. 4), charting the influence of the regulators has 
occurred in previous ATSB investigations (ATSB, 2008, p.46). Therefore, 
given that the RAIB investigated the actions of the regulator, it was deemed 
acceptable to incorporate the additional safety factor level. However, as 
indicated on the analysis chart, the actions of the regulator were not 
considered to have a significant impact on Network Rail’s maintenance 
management. 
5.1.2. AcciMap analysis output 
The AcciMap diagram resulting from the analysis is presented in Fig. 11. 
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Figure 11 – AcciMap diagram of the Grayrigg accident 
Similarly to the ATSB model analysis, the train passing over the failed 2B 
points and derailing were considered to be the critical event and its direct 
consequence respectively. Only two ‘equipment and surroundings’ related 
issues were identified during the analysis. However, they both influenced two 
key factors in the accident, i.e. the missed inspection by the TSM and the 
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movement of left-hand switch rail, which contributed to the points being 
impassable. Five human actor activities were included in Level 5 of the 
AcciMap diagram and focused on two important activities: (1) the reuse of 
threaded fasteners and (2) the undetected physical faults. These actor 
activities either directly or indirectly contributed to the physical processes 
associated with the points’ degradation. For example, the reuse of threaded 
fasteners directly contributed to the inability of the points to withstand the 
physical loads from rail traffic. Furthermore, the missed TSM inspection 
indirectly contributed to the failure of the points, as an opportunity to identify 
the required maintenance was missed. A relatively higher number of physical 
processes, in comparison with actor activities, were incorporated into the 
analysis diagram to describe the gradual deterioration and failure of the 
points. A number of influential decisions taken at Level 4 of the system, i.e. 
technical and operational management, were identified. These decisions had 
direct consequences which subsequently affected the physical processes 
and actor activities linked with the derailment, e.g. local track access policies 
restricted the time available to conduct inspections. Conversely, the risk 
assessment and maintenance management decisions attributed to the 
higher-level company management influenced numerous direct and indirect 
consequences. These consequences, in turn, either directly or indirectly 
influenced activities at the lower system levels, as shown on the analysis 
chart. The AcciMap diagram did not include Level 1 of the system, i.e. 
national government, as no information was available in the report to 
populate this section of the chart. Adapted from RAIB (2011, p.123–124).  
5.1.3. STAMP analysis output 
The first stage of the STAMP analysis, as described in Section 4.1.3, 
required the identification of the system and hazard involved in the accident. 
These were defined as the ‘UK railway’ and ‘train derailment due to failed 
points’ respectively. Two system safety constraints were subsequently 
associated with controlling the hazard: (1) the physical points components 
must operate within design limits; (2) maintenance and repair activities must 
correct any points defects. The hierarchical control structure, as it existed at 
311 
 
the time of the accident, consisted of multiple organisational functions which 
had a responsibility for ensuring safety on the railway (see Fig. 12). 
Network Rail
Maintenance
function
Senior Management
Engineering 
function
Physical 
equipment
Track Section 
Manager
Train movements
Track Maintenance 
Engineer
Joint Points 
Team
Signalling Maintenance 
Assistant
Signaller
Maintenance Delivery 
Unit Manager
Infrastructure 
Maintenance ManagerArea Track 
Engineer
Area Signal 
Engineer
Signal Maintenance 
Engineer
Territory Track 
Engineer
Territory Signal 
Engineer
Head of Track 
Engineering
Chief 
Engineer
Projects and 
Engineering Director
Deputy Chief 
Executive Officer
Chief Executive 
Officer
Maintenance 
Director
Territory Maintenance 
Director
Head of Signal 
Engineering
Depot Time Keeper
HMRI (regulator)
HQ maintenance team
Head of Maintenance 
Compliance and 
Assurance
Head of 
Maintenance 
Workforce Safety
 
Figure 12 – The control structure in place at the time of the Grayrigg accident 
Defining the control structure involves describing the roles and 
responsibilities of each component in the system, as well as the controls and 
feedback available to them. However, for the sake of clarity and because 
some of this information was not available in the RAIB (2011) report, this 
description has not been included in Fig. 12.  The proximate events leading 
312 
 
up to the accident are described, in terms of the condition of the points and 
the maintenance activities, in Table 1. 
Date Event 
1st December 2006 Supervisor’s inspection identified loose check rail bolts on crossing of 2B points 
6th-7th January 2007 Overnight repair of defects identified on 1st December 2006 
7th January 2007 Basic visual inspection identifies third PWSB right-hand bracket joint fasteners had failed and were renewed 
8th January - 12th 
February 2007 
Third PWSB right-hand bracket failed again, third PWSB 
subsequently fractures 
14th January 2007 Routine patrol reported no defects 
21st January 2007 Routine patrol reported no defects 
25th January 2007 Supervisor's inspection identified alignment defects with rectification required within six months 
28th January 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
4th February 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
11th February 2007 Routine basic visual inspection reported no defects 
11th-21st February 
2007 Second PWSB joints failed and PWSB missing from points 
18th February 2007 Missed basic visual inspection 
21st-23rd February 
2007 First PWSB and lock stretcher bar failed 
23rd February 2007 Derailment 
Table 1 – The proximal events leading to the Grayrigg accident (adapted 
from RAIB (2011 p. 123 -124)) (PWSB = permanent way stretcher bar) 
These events, e.g. the missed inspection on 18 February 2007, acted as 
reference points to begin the analysis of the derailment at the physical 
system level and the lower levels of the control structure. The subsequent 
analysis of the system components, considered to have had the most 
influence on the accident, is presented in Figs. 13 and 14. 
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Physical equipment
Safety requirements and constraints violated
• Enable trains to transfer between two sets of rails
• Residual switch opening of 1.5 mm
• No flange-back contact on the open switch rail
Controls
• Switch rails
• Lock stretcher bar
• Fasteners, brackets, bolts and torque nuts
• Switch rail extension piece
• Three permanent way stretcher bars (PWSB)
• PWSB-switch rail fasteners
• Detector rod
• Supplementary drive
Failures and inadequate controls
• Clamping force of third PWSB exceeded by the load imposed on the 
joint
• Unwinding of nuts from bolts 
• Failure and separation of third PWSB bar/right-hand switch rail joint
• Left-hand switch rail closes towards its stock rail
• Residual switch opening between 7-10 mm
• Increasing levels of flange-back contact
• Fracture of third PWSB
• Retention by the supplementary drive was lost
• Failure of rail brackets of first and second PSWB and their brackets
• Failure of fasteners common to lock stretcher bar and switch rail 
extension piece meant left-hand switch rail closure was undetected by 
signalling system
• Switch rail closed sufficiently to allow more than one of the train’s 
wheelsets to run into the narrowing track gauge between the two switch 
rails
Context
• PWSB on correctly set points have a long, albeit finite, life when 
subjected to normal service forces (in the order of tens of years)
• Points with non-adjustable PWSB bars can withstand forces from 
flange-back contact for a limited period of time only, which may be a 
matter of days depending on the degree of flange-back contact
• No evidence to suggest that any significant change in traffic took place 
at 2B points in the six months before the accident
Joint Points Team
Safety-related responsibilities
• Perform inspections and maintenance of the points 
• Rectify variety of minor points defects (but not stretcher bar 
bolts)
• Identify and report other defects and when no defects were 
found
• Walk through each section of track in the four-foot and observe 
the condition of the points components
• Observe rail condition, the presence of obstructions, the 
position and security of check rails, track geometry and track 
support
• Visually assess the free wheel clearance within points, and 
report for correction within 36 hours if less than 45 mm 
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• Re-use of threaded fasteners
• Patrollers who completed repairs to defects during or 
immediately after completion of the inspections did not record 
details of the defects and repairs on the inspection sheet
• Local custom and practice to not report when no defects were 
identified
• Patrollers differed in how they identified defects and recorded 
them on inspection record sheets
• Did not check residual switch opening
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• No Network Rail standards or procedures regarding the reuse 
of threaded fasteners
• No measurements were required as part of basic visual track 
inspections; inspection record sheets did not therefore provide 
a reliable guide to the extent of observed defects 
• All of the cracks within the PWSB swan neck assembly were 
not detectable by visual inspection until the PWSB section had 
fully fractured
• Loosening of nuts on the PWSB bracket-to-rail joint may not be 
immediately identifiable by visual inspection
• All of the PWSB fastener bolt preload is lost by the nut 
unwinding by 1/19 of a complete turn; ‘loose’ as defined by 
Network Rail was between ⅛ and ¼ of a turn
• The joint points team signal engineering team members had 
not received training on the setting up of the supplementary 
drive and the residual switch opening
• Basic visual inspection boundaries did not match those 
actually in use
• Discrepancy existed between the information generated by 
Ellipse (asset management system) and the actual work 
required
• No specific reference to checking the residual switch opening 
in the signalling maintenance specifications; staff had to refer 
to separate instructions which were not as readily available to 
them and whose content mainly related to installation rather 
than maintenance
• Signal engineers generally misunderstood that the residual 
switch opening setting was 6 - 8 mm and assumed that the 
required supplementary detection setting was the residual 
switch opening value
Context
• The patroller was not required to make measurements directly 
during the inspection.
• Track access restrictions meant that inspections and repairs 
were confined from first light to approximately 10:00 on 
Sunday mornings
• Patrollers had a range of inspection experience ranging from 
one and 34 years
• All eight patrollers had been trained, but in five cases their 
certificate of competency had lapsed
• None of the patrollers had a working knowledge of the relevant 
track maintenance standard but were aware of the contents of 
the associated work instruction and had access to that 
document
• A considerable amount of overtime for non-rostered staff was 
necessary to provide sufficient staffing for inspections
• Inspections were not always sufficiently staffedTrain movements
Track Section Manager
Network Rail management
 
Figure 13 – STAMP analysis of lower-level system components 
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Track Section Manager
Safety-related responsibilities
• Perform supervisor’s inspections
• Identifying work to be planned and carried out
• Review trends in condition
• Identifying items to be proposed for renewal
• Check that basic and special track inspections, maintenance 
and renewal work were effective
• Measurement free wheel clearance
• Determine and prioritise the actions needed to address defects 
identified
• Arrange entry of defects that required remedial work into Ellipse 
asset management system
• Manage track engineering staff in the joint points team
• Manage the competence of track engineering staff
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• Forgot that he had agreed to carry out basic visual inspection of 
track section, which included points, as well as his own 
supervisor’s inspection on 18th Feb 2007
• Produced a report for his inspection, using a template which 
referenced the supervisory inspection boundary at 23 miles 
1320 yards as the northern limit of his inspection, even though 
he had stopped 640 yards south of this point
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• Did not receive a copy of the inspection roster sheet, as per 
normal, and was therefore not reminded that he had agreed to 
inspect the points on 18th Feb 2007
• Began his inspection on 18th Feb 2007 with two specific 
objectives in mind: re-check a site of remedial tamping and 
inspect a section of track where severe rail head wear was 
occurring, i.e. possibly distracted from inspecting the points
Context
• Usually worked 50 to 60 hours per five day working week, 
including Sundays when rostered, to meet workload demands
• Did not manage to achieve all the inspections that he was 
required to do personally, although they were being carried out 
by his assistants.
• Volunteered to cover basic visual inspection the same time as 
undertaking a supervisor’s inspection in order to release two 
members of staff to undertake outstanding maintenance work
• Inspection and maintenance activity was undertaken at the 
specified frequency but was of varying quality, which affected 
the reliability of the outcome
Network Rail management
Safety-related responsibilities
• Specify and manage maintenance policies, regimes, work instructions, 
technical specifications and engineering standards
• Provide leadership and technical guidance to engineering and 
maintenance technical specialists 
• Accountable for the quality of technical advice and support provided to 
the business
• Ensure compliance of patrolling, inspections, examinations and 
maintenance to company standards and procedures
• Ensure infrastructure was compliant with company standards and 
available for operation
• Disseminate information regarding maintenance regimes throughout 
the organisation
Unsafe decisions and control actions
• No standards or procedures regarding the reuse of threaded fasteners 
were produced
• Evaluation of the effect of timetable changes did not consider or identify 
that any changes might lead to greater difficulty for maintenance and 
inspection staff in gaining access to the track
• Network Rail neither routinely nor regularly carried out surveys across a 
representative sample of point components to provide a reliable source 
of independent data on asset condition
• Management information systems (SINCS and Ellipse) were not 
configured to permit efficient analysis of types of failures and 
identification of trends across a large population of switches and 
crossings
• Management processes no longer required that independent 
inspections of asset condition were carried out, as had been the case 
when maintenance was carried out by contractors
• Key performance indicators did not include any specific reference to the 
condition of stretcher bars, brackets, fasteners or flangeway clearance
• Audit process did not include checks of asset condition or observation 
of inspection/maintenance activities
• Approach to the assessment of risk from points defects was based on 
the RSSB’s safety risk model and the linked precursor indicator model 
which did not provide an appropriate level of resolution to enable the 
risk impact of individual components to be identified or the input of data 
derived from ‘bottom-up’ analytical techniques
• Monitoring of the reliability of non-adjustable stretcher bar components 
was incomplete and it did not carry out a detailed assessment of the 
adequacy of the design and inspection/maintenance arrangements
Reasons for unsafe decisions and control actions
• There was an absence of awareness throughout Network Rail of the 
importance of the residual switch opening and its relationship with 
flange-back contact, and of the need to check and rectify residual 
switch opening
• Network Rail did not have any comprehensive data about the condition 
of stretcher bars, brackets and fasteners across its network at the time 
of the accident which contributed to an incomplete understanding of the 
performance of its switches and crossings assets at component level
• The high reliance on historical data at the system level and the limited 
application of predictive tools reduced the likelihood that Network Rail 
would recognise the performance of non-adjustable stretcher bar 
components as an important risk management issue
• Network Rail did not see switches and crossings with non-adjustable 
stretcher bars to be a significant risk, providing they were properly set 
up, maintained and inspected
• At all levels of the organisation, managers considered the tightening of 
bolts on stretcher bars to be a routine, normal activity that had always 
been undertaken by maintenance staff
• Understanding of the performance of its existing points with non-
adjustable stretcher bars was incomplete
• Senior managers had not recognised that at some locations the safe 
performance of existing S&C with non-adjustable stretcher bars had 
become over-reliant on routine inspection and maintenance activities
Context
• Inherited standards and working practices, e.g. joint points team 
working, from previous infrastructure owner, operator and maintenance 
organisation and sub-contractors 
• Network Rail standards for the maintenance of signalling assets 
recognised the value of predicting the hazards associated with failures 
of both systems and components (and failures to inspect or maintain), 
by using techniques such as failure modes and effects analysis, Hazard 
and Operability Study and Task Analysis. However, application of the 
standards was only mandated for changes to maintenance regimes, or 
for new assets.
• Until April 2006 there had been no requirement to report loose or 
missing bolts on stretcher bars. Once this became a requirement there 
is evidence of significant underreporting
Physical equipment
Joint Points Team
Train movements
 
Figure 14 – STAMP analysis of higher-level system components 
Many of the actions and decisions taken by the higher levels of the control 
structure were summarised by the RAIB (2011) as Network Rail’s 
management arrangements. Therefore, these higher level components were 
amalgamated into a ‘Network Rail management’ component in order to 
facilitate the analysis. A number of longstanding and proximal issues were 
identified whilst assessing the overall coordination and communication 
throughout the system. Respective examples include: no training was 
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provided to the maintenance teams concerning the required setting for 
residual switch opening; the points failure was undetectable by the signalling 
system. Network Rail experienced large changes to its control structure since 
it took over the running of the rail infrastructure in 2002. However, it was not 
possible to identify whether these changes resulted in the system migrating 
to a higher state of risk and increased the chance of an accident. 
5.2. Comparing the analysis models 
5.2.1. Systems thinking approach 
5.2.1.1. System structure 
All three techniques require the analysis of the whole system hierarchy which 
was responsible for preventing the accident, up to and including the 
regulatory level. However, the ATSB model and AcciMap require the 
description of events, actions and conditions, rather than system components. 
Therefore, their analysis charts provide little information about the structure 
of the system in question, or its boundary. Conversely, the STAMP analysis 
requires the documentation of the system control structure and provides a 
clear visual description of the system hierarchy. The boundary of the system 
(and those of its sub-systems) is defined by the boundary of responsibility for 
a given hazard and safety constraint. For example, the condition of the points 
was the responsibility of Network Rail, whereas the condition of the train 
involved in the accident was the responsibility of a different maintenance 
organisation (Alstom Transport West Coast Traincare Ltd.). 
5.2.1.2. System component relationships 
Each model requires the analyst to take a holistic view of the system, i.e. 
examining the interaction between the various elements of the system, albeit 
in different ways. The ATSB model and AcciMap analysis charts, rather than 
describing the system components and their relationships, show the outputs 
of these relationships and how they reduced system safety. By documenting 
the control structure, the STAMP analysis process shows the relationships 
between the various system components. The subsequent stages of the 
analysis then examine how the dysfunctional interactions between a given 
316 
 
component and the rest of the system contributed to its unsafe actions and/or 
decisions (see Figs. 13 and 14). 
5.2.1.3. System behaviour 
The ATSB model and AcciMap analysis charts describe (via the caption 
boxes) key input and output conditions of system components. The 
transformation processes, which convert the inputs to outputs, are indicated 
by arrows, although details of the processes are not provided. In keeping with 
its control theoretic underpinnings, STAMP describes system inputs as the 
information available to a given component and the control instructions it 
receives. Component outputs, e.g. unsafe control actions, are described as 
well as the reasons why they happened, i.e. why the associated 
transformation processes failed. 
Neither the ATSB model nor AcciMap require the analyst to state the safety-
related goals of the system. However, they are implicitly addressed, as the 
principal goal of the system is clearly the avoidance of the main 
occurrence/critical event. STAMP, however, explicitly defines the system- 
and component-level safety-related goals during the various stages of the 
analysis. 
The adequacy and impact of the controls and feedback within the system is 
addressed by the ATSB model via the analysis of the ‘risk controls’ created 
by the organisation. The same is true of the AcciMap method, although this 
information is presented in the decisions and/or consequences caption boxes 
across the diagram. However, the influence of missing/inadequate feedback 
on management activities and decisions is not included in either analysis 
chart. Examining the control and feedback in a system is a core requirement 
of the STAMP analysis process. As such, this is clearly documented in the 
system control structure and the detailed analysis of each component. 
The ATSB model prompts the investigation of how the system’s behaviour 
changed over time. This is achieved by examining and charting the proximal 
events and conditions that occurred locally to the accident site, as well as the 
organisational and regulatory factors that were created further back in the 
system’s history. This approach is also taken by the AcciMap method. The 
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requirement of STAMP to determine the proximal and historic events leading 
to an accident ensures that the changes in system behaviour are analysed. 
The context in which actions and decisions were taken by the various 
frontline system components are explicitly incorporated into the ATSB model 
via the description of the local conditions. Although the context in which 
organisational and regulatory issues were created is not present in the 
analysis chart, the ATSB suggests that this contextual information can be a 
useful addition to an analysis (ATSB, 2008, p.44). By describing pre-
conditions and the direct/indirect consequences created throughout the 
system, the AcciMap depicts the context in which decisions and activities 
took place at the various system levels. The local context in which system 
component behaviour took place is explicitly addressed by STAMP via the 
detailed analysis of the control structure (see Figs. 13 and 14). 
Given that accident investigation involves determining why a particular set of 
events and conditions contributed to an accident, the ability of the models to 
represent equifinality and multifinality is a moot point. A summary of the 
systems thinking approach comparison is provided in Table 2. 
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Systems thinking approach comparison 
Model 
characteristic ATSB model Accimap STAMP 
System 
structure 
Requires analysis of the whole system. Describes 
system as combination of events, actions and 
conditions. Little information about system structure 
or boundary provided 
Requires analysis of the 
whole system. System 
structure and boundary 
defined by hierarchy of 
components responsible 
for controlling safety 
constraints. System 
structure graphically 
described. 
System 
component 
relationships 
Takes a holistic view of the system. Describes the 
safety-related outputs of relationships throughout the 
system and their affect on other relationships 
Takes a holistic view of 
the system. Describes 
component relationships 
throughout the system 
and their impact on 
safety 
System 
behaviour 
Incorporates all aspects 
of system behaviour, 
although some are only 
partially described (e.g. 
feedback availability and 
context of behaviour at 
the organisational level). 
Short- and long-term 
system history is 
examined.  
Incorporates all aspects 
of system behaviour, 
although some are only 
partially described (e.g. 
systems goals and 
feedback availability at 
the organisational level). 
Short- and long-term 
system history is 
examined.  
Incorporates all aspects 
of system behaviour, 
which are described in 
the analysis output. 
Short- and long-term 
system history is 
examined.  
Table 2 – Systems thinking approach comparison 
5.2.2. Usage characteristics 
5.2.2.1. Data requirements 
Due to their holistic approach, all of the models require various types of data 
to be collected from all of the relevant parts of the socio-technical system and 
its environment. In practice, accident investigators will obtain this evidence in 
a variety of formats, such as photographic, documentary and witness 
testimony. A range of preliminary analysis activities is required to convert this 
data into a format suitable for the subsequent analyses (ATSB, 2008, p.49). 
This involves the use of techniques to interpret and organise data, e.g. 
employing photogrammetry to measure the distribution of a wreckage trail 
from an accident site photograph. The ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP 
analyses are, therefore, summaries of the findings produced by these more 
specific analytical processes. Consequently, the type of information that 
either model can analyse is not restricted by the original format of that data. 
More data is, however, explicitly required by STAMP, e.g. details on the 
system structure and components. 
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5.2.2.2. Validity 
Capturing all of the complexity in a large socio-technical system is seemingly 
beyond the capability of an individual analysis model and the resource 
constraints of accident investigation. Therefore, proving the internal validity of 
the three analysis techniques is not possible. In fact, the ATSB model does 
not attempt to describe all of the complexities involved in accident causation. 
Rather it favours providing a general framework that helps guide data 
collection and analysis during an investigation (ATSB, 2008, p.36). 
Conversely, AcciMap purposefully sets out to analyse the dynamic behaviour 
that exists within a system and how it contributes to accidents. Likewise, 
STAMP deliberately addresses how complexity within a system influences 
accident events. Regardless of these different approaches, each model was 
devised specifically for the purposes of accident analysis, is based on a 
recognised theory of accident causation and has been used across multiple 
domains, which suggests an acceptable degree of face and external validity 
exists. 
5.2.2.3. Reliability 
The qualitative nature of the models negatively impacts on their reliability. 
None of the techniques provide a detailed taxonomy of contributory factors, 
which further reduces their reliability and the chance to perform accident 
trend analysis. However, this also means the analyst has more freedom in 
how they classify such factors. It is understood that the ATSB use a 
taxonomy in their accident database, however, details about its content are 
not publically available (see ATSB, 2008, p.9). The reliability of the ATSB 
model and STAMP is, however, improved by the detailed descriptions of 
safety factors and accident causes and the model usage guidance provided 
by the ATSB (2008) and Leveson (2012, p.92–100). Therefore, both models 
are considered to have moderate reliability. The AcciMap guidance material 
(e.g. Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) provides little support in comparison, 
albeit that it slightly improves the chance of performing a reliable analysis. 
Therefore, the method was considered to have low reliability. 
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5.2.2.4. Usability 
Assessing how easy the analysis tools are to understand and apply clearly 
involves the subjective opinion of the user, an issue which is discussed in 
Section 6. However, a number of observations regarding the availability and 
clarity of the guidance material which supports the techniques can be made. 
The ATSB (2008) provide a substantial amount of information regarding the 
theoretical aspects of their model and how it can guide the collection and 
analysis of data in an investigation. Structured approaches for identifying 
potential safety factors and testing their validity are also given. The usage 
guidance provided for STAMP (Leveson, 2012) is also considerable and 
describes systems theory, how it is applied by STAMP and how to use 
STAMP to analyse accidents. Therefore, the analyst is provided with a body 
of information that can facilitate a more effective and efficient analysis. 
However, the ATSB model and STAMP guidance contains substantial 
amount of jargon, such as ‘safety factor’ and ‘safety constraint’, and the 
analyst is required to read a considerable amount of information to gain a full 
understanding of how to apply the models. The guidance available for 
AcciMap also provides detailed description about the conceptual aspects and 
purpose of the method, i.e. analysis of a system’s dynamic behaviour and the 
variable performance of its components. However, little guidance is provided 
about how to apply the method and, although there is arguably less jargon 
associated with the technique, it seems likely that the analyst would have to 
carefully study the available information to fully understand how to apply 
AcciMap. Whether the analyst is taught how to use any of these models via 
self-learning or a training course, conveying such a large amount of 
information will clearly require more time and funding compared with simpler 
analysis techniques. The holistic approach taken by the models also means 
significant resources will be required for data collection. 
5.2.2.5. Graphical representation of the accident 
The graphical output of the ATSB model, based on the AcciMap method 
(Rasmussen, 1997), provides a description of the accident scenario on a 
single diagram (see Fig. 10). The use of colour coding helps to distinguish 
between the various different types of safety factors presented on the chart. 
321 
 
The influence that a given safety factor has had on others is clearly indicated 
by arrows linking the caption boxes. Furthermore, by including the sequence 
of occurrence events leading up to the accident, the reader is provided with a 
sense of how the accident developed over time. In combination, these 
features provide a relatively simple means of understanding and 
communicating the findings of an analysis, albeit that knowledge of the ATSB 
model and its terminology is required to interpret the diagram. Similarly, 
AcciMap describes the accident scenario on one diagram (see Fig. 11), 
provides information about the proximal sequence of events (via information 
contained in Level 5 of the analysis chart) and the relative influence of the 
identified actions, decisions and consequences etc. Given that there is 
comparatively little jargon associated with the method, the AcciMap chart is 
also relatively simple to understand. However, the lack of colour-coding 
utilised by Rasmussen (1997) and Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) (see Fig. 
5) arguably increases the difficulty in reading an AcciMap analysis chart 
(additional colour-coding was implemented by the authors to ease the visual 
communication of the AcciMap findings).STAMP presents the findings of an 
analysis over several documents, some of which are mainly text based (e.g. 
Fig. 13), and does not lend itself to a simple graphical representation of an 
accident (Leveson, 2012, p.91). Therefore, graphical communication of the 
accident analysis findings is not performed as efficiently as the ATSB 
approach. A summary of the model usage characteristics comparison is 
provided in Table 3. 
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Usage characteristic comparison 
Model 
characteristic ATSB model Accimap STAMP 
Data 
requirements Data required from all system levels.  Compatible with all forms of data. 
Validity 
Provides a general 
framework devised for 
accident analysis. 
Underpinned by a 
recognised accident 
causation theory. Used in 
multiple domains. Face 
and external validity 
provided. 
Specifically designed to 
analyse the dynamic 
behaviour of a system. 
Underpinned by a 
recognised accident 
causation theory. Used in 
multiple domains. Face 
and external validity 
provided. 
Specifically designed to 
analyse the complexity in 
a system. Underpinned 
by a recognised accident 
causation theory. Used in 
multiple domains. Face 
and external validity 
provided. 
Reliability 
Qualitative technique 
with no detailed 
(publically available) 
taxonomy of contributory 
factors. Safety factor 
definitions and analysis 
process guidance 
provided. Moderate 
reliability achieved. 
Qualitative technique 
with no detailed 
taxonomy of contributory 
factors. Little analysis 
process guidance 
provided. Low reliability 
achieved. 
Qualitative technique 
with no detailed 
taxonomy of contributory 
factors. Structured 
analysis process 
guidance and 
classification of accident 
causes provided. 
Moderate reliability 
achieved. 
Usability 
Substantial guidance 
provided about the 
model, its application and 
safety factor identification 
and testing. Resource 
intensive to learn and 
use. 
Substantial guidance 
provided about system 
behaviour and the 
purpose of Accimap.  
Little application 
guidance provided.  
Resource intensive to 
learn and use. 
Substantial guidance 
provided about systems 
theory, its use in STAMP 
and the application of the 
model .  Resource 
intensive to learn and 
use. 
Graphical 
representation 
of the accident 
All (colour coded) safety 
factors, their 
relationships and 
proximal timeline 
included in one diagram. 
Effective visual 
communication of 
accident. 
All actions, decisions and 
consequences etc., their 
relationships and 
proximal timeline 
included in one diagram.  
Effective visual 
communication albeit 
lack of colour-coding 
reduces effectiveness. 
Findings presented over 
several documents.  
Model does not lend 
itself to simple graphical 
representation. 
Ineffective visual 
communication of 
accident. 
Table 3 – Usage characteristic comparison 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Comparing the analysis models 
6.1.1. Systems thinking approach 
The ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP all provide a systems thinking 
approach, i.e. they require the analysis of a system’s structure, the 
relationship of its components and its behaviour. However, there is a 
considerable difference between how the models achieve this. 
A number of the systems theory concepts are only implicitly and/or partially 
contained within the ATSB model. This is particularly true with respect to the 
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description of the system structure and its boundary, the impact of 
missing/inadequate feedback and contextual factors on the actions and 
decisions made at the organisational level (see Section 5.2.1). Indeed, the 
ATSB (2008, p.47) suggest that the model does not fully explain the complex, 
dynamic nature of accident development. Therefore, strict adherence to the 
format of the ATSB model may result in an incomplete application of the 
systems thinking approach. However, although such usage may prevent 
investigators from exploring all of a system’s complexity, the model does not 
preclude this in anyway either (Ghirxi, 2010). If investigators understand and 
apply the systems theory concepts during an investigation then the ATSB 
model can fulfil its intended role as a framework for analysis activities and act 
as a gateway to SAA (see Section 2.1). 
Similarly to the ATSB model, AcciMap implicitly or partially describes the 
system structure, its boundary and the impact of missing/inadequate 
feedback. It does, however, provide a clearer representation of the context in 
which managerial decisions and activities took place. Nevertheless, a 
prescriptive application of the method may also result in an incomplete 
systemic accident analysis. Some of the system theory concepts implicitly 
covered by the ATSB model and AcciMap would naturally be addressed by 
investigators, such as identifying the components involved in an accident. For 
example, an ‘individual action’ cannot be examined until the person who 
performed that action is known. However, without explicit instructions to do 
so, some information may remain uncollected and/or undocumented, e.g. 
missing/inadequate feedback. In the case of AcciMap, this problem can be 
overcome by using the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap techniques that also form 
part of the risk management process suggested by Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002, p.403). The ActorMap identifies the organisational bodies and 
individual actors involved in risk management whereas the InfoFlowMap 
graphically represents the communication between these decision makers. 
Whilst originally intended for use in risk management, these techniques could 
easily be utilised to provide information about the system components 
involved in an accident and any missing/inadequate communication. 
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However, the use of additional techniques has usage implications, which are 
discussed in Section 6.1.2. 
STAMP more clearly embodies the core components of systems theory (see 
Table 2). This is unsurprising, given that it was specifically designed to 
employ a systems thinking approach to accident analysis. Furthermore, the 
structured process for applying STAMP deliberately guides the analyst to 
consider these core components. By doing so, STAMP arguably provides a 
more effective means of applying the systems thinking approach. Therefore, 
when considering how much of the systems thinking approach could be 
applied during a live investigation, the difference between the models seems 
to be a small one. Instead, the more noticeable difference between the ATSB 
model, AcciMap and STAMP comes from how they guide investigators to 
apply the components of systems theory. The systems thinking approach 
comparison of the models is visually represented in Fig. 15. 
STAMPExplicit description of: • System structure• Component relationships
• System behaviour
ATSB model & AcciMapImplicit/partial description of: • System structure• Component relationships
• System behaviour
 
Figure 15 – Systems thinking approach comparison of the ATSB model, 
AcciMap and STAMP 
6.1.2. Usage characteristics 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the ability of an individual to employ the 
systems thinking approach depends on the usage characteristics of their 
chosen method. When comparing the models in relation to these 
characteristics, it appears that the data requirements, validity and reliability of 
the ATSB model and STAMP are not significantly different (see Table 3). 
Therefore, it is arguable that these aspects of the techniques will not 
necessarily hinder the application of systems thinking relative to one another. 
Whilst similar in its data requirements and validity, the arguably lower 
325 
 
reliability of AcciMap suggests that its application of the systems thinking 
approach may be more problematic. However, without formally testing the 
models, this evaluation is a subjective one.  
The usability of an analysis tool is affected not only by its features but also by 
the characteristics of its users (Thomas and Bevan,1996). Therefore, 
although aspects relating to the usability of the models seem to be similar, as 
mentioned in Section 5.2.2.4, any judgement about a technique’s usability is 
a subjective one. This is evidenced by the conflicting opinions regarding the 
usability of AcciMap and STAMP contained within the research literature (see 
Underwood and Waterson, 2012). The most significant usability issue 
encountered by the authors of this paper related to the classification of 
evidence. In the case of the ATSB model analysis, some of the safety factors 
did not neatly fit into one of the levels of the model. Similarly with the STAMP 
analysis, it was sometimes hard to distinguish between the reason why 
unsafe decisions and control actions were made and the context they were 
made in. Furthermore, the lack of specificity in the investigation report, 
regarding which elements of the Network Rail management contributed to the 
accident, made it hard to determine which AcciMap system level to attribute 
various decision/actions and consequences to. The application time of 
STAMP in this study was approximately double that of the ATSB model and 
AcciMap. This was attributed to the greater number of steps required to 
complete the STAMP analysis and the associated need for more information 
about the system structure and its components. It is considered by the 
authors that, had the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap methods been employed to 
complement the AcciMap and produce a more thorough analysis, the 
application time would have been similar to that of STAMP. 
The clearest difference between the models, in terms of their usage 
characteristics, lies in their graphical outputs. The ATSB model and AcciMap 
analysis charts provide a relatively succinct summary of all of the safety 
factors which contributed to an accident. This similarity is not surprising, 
given that the ATSB model charting format is based on the AcciMap. 
However, the different features of the underlying models do produce notable 
variations in the graphical outputs of the techniques. For example, the 
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authors believe that the ATSB model chart more clearly delineates the 
various events, activities and conditions that occurred at a local level. 
Conversely, incorporation of the Risk Management Framework (Rasmussen, 
1997) format enables AcciMap to provide a more detailed description of the 
accident across the different organisational levels of the system. In the 
ATSB’s experience, the use of their charting format has helped investigators 
maintain awareness of their progress during an investigation and assists the 
explanation of complex occurrences to industry personnel (ATSB, 2008,p.45). 
It seems likely that AcciMap would provide the same benefits, particularly if 
colour-coding was used to improve the effectiveness of its visual 
communication (as per Fig. 11). In the authors ‘opinion, STAMP would also 
enable an awareness of an investigation’s progress to be maintained. 
However, given that STAMP does not lend itself to a simple graphical 
representation of an accident, its usefulness in communicating an 
investigation’s findings to a non-expert audience may be limited (Leveson, 
2012, p.91). This problem may also exist if AcciMap were to be 
complemented by the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap techniques. The differing 
usage characteristics of the models are described in Fig. 16. 
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Figure 16 – Usage characteristic comparison of the ATSB model, AcciMap 
and STAMP 
6.2. Systems thinking and accident analysis: a trade-off 
Comparing the three techniques shows that there are a number of similarities 
between them as well as some important differences. Indeed, a comparison 
of any analysis methods would highlight various strengths and weaknesses. 
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It is clear that no single method can meet the needs of every analyst, 
otherwise there would be far fewer available. So, how does an individual 
select the most appropriate tool for a systemic analysis, if free to do so? A 
trade-off must be made between multiple factors associated with the 
requirements of the analysis and those of the user. These trade-offs are 
considered within the context of research and practice to help explain how 
the different needs of the two communities can affect the method selection 
process. 
6.2.1. Analysis trade-offs 
In any form of analysis, a compromise must be made between the 
thoroughness of the analysis and the resources available to complete it. 
Performing a systemic analysis of an accident is, by definition, a thorough 
process and, therefore, resource intensive. However there are some 
differences between the how the practitioner and researcher communities 
make this trade-off. Practitioners can be placed under intense amounts of 
pressure (e.g. commercial and legal) to provide an explanation for an 
accident (Hayward and Lowe, 2004, p.378). There is also a need to conclude 
an analysis quickly so that feedback does not come too late to be of any use 
and resource expenditure, which can be significant, can be optimised 
(Hollnagel, 2009, p.70). Therefore, practitioners are likely to require a method 
which provides a thorough enough analysis to generate useful safety lessons 
whilst also ensuring efficient resource usage. The ATSB (2008, p.47) claims 
that their model provides such a balance. Practitioner feedback on SAA 
methods, such as STAMP, AcciMap and FRAM, has not been widely 
publicised and, therefore, it is not possible (at present) to determine whether 
they can also satisfy this efficiency-thoroughness trade-off. However, given 
the similarities to the ATSB model (see Section 5.2), it is arguable that 
AcciMap may well meet this requirement. 
Whilst researchers are also required to make such a trade-off, the scope of 
their accident analysis is generally quite different. For example, accident 
case study analyses tend to focus on whether a given method can provide 
additional safety insights (e.g. Hickey, 2012; Stanton et al., 2012) or if it is 
suitable for use in a given domain (e.g. Kazaras et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
328 
 
there is significantly less external pressure on researchers to deliver a timely 
analysis. Therefore, there is a justifiable tendency to perform as thorough an 
analysis as possible. Furthermore, the cost of performing such research is 
small in comparison to an accident investigation so the need for efficiency is 
arguably less. It is possible that, due to the procedural requirement for an 
extensive analysis which incorporates all of the systems thinking concepts, 
STAMP may be a more attractive option for researchers conducting SAA. 
This is not to say that practitioners would find that STAMP does not provide 
an appropriate balance of thoroughness and resource requirements. 
However, in everyday practice the efficiency of a method often outweighs the 
drawback of reduced thoroughness (Hollnagel, 2009, p.132). AcciMap, as a 
standalone method, may be better suited for use by practitioners. However, if 
it is combined with the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap, the increased coverage 
of systems theory concepts may better meet the analysis needs of 
researchers. 
Practitioners and researchers arguably have some dissimilar requirements of 
their analysis method outputs too. For example, practitioners will often need 
to classify the various findings of their analyses via a taxonomy, in order to 
conduct trend analysis. Although accident trend analysis is a well-established 
part of safety research, there is not such a pressing need for researchers to 
conduct accident case study analyses with a taxonomic method. Therefore, it 
is possible that researchers are afforded a wider choice of methods, including 
the SAA methods, which are yet to have industry-specific taxonomies 
developed for them. 
6.2.2. User trade-offs 
The choice of method can be influenced by a number of factors, such as its 
usability and how it suits the user’s way of thinking (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). For example, it may be easier for someone to view safety 
inadequacies in a system as holes in allayer of Swiss cheese and, therefore, 
increase the chance of them using an SCM-based method (despite the fact, 
for example, that the ineffective safety constraint controls described by 
STAMP represent the same thing). The influence that an individual’s 
understanding of accidents has on their method selection is obviously 
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common to both researchers and practitioners. On this basis, it is not 
possible to say whether SCM-based methods would be favoured over SAA 
techniques by one or both communities. However, it should be noted that one 
of the reasons for the success of the SCM (and its related methods) is that it 
offers a simple, easily remembered description of accident causation 
(Reason et al., 2006, p.9). Therefore, it is likely that the SCM will continue to 
be a popular choice of analysis technique. 
The impact that a method’s usability (which is partly affected by its 
compatibility with a user) has on its selection by researchers and 
practitioners is slightly clearer to distinguish. As described in Section 6.2.1, 
researchers tend to focus on performing very thorough analyses of accidents 
and are subjected to less intense pressure to deliver a timely outcome. 
Therefore, it is possible that they are more able to sacrifice the usability of a 
method for the level of analysis detail it provides. Consequently, given its 
higher resource requirements and its less efficient communication, STAMP 
(or the combined AcciMap, ActorMap and InfoFlowMap techniques) may be 
better suited for use by researchers. 
Selecting a method with an established track record in accident investigation 
can also influence an individual’s choice of technique. Practitioners may be 
reluctant to try new methods in a live investigation, particularly if they are 
conducting accident investigation on a consultancy basis and need to 
establish credibility with their client (Underwood and Waterson, 2013, p.159). 
Therefore, the ATSB model may be a more suitable option for them. 
Conversely, the research community, when conducting academic studies, 
may be incentivised to use relatively untested and/or developmental 
techniques (such as the SAA methods) in order to advance the 
understanding of accidents. The different factors that affect the method 
selection of researchers and practitioners are represented in Fig. 17.  
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Figure 17 – Method selection trade-off factors 
The choice of analysis method is subject to a complex trade-off of various 
factors and, therefore, it is hard to prescribe any one method to a given 
individual undertaking an analysis. However, it may be that, in general, the 
SAA methods may offer a more suitable systems thinking approach to 
accident analysis researchers until their suitability for use in live accident 
investigations can bedemonstrated. 
6.3. Performing SAA with the SCM 
The discussion, so far, has focused on the similarities and differences 
between the ATSB model, AcciMap and STAMP. What implications do these 
factors have on the application of the SCM and the systems thinking 
approach? The modifications made to the SCM by the ATSB when 
developing their model (see Section 2.1) supplemented the concepts 
embodied by the SCM, rather than eliminate them. Therefore, as the various 
components of systems theory can be applied with the ATSB model, this 
suggests that the underlying SCM can also achieve this and act as a 
gateway to SAA. Consequently, it seems that the SCM does provide a viable 
means of applying the systems thinking approach. 
This statement, however, comes with an important caveat. As described in 
Section 1.2, the SCM is not a detailed accident analysis model, nor was it 
intended to be (Reason et al., 2006, p.21).Therefore, it should be applied via 
a method to ensure that the systems thinking approach is correctly utilised. 
However, this places an onus on the developers of SCM-based analysis 
methods to ensure that their techniques promote, rather than restrict, this 
application. This requirement is obviously true of any systemic analysis 
method. However, methods which explicitly incorporate the key concepts of 
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systems theory, such as STAMP, go some way to resolving this problem. 
Therefore, it could be argued that such SAA techniques represent an 
evolution, rather than a revolution, in the application of the systems thinking 
approach. 
6.4. Analysis and study limitations 
An important question in this type of study is whether any of the analysis 
techniques highlighted systemic issues that were not addressed in the 
investigation report. The findings presented in Section 5.1 indicate that 
insufficient information was provided in the report to complete the AcciMap 
and STAMP analyses. In the case of AcciMap this manifested as an inability 
to analyse the influence of the governmental level of the system, whereas it 
was not possible to examine the long-term changes to the system overtime 
with STAMP. Although the ATSB model analysis was relatively complete in 
comparison, the next stage of analysis would naturally be to examine why the 
organisational and regulatory issues existed. 
These limitations raise the important issue of when to stop evidence 
collection in an investigation. To fulfil the data requirements of AcciMap, 
STAMP and (to a lesser degree) the ATSB model, the RAIB would have 
needed to expand the boundary of the system they were investigating and 
look further back into the system’s history. The collection of this extra 
information may not have occurred fora number of reasons, e.g.: the 
resource constraints of the investigation; the analysis processes used by the 
RAIB did not need the information; the required evidence was not available. 
Even if one of the three models used in the study had been adopted by the 
RAIB, it is possible that resource constraints and/or evidence availability 
would have prevented a complete analysis. Therefore, suggesting that a 
more extensive SAA would have yielded more in-depth results, whilst true, 
does not necessarily account for the practicalities of accident investigation. 
Furthermore, the RAIB (2011) report was written for a general audience and 
therefore, it is unclear what information was left out of the report for the sake 
of readability, personal or commercial sensitivity, etc. 
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Due to the resource constraints of this study, only three analysis models 
were utilised. Therefore, comments about how the SCM and its related 
methods compare in general to the SAA techniques are not necessarily 
representative of all of the available methods. However, it is felt that the 
comparison of the methods and the trade-offs associated with their selection 
is indicative of the current state of accident analysis in research and practice. 
The resource limitations of the study also prevented the researchers from 
independently performing an analysis of the derailment with each model. 
Whilst this would have been the ideal approach to take, the authors consider 
that the analysis process employed in the study (see Section 4.1) was 
sufficiently robust and provides accurate findings. 
7. Conclusions 
The systems thinking approach is arguably the dominant concept within 
accident analysis research. Its application, via systemic accident analysis 
(SAA), supposedly provides an improved description of accident causation, 
avoids the incorrect apportioning of blame and helps inform more effective 
safety recommendations. Debate exists within the research literature over 
whether the popular and widely adopted Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 
provides an out-dated view of accident causation or remains a viable means 
of applying the systems thinking approach to accident analysis. This issue 
was examined by applying an SCM-based analysis model (the ATSB 
accident investigation model) and two SAA methods (AcciMap and STAMP) 
to the Grayrigg train derailment. A comparison of the analysis outputs and 
usage of the techniques showed that each model did apply the systems 
thinking approach, albeit in different ways. The ATSB model and AcciMap did 
not explicitly address all of the key systems theory concepts, but graphically 
presented their findings in a more succinct manner. Conversely, STAMP 
more clearly embodied the concepts of systems theory but did not provide a 
simple graphical representation of the accident. Given the differing nature of 
accident analysis within the practitioner and research communities, the trade-
offs associated with method selection suggest that ATSB model provides a 
suitable option for practitioners. Conversely, STAMP may be better suited for 
use within research. With the option to use it as a standalone method or in 
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combination with the ActorMap and InfoFlowMap techniques, the AcciMap 
method may more easily meet the needs of both parties. Finally, this study 
suggests that the SCM remains viable model for understanding accidents 
and that SAA methods offer an evolutionary progression, rather than 
complete transformation, in accident analysis. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Science Direct search for research-practice gap articles 
Total of 102 articles found for: pub-date > 2010 and title((research w/5 
practice) or (theory w/5 practice) w/5 (gap or divide)) 
26 articles related to research-practice gaps including (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013a) 
Web of Science search for research-practice gap articles 
Total of 414 articles found for: TS=(((research NEAR/5 practice) OR (theory 
NEAR/5 practice)) NEAR/5 (gap OR divide))  
Timespan=2011-2013. Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, 
CPCI-SSH, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, CCR-EXPANDED, IC.  
108 articles related to research-practice gaps excluding (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013a) and duplicates of Science Direct search results 
Science direct search for accident analysis and investigation research-
practice gap articles 
Two articles found for: pub-date > 2000 and title-abstr-key((research w/5 
practice) or (theory w/5 practice) w/5 (gap or divide)) and ({accident analysis} 
or {accident investigation}) 
Web of Science search for accident analysis and investigation 
research-practice gap articles 
Two articles found for:  TS=(((research NEAR/5 practice) OR (theory NEAR/5 
practice)) NEAR/5 (gap OR divide)) AND TS=("accident analysis" OR 
"accident investigation")  
Timespan=2000-2013. Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, 
CPCI-SSH, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, CCR-EXPANDED, IC. 
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Appendix 3.1 
SAA literature search string 
title-abstr-key(((accident* or disaster* or incident*) w/5 (analy* or investigat*)) 
AND (system* w/5 (theor* or approach))) 
SAA model identification search string 
title-abs-key(((accident* w/15 analy*) or (accident* w/15 investigat*)) OR 
((disaster* w/15 analy*) or (disaster* w/15 investigat*)) AND (model or 
method or tool or technique or framework) and system*) 
Model citation count search strategy 
• If the name of the model is a unique noun then search using that name 
• If the name of the model is not a unique noun then include the originating 
researcher’s name, e.g. STAMP and Leveson, to stop the search engines 
generating excessive numbers of unrelated articles 
• If the model name has an acronym, e.g. STAMP, then search for both the 
acronym and the full name 
• Include the terms accident*, disaster* and inciden* to filter out documents 
that are not related to accident analysis 
• If the model has no name or acronym then use the originating 
researcher’s name 
• Search for citations from the year the model was first published to prevent 
generating invalid search results from previous years 
Search strings for SAA methods other than STAMP, FRAM and AcciMap are 
not included in appendix, however, all searches followed the format 
described above. 
STAMP 
(accident* or disaster* or incident*) and (STAMP or Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes) and Leveson 
For Google Scholar search use: 
Exact phrase: Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
At least one word: accident* or disaster* or incident* 
339 
 
Published since: 2002 
FRAM 
(accident* or disaster* or incident*) and (“FRAM” or “functional resonance 
accident model”) and (Hollnagel or Goteman) 
AcciMap 
(accident* or disaster* or incident*) and (accimap* or “acci map”) and 
(Rasmussen or Svedung) 
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Appendix 4.1 
Study 2 sample demographics 
 
Figure 50 - Participant location 
 
 
Figure 51 - Industries worked in by participants 
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Appendix 4.2 
Study 2 Interview questions 
Background information 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your current job title? 
3. What are the main duties of your current role? 
4. As a percentage, how much of your time is spent analysing accidents? 
5. How many years of experience do you have of analysing accidents? 
6. How many accidents have you analysed? 
7. What types of accidents have you analysed? 
8. Which industries did these accidents occur in? 
9. When would you be called into perform an analysis/risk assessment? 
10. In your opinion, what is the main reason why major accidents within the 
industry you work in? 
10.1 Why? 
The systems approach 
11. Have you heard of the systems approach? 
12. What is your understanding of the systems approach to accident analysis? 
12.1 How did you gain this understanding? 
13. Do you apply a systems approach to accident analysis? 
13.1 How do you apply it? 
14. What do you think the benefits of using the systems approach are? 
15. What are the drawbacks of using the systems approach? 
The current approach 
16. When you perform an analysis, what steps do you go through? 
17. How much time is spent on analysing the data compared with its 
collection and report writing? 
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18. What method(s) do you currently use to analyse accidents? 
19. What made you choose that specific method? 
20. What are the benefits of the method? 
21. What are the drawbacks of the method? 
22. What other methods did you consider? 
23. Why is your current method better than the alternatives? 
24. When selecting a method what consideration do you give to: 
24.1 Validity and reliability? 
24.2 Usability? 
24.3 How it helps you generate recommendations? 
25. If I asked you to write a wish list of the features that your ideal analysis 
technique would possess, what would you write? 
Research–practice gap 
26. How do you keep up-to-date with new analysis theories and methods? 
27. What sort of input would you value from the researcher/practitioner 
community? 
28. What are the barriers which prevent the application of accident analysis 
research? 
29. How do you think those barriers could be removed? 
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Appendix 4.3 
Study 2 analysis model awareness table 
 
Figure 52 - Analysis model awareness table 
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Appendix 5.1 
RAIB (2011) investigation findings 
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Appendix 6.1 
STAMP workshop material 
 
Figure 53 - STAMP application process form 
 
Figure 54 - CAST step 1 and 2 form 
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Figure 55 - CAST step 5 form 
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Figure 56 - CAST step 6 form 
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Figure 57 - CAST step 7 form 
 
Figure 58 - CAST step 8 form 
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Appendix 6.2 
STAMP evaluation questionnaire 
 
STAMP Evaluation Questionnaire 
Your name: 
Your team number: 
During the previous three-day investigation exercise in Weeks 2 and 3 
1. What method(s) did you use to analyse your evidence? 
 
Before attending the Fundamentals of Accident Investigation course  
2. Were you aware of the STAMP method?  Yes [  ]  No [  ] 
3. Had you used the STAMP method ?  Yes [  ]  No [  ] 
Some questions about STAMP 
The following is a set of statements about using the STAMP method.  For each statement please 
say whether you: 
[6] – Strongly agree 
[5] – Agree 
[4] – Slightly agree 
[3] – Are neutral 
[2] – Slightly disagree 
[1] – Disagree  
[0] – Strongly disagree 
Put a tick in the appropriate box. 
 
4. STAMP is a suitable method for analysing  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
    accidents 
5. STAMP effectively describes the event timeline of  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
    an accident  
6. STAMP effectively analyses the contribution to an  
    accident from: 
a. Technical components, e.g. hardware, software  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
b. Human factors issues, e.g. workload, fatigue  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
c. Organisational issues, e.g. policies and procedures [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
d. Environmental issues, e.g. climate and noise levels [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
Strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
disagree Neutral 
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7. STAMP provides a comprehensive description  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
    of an accident 
8. STAMP effectively represents the relationships  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
    between system components (i.e. people and 
    equipment)  
9. STAMP correctly identifies the causes of an accident [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
10. STAMP could be applied to any type of accident [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
      in my industry 
Some questions about the usability of STAMP 
The following is a set of statements about the usability of STAMP.  For each statement please put 
a tick in the appropriate box 
 
 
11. STAMP is an easy method to understand  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
12. The terms and concepts used in STAMP are clear  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6]                       
      and unambiguous 
13. It is easy to identify the system safety requirements [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
14. It is easy to define the system control structure  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
15. It is easy to identify unsafe decisions    [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
      and inadequate control actions   
16. It is easy to describe: 
a. Dysfunctional interactions (e.g. communication flaws) [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
b. The context of decisions/actions taken by different [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
    system components 
17. STAMP is an easy method to use    [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
18. STAMP is easy to use in a team-based analysis [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
19. STAMP promotes team collaboration during analysis [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
20. A STAMP diagram is a useful communication tool [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
21. A STAMP analysis can be completed in an   [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
      acceptable timescale (remember that you had 
      more time to complete your analysis in Week 3) 
22. It would be easy for me to become skilled at  [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
      using STAMP  
23. I received sufficient training in the use of STAMP [0]     [1]      [2]      [3]      [4]      [5]     [6] 
      to effectively use the method 
Any other comments? 
Strongly 
disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
agree 
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Appendix 6.3 
STAMP workshop outputs 
Hazard 
Participant number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Trains operating 
during 
maintenance/people 
or equipment on 
track 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Incorrect use/failure 
of speed signage 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Adverse 
environmental 
conditions 
0 0 1 0   1 
Train derailment 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Brake failure 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Use of cumbersome 
equipment during 
repairs 
0 0 1 0   0 
Total 1 1 4 1 4 3 
Table 22 - Hazard identification7  
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System safety constraint 
Participant number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Speed 
restrictions 
Slow trains for 
inspection 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Stop trains for 
maintenance 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Personnel 
requirements 
Duties of signalman 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Flagman warns 
workers of train 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Signalman stops rail 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Use of flagman 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Use of signalman 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Procedures 
Daily train driver 
briefings 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Maintenance forms 0 1 0 2 0 0 
Procedures for 
control of track 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Request stoppage 
for maintenance 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Use of radio 
communication 
devices 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
Speed 
restriction 
signage and 
warning 
systems 
AWS to warn 
drivers 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Speed limit signals 
and AWS 0 3 2 2 0 1 
Warnings issued to 
train drivers 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 
Unscheduled train 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Levers to change 
status of track from 
green to red 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 7 7 6 6 4 1 
Table 23 - System safety constraint identification7 
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Physical control description 
Participant number 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Physical 
equipment 
AWS 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
AWS master switch 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Driver notifications 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Electrical train control 
system 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Flagman flag 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Flagman whistle 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Speed limit signs 1 2 1 1 1 0 6 
Train whistle 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Warning label on 
signal lever 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Work permit form 181 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Personnel Flagman 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Other 
Reliable supervisor 
required 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Semaphore signals 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Work permit form held 
by COSS and 
signalman 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 6 4 6 4 2 
 
Table 24 - Physical control description7 
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Physical system failures and inadequate 
controls 
Participant 
number Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Physical 
equipment 
failures 
AWS malfunction 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
AWS not installed 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Failure of electrical control system 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
No back-up electrical control 
system 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Speed limit signals not correctly 
installed 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Work permit form 181 open to 
interpretation 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Work permit was for inspection 
only 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Personnel 
failures 
COSS did not check speed limit 
sign installation 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Failure of engineers to follow 
procedures 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Failure of engineers to impose 
line blockage 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Failure of flagman to remain in 
position 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Failure of train drivers to adhere 
to speed limit 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Failure of train drivers to see 
speed limit signs 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Failure to change signal lever to 
stop position 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Flagman did not put up speed 
limit sign 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Flagman not in position 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Inadequate communication 
between train stations 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Local working arrangements 
voided use of train whistle 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Semaphore signal not activated in 
time 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Work permit form not 
communicated correctly 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Other 
Fatigue of workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Unscheduled train 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 9 3 5 7 2 
 
Table 25 - Physical system failures and inadequate controls7 
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Appendix 6.4 
STAMP evaluation questionnaire individual responses 
 
Figure 59 - STAMP evaluation questionnaire individual responses
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Appendix 7.1 
Examples of research-practice knowledge transfer events 
Astronomy: http://www.globalsciencecollaboration.org/Events/1st-
implementation-workshop-for-the-aerap-framework-programme-for-
cooperation 
Healthcare: http://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/index.php?pid=101&puid=243 
Human factors: http://www.ehf2013.org.uk/debates-discussions/ 
Multi-domain: http://www.university-
industry.com/pdf/Conference_Program_Final.pdf 
Rail: http://rruka.org.uk/events-activities/ 
Robotics: http://www.europeanrobotics12.eu/news/best-practice-for-
knowledge-transfer-and-industry-academia-collaboration-in-european-
robotics.aspx 
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Appendix 7.2 
System of systems definition 
 
Figure 60 - System of systems vs. large system definition. Adapted from 
Leveson (Leveson, 2013b) 
System A and System B can be considered to be in a ‘system of systems’ or 
part of the larger AB system. 
